Abay, Jr. vs. People

An extrajudicial confession of a conspirator, when affirmed in open court during trial, ceases to be hearsay and becomes judicial testimony admissible against co-accused it implicates, and the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely.

Petitioners Rustico Abay, Jr. and Reynaldo Darilag were among ten persons charged with Highway Robbery/Brigandage for an armed hold-up of a Kapalaran Bus Line passenger bus on the South Luzon Expressway in Biñan, Laguna on February 17, 1994. Several of the accused, including the petitioners, were detention prisoners at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) at the time of the incident. Two co-accused, Isagani Espeleta and Cesar Camacho, were prison guards at the NBP alleged to have facilitated the temporary release of inmates to commit robberies. The Information charged the group with forming a band of robbers, armed with handguns and bladed weapons, who staged indiscriminate hold-ups along the highway on multiple dates in February 1994. The case was prosecuted under Presidential Decree No. 532, the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

On February 17, 1994, at approximately 7:30 in the evening, a Kapalaran Bus Line bus bound for Sta. Cruz, Laguna was traveling along the South Luzon Expressway in Biñan, Laguna when it was held up by an armed group. The robbers, numbering at least seven principals by direct participation and three by indispensable cooperation, were armed with handguns and bladed weapons and were aboard the bus and a backup owner-type jeep. The group seized cash and personal belongings from the passengers, including ₱3,500 from conductress Thelma Andrade, ₱30,000 in cash, $2,000 in dollars, and eyeglasses worth ₱5,000 from passenger Gloria Tolentino, and ₱120 from passenger Lilian Ojeda. During the robbery, passenger Rogelio Ronillo was shot in the neck, sustaining gunshot wounds that did not result in death only because of timely medical assistance.

An Information was filed on January 13, 1995, charging ten persons with Highway Robbery/Brigandage. Among the accused were petitioners Rustico Abay, Jr. and Reynaldo Darilag, both detention prisoners at the New Bilibid Prison, and co-accused Ramoncito Aban, Ernesto Ricalde, Ramon Punzalan, Ariston Reyes, Isagani Espeleta, Cesar Camacho, Leonardo Perello, and Danilo Pascual. The Information alleged that Espeleta and Camacho, both prison guards at the NBP, had taken advantage of their public positions by bringing out prison inmates and equipping them with deadly weapons for the robbery. All accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Ramoncito Aban later withdrew his plea and, on September 11, 1997, pleaded guilty to simple robbery, for which he was sentenced on the same date.

The prosecution presented three witnesses. Thelma Andrade, the bus conductress, testified that Aban took her collected fares at gunpoint and identified Rustico Abay, Jr. and Ernesto Ricalde as two of Aban's companions. Gloria Tolentino, a passenger, testified that someone shouted "hold-up" and ordered passengers to bow their heads; she obeyed but occasionally raised her head and observed that the man seated beside her, Ariston Reyes, took her money and jewelry and handed them to Reynaldo Darilag. She also identified Rustico Abay, Jr. as one of the robbers' companions. Ramoncito Aban testified that on February 22, 1994, Camacho and Espeleta took him and his companions — Ricalde, Abay, Jr., Punzalan, Darilag, Reyes, Perello, and Pascual — aboard Camacho's owner-type jeep to stage a hold-up. Aban stated that the February 22 hold-up was the fourth staged by the group, the prior three having occurred on February 11, 13, and 17, 1994, all carried out by the same persons using the same route and strategy. He identified Punzalan and Darilag as those who took the passengers' money and belongings during the robberies.

The defense presented the testimony of petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, their co-accused, and prison guard Genaro Alberto. All accused denied participation in the February 17, 1994 robbery. Abay, Jr., Darilag, Reyes, and Ricalde, who were detention prisoners, testified that they were confined at the NBP at the time of the incident. Pascual and Perello, both civilians, testified that they were at home. Genaro Alberto, a Bureau of Corrections prison guard, testified that during the 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. headcounts of inmates on February 17, 1994, no inmate was found missing. The RTC found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The Court of Appeals acquitted Espeleta, Camacho, and Punzalan for insufficiency of evidence but affirmed the conviction of petitioners Abay, Jr. and Darilag, along with Ricalde and Reyes.

