Abbas vs. COMELEC

R.A. No. 6734 is constitutional; the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao depends on approval by a simple majority of votes cast in each constituent unit in a plebiscite—not a double majority of all votes cast across all units plus a majority in each unit—and Congress's determination of which areas share common and distinctive historical and cultural characteristics for inclusion in the autonomous region is a legislative prerogative whose wisdom the Court cannot review.

The Tripoli Agreement, signed on December 23, 1976, between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front, with the participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference, provided for the establishment of autonomy in the southern Philippines and enumerated thirteen provinces comprising the areas of autonomy. The 1987 Constitution, for the first time, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, directing Congress to enact organic acts for each region within eighteen months from the organization of both Houses. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989, with a plebiscite scheduled for November 19, 1989 in thirteen provinces and nine cities in Mindanao and Palawan.

The consolidated petitions were filed by taxpayers from Mindanao—Datu Firdausi I.Y. Abbas, Datu Blo Umpar Adiong, Datu Macalimpowac Delangalen, Celso Palma, Ali Montana Babao, Julmunir Jannaral, Rashid Saber, and Datu Jamal Ashley Abbas in G.R. No. 89651, and Atty. Abdullah D. Mama-o in G.R. No. 89965—seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from conducting the plebiscite scheduled for November 19, 1989 and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds for that purpose, and to declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The plebiscite was to be conducted in thirteen provinces—Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur—and nine cities—Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa, and Zamboanga—in implementation of R.A. No. 6734.

The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 fell into two general categories: first, that R.A. No. 6734 or parts thereof violate the Constitution, and second, that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The Tripoli Agreement, which took effect on December 23, 1976, provided for the establishment of autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity, and enumerated the same thirteen provinces as those later included in R.A. No. 6734. After the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment for respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision. Petitioner Mama-o subsequently filed a manifestation with motion for leave to file a reply and to open oral arguments, which the Court noted.

• Conflict with the Tripoli Agreement: Petitioners premised their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement, and that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with it.
• Unconditional Creation of Autonomous Region: Petitioner Abbas argued that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to constitutional provisions making creation dependent on the plebiscite outcome, citing Article II, Section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
• Improper Inclusion of Non-Muslim Areas: Petitioner Mama-o maintained that only provinces and cities sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage—specifically Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Maguindanao, and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato—should be included, and that Congress unconstitutionally expanded the scope by including areas not sharing those characteristics.
• Equal Protection Violation: Petitioner Mama-o alternatively argued that if non-Muslim areas were included, the scope should be further broadened to include the rest of non-Muslim Mindanao, claiming that excluding other non-Muslim areas denies them equal protection of the law.
• Free Exercise of Religion: Petitioners objected to the provision mandating that conflicts between the Muslim Code and national law be resolved by applying national law in Shari'ah courts, maintaining that Islamic law derived from the Koran is divine law that may not be subjected to "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas enumerated possible instances of conflict offensive to Muslim religious convictions.
• Unconstitutional Delegation of Merger Power: Petitioners impugned Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 for granting the President the power to merge administrative regions, a power not conferred by the Constitution, and argued it conflicts with Article X, Section 10 requiring a plebiscite for the merger of local government units.
• Oversight Committee Delaying Creation: Petitioners asserted that provisions creating an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer of powers, appropriations, and properties to the regional government would unconstitutionally delay the creation of the autonomous region, which under the Constitution takes effect upon plebiscite approval.

• Nature of the Tripoli Agreement: The Solicitor General asserted that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty—having not been entered into with a sovereign state nor ratified according to constitutional provisions—nor a binding international agreement.

• Tripoli Agreement as Standard: Whether the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land and whether conflicts between it and R.A. No. 6734 warrant enjoining the Organic Act's implementation.
• Unconditional Creation: Whether R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region contrary to the Constitution's plebiscite requirement.
• Plebiscite Vote Requirement: Whether "majority of the votes cast by the constituent units" requires a double majority (majority of all votes cast across all units plus majority in each unit) or a simple majority in each constituent unit.
• Legislative Discretion Over Coverage: Whether Congress acted within its discretion in determining which areas share common and distinctive historical and cultural characteristics for inclusion in the autonomous region.
• Equal Protection: Whether excluding other non-Muslim areas from the autonomous region violates the equal protection clause.
• Free Exercise of Religion: Whether the provision requiring application of national law in case of conflict with the Muslim Code violates the free exercise of religion.
• Merger of Administrative Regions: Whether the President's power to merge administrative regions under R.A. No. 6734 conflicts with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution.
• Oversight Committee: Whether the Oversight Committee provisions unconstitutionally delay the creation of the autonomous region.

