Abay de Arroyo vs. Abay

A dismissal of a petition for probate of a will due to the failure of the petitioner and counsel to appear at the hearing is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar a subsequent petition for probate of the same will filed by a different interested party. The fault or inaction of one person interested in the probate cannot be imputed to other persons who also have an interest in the transmission of property rights under the will.

Candelaria Benguan died leaving a last will and testament. Susana Abay de Arroyo, a first-degree cousin of the deceased, and Felix Abay, her brother, were among the interested parties in the estate. The probate of a will may be initiated by any interested party, and the State's policy, as evidenced by provisions penalizing the failure to present wills for probate, favors the submission of wills to court for legalization.

Candelaria Benguan died leaving a last will and testament. On September 27, 1955, Felix Abay, a brother of Susana Abay de Arroyo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the probate of Benguan's will, docketed as special proceedings No. 3623. On November 5, 1955, the date set for the hearing, Felix Abay and his counsel, Pio B. Japitana, failed to appear despite due notice. The court thereupon dismissed the petition, without stating that the dismissal was with prejudice. Two motions for reconsideration were subsequently filed, the first on November 15 and the second on November 28, 1955, but both were denied, the last for lack of merit.

On January 5, 1956, Susana Abay de Arroyo, a first-degree cousin of the deceased and sister of Felix Abay, filed a separate petition for the probate of the same will, docketed as special proceedings No. 3883. On May 28, 1956, the court ordered that the petition be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in Civismo, a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Occidental, and set the hearing for June 23, 1956. On the date and time set for the hearing, attorney Rolando Medalla, representing some of the heirs designated as opponents, moved for postponement to allow time to file a written objection. The hearing was reset to June 30, 1956.

On June 28, 1956, before the rescheduled hearing, the opponents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that a previous petition for probate of the same will had been dismissed by the same court in special proceedings No. 3628, and that this prior dismissal constituted a bar to the present proceedings. Petitioner answered the motion to dismiss on July 7. By an order entered on July 14, the court dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on July 31, 1956, to which the opponents filed an answer on August 3. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the appeal to the Supreme Court, as only questions of law were raised.

• Not Res Judicata: Petitioner contended that the dismissal of the petition in the previous special proceedings (No. 3628) does not bar the present proceedings (No. 3883), both seeking probate of the same will, because the prior dismissal for failure of the petitioner and his counsel to appear at the hearing was not an adjudication on the merits and therefore does not constitute res judicata.
• Lack of Identity of Parties: Petitioner argued that the parties in the previous and present proceedings are not the same, as the prior petition was filed by Felix Abay while the present petition was filed by Susana Abay de Arroyo, a different interested party.

• Bar by Prior Dismissal: Opponents-appellees argued that the prior dismissal of the probate petition in special proceedings No. 3628 constituted a bar to the present proceedings, invoking the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of Rule 30 and section 2 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, which govern the effect of dismissals and the barring of subsequent actions.

• Res Judicata in Probate Proceedings: Whether the dismissal of a prior petition for probate of a will, due to the failure of the petitioner and his counsel to appear at the hearing, bars a subsequent petition for probate of the same will filed by a different interested party.

• Res Judicata in Probate Proceedings: No. The dismissal of the prior petition was not an adjudication on the merits and cannot prejudice the right of a different interested party to seek probate of the same will, the fault of one person interested in the probate being imputable only to that person and not to others.

• Res Judicata in Probate Proceedings: The dismissal of the prior petition for probate, occasioned solely by the failure of Felix Abay and his counsel to appear at the hearing, was not an adjudication on the merits. While the opponents invoked sections 3 and 4 of Rule 30 and section 2 of Rule 73 of the Rules of Court — provisions that generally make a dismissal of an action a bar to subsequent actions unless the dismissal is without prejudice — those provisions cannot be made to apply to proceedings for the probate of wills in the manner urged. The probate of a will may be the concern of one person or several persons, and the fault of one such person must be imputed to him alone. Other parties interested in the probate of a will for the transmission of property rights to them should not be prejudiced by the act or fault of another. Moreover, it is the policy of the State to have last wills and testaments submitted to court for probate or legalization, as evidenced by the punishment provided for persons who possess wills of deceased persons and fail or neglect to deliver or present them to court for probate within twenty days after knowledge of the death of the testator or after knowledge that they were named executors (sections 2 to 5, Rule 76). The underlying reason for the rule that a dismissal of an action may bar a subsequent action is the lack of interest or inaction of the one who brought the action — a rationale that does not extend to a different interested party who was not responsible for the prior dismissal.

• Fault of one interested party in probate cannot prejudice others — In probate proceedings, the fault or inaction of one person interested in the probate of a will (such as failure to appear at the hearing) is imputable only to that person and cannot bar or prejudice the right of another interested party to file a subsequent petition for probate of the same will. This is because the probate of a will may be the concern of several persons, and the State's policy favors the submission of wills to court for legalization.

• "The fault of one such person may be imputed to him alone who must suffer the consequences of his act. Such fault cannot be imputed to other persons." — This passage articulates the core rationale: in probate proceedings, the procedural fault of one interested party does not extend to other interested parties who may independently seek probate.

• "[I]t is the policy of the State to have such last wills and testaments submitted to Court for their probate or legalization, as shown or indicated or evidenced by or in the punishment provided for persons who are in possession of last wills and testaments of deceased persons and fail or neglect to deliver or present them to Court for probate." — This passage grounds the ruling in substantive state policy favoring probate, explaining why the general rules on dismissal as a bar should yield in the probate context.

• Sections 3 and 4, Rule 30, Rules of Court — These provisions govern the effect of the dismissal of an action or complaint, generally providing that a dismissal may operate as a bar to a subsequent action unless the dismissal is without prejudice. The Court held that these provisions cannot be applied to bar a subsequent probate petition filed by a different interested party when the prior dismissal was due to the non-appearance of the original petitioner.
• Section 2, Rule 73, Rules of Court — Cited by the opponents in support of the bar argument; the Court declined to apply it in the manner urged, holding that the general rules on dismissal as a bar do not extend to probate proceedings where a different interested party seeks probate.
• Sections 2 to 5, Rule 76, Rules of Court — These provisions require persons in possession of a deceased person's will to deliver or present it to court for probate within twenty days after knowledge of the death of the testator or after knowledge that they were named executors, and provide penalties for failure to do so. The Court cited them as evidence of the State's policy favoring the submission of wills to court for probate.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concurred.