• Credibility of Ramoncito Aban: Petitioners argued that Ramoncito Aban is not a credible witness and that his testimony pertained to an incident on February 22, 1994, not February 17, 1994 as alleged in the Information. They further contended that since Aban's testimony was found insufficient as to Espeleta, Camacho, and Punzalan (who were acquitted), it should likewise be held not credible as to them.
• Lack of Physical Evidence: Petitioners claimed that no physical evidence linking them to the crime was presented by the prosecution.
• Prior Acquittal in a Related Case: Petitioners pointed to a related case filed against them in Imus, Cavite, wherein they were acquitted, arguing that the prosecution's evidence was similarly deficient.
• Defense of Alibi: Petitioners faulted the trial court and the Court of Appeals for disregarding their defense of alibi, asserting that they were confined at the NBP at the time of the incident, as corroborated by prison guard Genaro Alberto's testimony that no inmate was missing during headcounts.
• Credibility of Andrade and Tolentino: Petitioners contended that the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino were incredible and unsubstantiated, pointing to Tolentino's failure to identify Punzalan in court and the witnesses' inability to identify all the accused.
• Coerced Extrajudicial Confession: Petitioners contended that the lower courts erred in relying on Aban's extrajudicial confession, which they alleged was coerced.

• Question of Fact: The Office of the Solicitor General challenged the petition on the ground that it raises a question of fact, not a question of law.
• Credibility of Aban: The OSG maintained that Aban is a credible witness whose testimony, together with those of Andrade and Tolentino, established petitioners' guilt.
• Alibi Cannot Prevail: The OSG argued that petitioners' defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of petitioners by credible prosecution witnesses who had no motive to testify falsely.
• Dissimilarity of Prior Case: The OSG observed that there was no showing that the amount and quality of evidence in the present case and in the case where petitioners were allegedly acquitted are the same, and noted that petitioners could have filed a demurrer to evidence if they believed the prosecution's evidence was deficient.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether petitioners may be convicted on the basis of the testimonies of Ramoncito Aban, Thelma Andrade, and Gloria Tolentino.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether Aban's extrajudicial confession, allegedly coerced, may be used against petitioners.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino are credible and sufficient to sustain conviction despite their failure to identify all the accused.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi, supported by NBP confinement and headcount testimony, should prevail over positive identification.
• Classification of the Crime: Whether the crime committed constitutes Highway Robbery/Brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The conviction was sustained on the basis of the corroborated testimonies of Aban, Andrade, and Tolentino, which agreed on essential facts and formed a consistent and coherent whole.
• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Yes. Aban's extrajudicial confession was affirmed by him in open court during trial, thereby ceasing to be hearsay and becoming judicial testimony admissible against the petitioners.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The failure of Tolentino to identify Punzalan and the witnesses' inability to identify all the accused did not dent their credibility, given that passengers were ordered to bow their heads during the robbery and years had elapsed before they testified.
• Defense of Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses, especially where it was not physically impossible for petitioners to be at the crime scene, their place of detention being less than an hour's ride away.
• Classification of the Crime: Yes. The elements of Highway Robbery/Brigandage under P.D. No. 532 were established: the group was organized for the purpose of committing robbery on a highway, and the victims were chosen indiscriminately, not predetermined.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The Court found that the testimonies of Andrade, Tolentino, and Aban corroborated each other and agreed on the essential facts, forming a consistent and coherent whole. Petitioners were not similarly situated to their acquitted co-accused Espeleta, Camacho, and Punzalan, because while only Aban testified as to those three, the petitioners' participation was additionally established by the eyewitness testimony of Andrade and Tolentino, who positively identified them in open court. The absence of physical evidence did not adversely affect the weight of the prosecution's evidence, as physical evidence would have been merely corroborative given the credible eyewitness testimony. The prior acquittal in a related case in Imus, Cavite was deemed irrelevant, there being no showing that the amount and quality of evidence in both cases were the same; moreover, petitioners did not file a demurrer to evidence if they truly believed the prosecution's evidence was deficient.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The Court clarified that it was not Aban's extrajudicial confession per se but his court testimony reiterating his declarations in that confession that was instrumental in convicting the petitioners. Citing settled doctrine, when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at trial, it ceases to be hearsay and becomes a judicial admission — testimony of an eyewitness admissible against those it implicates. Since Aban affirmed his extrajudicial confession in open court, it partook of judicial testimony admissible against the petitioners.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court found untenable the petitioners' claim that the testimonies of Andrade and Tolentino were incredible. The failure of Tolentino to identify Punzalan in court did not dent her credibility, as years had elapsed before she testified. The witnesses' inability to identify all the accused was logical and expected, as the robbers ordered passengers to bow their heads, and the witnesses could only raise their heads from time to time. No dubious reason or improper motive was established to render the testimonies of Andrade, Tolentino, and Aban false or unbelievable; absent compelling reason, it was highly inconceivable why they would openly concoct a story sending innocent men to jail.