• Tripoli Agreement as Standard: No. The Court found it neither necessary nor determinative to rule on the nature or binding effect of the Tripoli Agreement, as the Constitution itself provides the standard for evaluating R.A. No. 6734; even assuming the Tripoli Agreement is binding, as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734 but in the same class, making R.A. No. 6734 amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement as a subsequent law.
• Unconditional Creation: No. R.A. No. 6734 does not unconditionally create the autonomous region; Article II, Section 1(1) expressly refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution, and Article XIX, Section 13 incorporates the plebiscite requirement, making creation dependent on approval by majority of votes cast by constituent units.
• Plebiscite Vote Requirement: A simple majority in each constituent unit is required, not a double majority. The constitutional proviso—"provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region"—underscores that approval depends on the will of the majority in each constituent unit, not on the totality of votes cast.
• Legislative Discretion Over Coverage: Congress acted within its discretion. The Constitution lays down the standards for determining which areas should constitute the autonomous region, and the ascertainment of areas sharing common attributes is within the exclusive realm of legislative discretion, whose wisdom the Court may not review without violating separation of powers.
• Equal Protection: No violation exists. Equal protection permits reasonable classification, and the classification made by Congress was based on substantial distinctions set forth by the Constitution itself; any determination of which areas to include necessarily carries with it the exclusion of others.
• Free Exercise of Religion: Not ripe for adjudication. No actual controversy between real litigants exists regarding conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom; the Court may not resolve a merely perceived potential conflict between the Muslim Code and national law.
• Merger of Administrative Regions: No conflict exists. The merger referred to in R.A. No. 6734 concerns administrative regions—mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes—not territorial and political subdivisions; the constitutional plebiscite requirement for mergers expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays, not to administrative regions.
• Oversight Committee: No constitutional violation. The creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the plebiscite result; the Oversight Committee provisions do not provide a different date of effectivity but are aimed at effecting a smooth transition, causing no impediment to the operation of the Organic Act.

• Tripoli Agreement as Standard: The Court declined to rule on whether the Tripoli Agreement constitutes a binding treaty or international agreement, finding the question neither necessary nor determinative. The Constitution itself provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao, making the Constitution the proper standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734. Even assuming arguendo that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty, it would constitute part of the law of the land but would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734; rather, it would be in the same class as the latter, as both would be internal law. Accordingly, R.A. No. 6734, being a subsequent enactment, would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement. Only a determination that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in granting the reliefs sought.

• Unconditional Creation: Petitioner Abbas's contention that Article II, Section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 makes the creation of the autonomous region absolute was rejected. The questioned provision itself refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution, which sets forth the conditions for creating the autonomous region, and this reference cannot be glossed over. Additionally, Article XIX, Section 13 of the Organic Act incorporates substantially the same requirements as the Constitution, providing that the creation shall take effect only when approved by a majority of votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and that only provinces and cities voting favorably shall be included. Under both the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the single plebiscite is determinative of both whether an autonomous region shall be created and which provinces and cities shall comprise it.

• Plebiscite Vote Requirement: The Court resolved that the Constitution requires a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units, not a double majority. Comparing Article XVIII, Section 27 (ratification of the Constitution by "a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite") with Article X, Section 18 (creation of the autonomous region "when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite"), the difference in phraseology is significant. The proviso—"provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region"—underscores that the creation depends on the will of the majority in each constituent unit. Had the framers intended a total majority, they would have used the same phraseology as for constitutional ratification. The categorical language also reflects how the people understood the vote requirement when they ratified the Constitution.

• Legislative Discretion Over Coverage: Petitioner Mama-o's argument that only certain provinces possess the requisite common and distinctive characteristics was found untenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas sharing common attributes is within the exclusive realm of legislative discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would go into the wisdom of the law, which the Court cannot do without violating separation of governmental powers.

• Equal Protection: Petitioner Mama-o's alternative contention that excluding other non-Muslim areas denies equal protection was rejected. Any congressional determination of which areas to include necessarily carries with it the exclusion of others, and such determination constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative whose wisdom may not be inquired into. Equal protection permits reasonable classification, and the Court has ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The classification here was made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions set forth by the Constitution itself.

• Free Exercise of Religion: The objection to the provision requiring application of national law in case of conflict with the Muslim Code was rejected for lack of an actual controversy. Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and as a condition precedent, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. In this case, no actual controversy exists—there are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. The Court may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the Muslim Code and national law.

• Merger of Administrative Regions: The challenge to the President's power to merge regions under Article XIX, Section 13 was rejected. What R.A. No. 6734 refers to is the merger of administrative regions—Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region—which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided in the Constitution, it is traditionally lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of general supervision over local governments. The constitutional plebiscite requirement for mergers expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays, not to administrative regions, so there is no conflict.

• Oversight Committee: The challenge to the Oversight Committee provisions was rejected. Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the plebiscite result; if the Organic Act is approved by majority of votes cast by constituent units, the creation immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide a different date of effectivity, nor would the committee's organization cause an impediment to the Organic Act's operation, as it is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.

• Presumption of Constitutionality — Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Those who petition the Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. The Court applied this doctrine to find that petitioners failed to overcome the presumption attaching to R.A. No. 6734.

• Legislative Prerogative in Determining Areas for Autonomous Regions — The Constitution lays down the standards (common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics) by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. The ascertainment by Congress of the areas sharing common attributes is within the exclusive realm of legislative discretion, and any review of this ascertainment would go into the wisdom of the law, which the Court cannot do without violating separation of governmental powers.