• Defense of Alibi: The Court agreed with the OSG that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable because it can be easily fabricated, and it becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification by credible witnesses without motive to testify falsely. For alibi to prosper, it must be clearly and indisputably demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at or near the scene of the crime. Here, petitioners' alibi rested solely on their own self-serving testimonies, and the trial court correctly ruled it was not impossible for them to be at the crime scene, as their place of detention was less than an hour's ride away.

• Classification of the Crime: The Court applied Section 2(e) of P.D. No. 532, defining Highway Robbery/Brigandage as the taking of property by means of violence or intimidation committed by any person on any Philippine highway. Citing People vs. Puno, the Court emphasized that the purpose of brigandage is indiscriminate highway robbery; if the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery or robbery in band. P.D. No. 532 punishes only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person on Philippine highways, not acts committed against a predetermined or particular victim. Both elements were satisfied: the group was organized for the purpose of committing robbery on a highway, and the Kapalaran bus was chosen indiscriminately upon reaching their agreed destination at Alabang, Muntinlupa.

• Extrajudicial Confession of a Conspirator Confirmed at Trial — When the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay and becomes a judicial admission, being testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates. The Court applied this doctrine to Aban's extrajudicial confession, which he affirmed in open court, thereby making it admissible against petitioners as co-participants.

• Alibi as a Weak Defense — The defense of alibi must be received with suspicion and caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can be easily fabricated. Alibi becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely. For alibi to prosper, it must be clearly and indisputably demonstrated that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at or near the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The Court rejected petitioners' alibi because their detention facility was less than an hour's ride from the crime scene, and their alibi rested solely on self-serving testimonies.

• Highway Robbery/Brigandage Under P.D. No. 532 — Highway Robbery/Brigandage is the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion, or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things, committed by any person on any Philippine highway. P.D. No. 532 punishes only acts of robbery perpetrated indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways, not acts committed against a predetermined or particular victim. The elements found satisfied were: (1) the group was organized for the purpose of committing robbery on a highway, and (2) there was no predetermined victim — the bus was chosen indiscriminately.

• "Settled is the rule that when the extrajudicial admission of a conspirator is confirmed at the trial, it ceases to be hearsay. It becomes instead a judicial admission, being a testimony of an eyewitness admissible in evidence against those it implicates." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on the admissibility of a co-conspirator's extrajudicial confession when affirmed in open court, forming a key basis for the petitioners' conviction.

• "Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification of the accused. An alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the petitioners by credible witnesses who have no motive to testify falsely." — This is the canonical formulation of the alibi doctrine as applied in this case, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the relative weight of alibi versus positive identification.

• "In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants…" — Quoted from People vs. Puno, this passage defines the distinguishing feature of highway robbery/brigandage under P.D. No. 532: the indiscriminate nature of the targeting, as opposed to a predetermination of the victim.

• People vs. Silan, G.R. No. 116011, March 7, 1996, 254 SCRA 491 — Cited for the doctrine that an extrajudicial admission of a conspirator confirmed at trial ceases to be hearsay and becomes a judicial admission admissible against co-accused.
• People vs. Victor, G.R. Nos. 75154-55, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 818 — Cited alongside Silan for the same doctrine on extrajudicial confessions of conspirators.
• People vs. Tuppal, G.R. Nos. 137982-85, January 13, 2003, 395 SCRA 72 — Cited for the proposition that alibi must be received with suspicion and caution, being inherently weak, unreliable, and easily fabricated.
• Vergara vs. People, G.R. No. 128720, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 313 — Cited for the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by credible witnesses without motive to testify falsely.
• People vs. Puno, G.R. No. 97471, February 17, 1993, 219 SCRA 85 — Cited as controlling authority on the definition and distinguishing features of Highway Robbery/Brigandage under P.D. No. 532, particularly the requirement of indiscriminate targeting.

• Section 2(e), Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) — Defines Highway Robbery/Brigandage as the seizure of any person for ransom, extortion, or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway. The Court applied this provision to classify the accused's acts as highway robbery, finding that the group was organized to commit robbery indiscriminately on a highway.

Conchita Carpio Morales, Dante O. Tinga, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Arturo D. Brion concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were rendered.