• Simple Majority vs. Double Majority in Plebiscite — The constitutional requirement for creating an autonomous region—"approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite"—means a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units, not a double majority of all votes cast across all units plus a majority in each unit. The proviso that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably shall be included underscores that approval depends on the will of the majority in each constituent unit.

• Equal Protection Permits Reasonable Classification — The guarantee of equal protection is not infringed where the classification is based on reasonable and real distinctions. One class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on substantial distinctions. In this case, the classification of areas for the autonomous region was made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions set forth by the Constitution itself.

• Administrative Regions Distinguished from Territorial and Political Subdivisions — Administrative regions (Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region) are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes and are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. The constitutional plebiscite requirement for the merger of local government units applies only to the latter, not to administrative regions. The power to merge administrative regions is traditionally lodged with the President to facilitate general supervision over local governments.

• Actual Controversy Required for Exercise of Judicial Power — Judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. As a condition precedent, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist. The Court may not be called upon to resolve a merely perceived potential conflict, such as the hypothetical conflict between the Muslim Code and national law.

• "Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought." — This passage establishes the ratio decidendi on the Tripoli Agreement issue: the Constitution, not the Tripoli Agreement, is the controlling standard, and even a binding treaty would not be superior to a subsequent congressional enactment as internal law.

• "It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units." — This is the canonical formulation of the plebiscite vote requirement for creating an autonomous region, distinguishing the phraseology of Article X, Section 18 from that of Article XVIII, Section 27 on constitutional ratification.

• "The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers." — This passage articulates the doctrine of legislative prerogative in determining the coverage of autonomous regions and the limits of judicial review under separation of powers.

• "Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail." — This states the controlling presumption and the burden of proof in constitutional challenges, which the Court applied to dismiss the petitions.

• Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936) — Cited for the principle that judicial power requires an actual controversy as a condition precedent, and for the separation of powers doctrine limiting judicial review of legislative discretion.
• Morfe vs. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424 — Cited in support of the proposition that the ascertainment of areas sharing common attributes is within legislative discretion and for the presumption of constitutionality.
• Dumlao vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392 — Cited for the doctrine that equal protection permits reasonable classification, where one class may be treated differently from another based on reasonable and real distinctions.
• People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963) — Cited for the equal protection doctrine permitting reasonable classification.
• Laurel vs. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946) — Cited for the equal protection doctrine permitting reasonable classification.
• J.M. Tuason and Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 — Cited for the equal protection doctrine permitting reasonable classification.
• Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925) — Cited for the presumption of constitutionality of laws.
• Salas vs. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734 — Cited for the presumption of constitutionality of laws.
• Peralta vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30 — Cited for the presumption of constitutionality of laws.
• Tan vs. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677 — Cited for the requirement of an actual controversy as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power.

• Article X, Sections 15–21, 1987 Constitution — These provisions mandate the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, define the President's supervisory power, reserve ungranted powers to the National Government, require Congress to enact organic acts with the assistance of regional consultative commissions, condition the creation of autonomous regions on plebiscite approval by constituent units, set an eighteen-month deadline for enactment, enumerate legislative powers of autonomous regions, and assign peace and order responsibility to local police agencies and defense to the National Government. The Court relied on these provisions as the constitutional standard for evaluating R.A. No. 6734.
• Article X, Section 18, 1987 Constitution — Provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." The Court interpreted this as requiring a simple majority in each constituent unit, not a double majority.
• Article X, Section 10, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with local government code criteria and subject to plebiscite approval. The Court held this provision inapplicable to the merger of administrative regions, which are not territorial and political subdivisions.
• Article XVIII, Section 27, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Constitution takes effect upon ratification by "a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite." The Court compared this phraseology with that of Article X, Section 18 to conclude that the latter requires only a simple majority in each constituent unit.
• Article III, Section 5, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees free exercise of religion. Petitioners invoked this provision to challenge the Organic Act's mandate that national law prevail over the Muslim Code in case of conflict, but the Court found no actual controversy ripe for adjudication.
• Article VIII, Section 1, 1987 Constitution — Defines judicial power as including the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. The Court applied this to hold that the religious freedom challenge was not ripe, as no actual controversy existed.
• R.A. No. 6734 — The Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, enacted on August 1, 1989. The Court upheld its constitutionality in its entirety against all challenges raised.
• Article II, Section 1(1), R.A. No. 6734 — Declares the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite. The Court held this provision constitutional because it expressly refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
• Article XIX, Section 13, R.A. No. 6734 — Provides that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect when approved by majority of votes cast by constituent units in a plebiscite, and grants the President power to merge existing administrative regions. The Court upheld both aspects.
• P.D. No. 1083 (Muslim Code) — The Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Petitioners argued that requiring national law to prevail over the Muslim Code in Shari'ah courts violates religious freedom, but the Court found no actual controversy.
• Pres. Dec. No. 1 and Pres. Dec. No. 742 — Made the Integrated Reorganization Plan part of the law of the land, establishing administrative regions as mere groupings of contiguous provinces. The Court cited these to distinguish administrative regions from territorial and political subdivisions.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur. Melencio-Herrera, J., was on leave.