Abarquez vs. People

An accused cannot be convicted as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code absent proof of community of design — knowledge of and concurrence with the principal's criminal intent — and where the evidence of his acts is capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence, the equipoise rule mandates acquittal.

Coverdale Abarquez, a barangay kagawad residing at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, was charged jointly with homicide and attempted homicide for events occurring on November 21, 1993, on the same street. His co-accused, Alberto Almojuela, resided nearby and had been separately charged. The Informations alleged conspiracy between Abarquez and Almojuela in the killing of Ricardo Quejong and the stabbing of Jose Buenjijo Paz. The legal framework governing accomplice liability is Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires both community of design and cooperation by previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to the commission of the crime.

On November 21, 1993, at about 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz, Ricardo Quejong, and friends were drinking liquor at the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, celebrating the birthday of Boyet's son. Around 7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home, joined by Boyet Tong, Abarquez's son Bardie, and Sonito Masula. They proceeded toward the exit of San Jose St. Meanwhile, about six or seven meters from Boyet's house, Alberto Almojuela, a certain Ising, and Abarquez were likewise drinking liquor in front of Almojuela's house. As the group of Paz passed toward the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path.

According to the prosecution, Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" and when Paz replied, "Why?", Almojuela attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez what their offense was, and Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na." Almojuela then confronted Quejong, and they had an altercation followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez, who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall to the ground, Paz struggled free and approached Quejong, whom he found already bloodied — Almojuela had stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull Quejong up but failed, then ran toward the exit of San Jose St. to seek help. While running, he heard Abarquez shout, "You left your companion already wounded!" When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground, with Almojuela and Abarquez still in the area. They brought Quejong to the UST Hospital, where he died. Paz reported the incident to the WPD General Headquarters and had his own injury treated at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital, where a medico-legal certificate showed a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.

The defense presented a different version. Abarquez testified that at about 7:30 p.m., Almojuela's wife informed him that Paz's group was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Being a barangay kagawad, Abarquez proceeded to Almojuela's house, about twenty meters away. There he saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by Quejong, with Paz holding Almojuela's waist and boxing him in the stomach, and Masula nearby holding a piece of stone. Abarquez shouted at the group to stop; when they did not heed him, he fired a warning shot into the air, then a second warning shot, after which Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered away. Almojuela told Abarquez he was merely trying to stop the group from smoking marijuana. Abarquez then went home, met the Chief Tanod and two kagawads, and together they reported the incident to Precinct No. 4. Almojuela corroborated this account, testifying that he had gone outside to ask the group to move away because marijuana smoke was entering his house, and that Quejong tried to strangle him. A defense witness, Winfred Evangelista, testified that he saw Paz kicking Almojuela and that Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but was told not to interfere, prompting him to fire a warning shot.

Dr. Antonio Rebosa, a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted the autopsy on Quejong and reported two stab wounds causing massive hemorrhage due to penetrating wounds to the heart and left lung, inflicted by a sharp instrument, as well as abrasions and contusions on the right upper body, wrist, and lower extremities. The trial court gave more credence to the prosecution's version, finding that Abarquez, by holding and restraining Paz, prevented Paz from helping Quejong and allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance, but found insufficient evidence of conspiracy to convict Abarquez as a principal.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner alleged that the prosecution's evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioner argued that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises, and conjectures, constituting a misapprehension of facts.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Petitioner assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses against him.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of homicide.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution failed to establish community of design — the first element of accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code — because Abarquez's act of restraining Paz was capable of an innocent interpretation consistent with pacification, and the equipoise rule required acquittal.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The Court found that the trial court failed to consider facts of substance that, if considered, would affect the result, making this an exception to the general rule that the trial court is in the best position to assess witness credibility.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Two elements must concur for accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) community of design, meaning the accomplice knows of and concurs with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, and (2) performance of previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to the commission of the crime. The Court found that Paz's own testimony did not establish that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela's criminal design. Abarquez told Paz "Tumigil ka na" ("Stop"), which the Court interpreted as an attempt to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz himself admitted that while being restrained, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him. The trial court's own factual findings confirmed that while Abarquez held Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela — showing Abarquez's intent was to pacify both sides, not to assist Almojuela. Abarquez's shout to Paz that he left his wounded companion indicated Abarquez was not aware of the extent of Quejong's injury and expected Paz to look after his own companion. The Court applied the equipoise rule: where inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to produce a conviction. The prosecution's failure to remove reasonable doubt as to Abarquez's concurrence in Almojuela's criminal design required acquittal.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: While the general rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of testimony, this case constitutes an exception because the trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result. Specifically, the trial court overlooked that Paz's own testimony revealed Abarquez was scolding and reprimanding Paz — telling him to stop — rather than acting in concert with Almojuela. The trial court also confirmed in its own factual findings that Bardie was pacifying Almojuela while Abarquez held Paz, which supports the interpretation that Abarquez was attempting to pacify the situation rather than assist in the killing. The Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's interpretation without accounting for these material details.

• Accomplice Liability under Article 18, Revised Penal Code — An accomplice is one who, not being a principal under Article 17, cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Two elements must concur: (1) community of design, meaning the accomplice knows of and concurs with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Mere commission of an act that aids the perpetrator is not enough; the cooperation punished by law is assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. The accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation. In this case, the Court found that Abarquez's act of holding Paz's shoulders and telling him to stop did not demonstrate concurrence with Almojuela's criminal design, as it was equally consistent with an attempt to pacify the parties.

• Equipoise Rule — Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The rule finds application when inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and does not suffice to produce a conviction. In this case, Abarquez's act of restraining Paz was susceptible to both an innocent interpretation (pacification) and a culpable one (assisting Almojuela), triggering the equipoise rule and requiring acquittal.

• Presumption of Innocence — Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution bears the burden of proving every single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient even if the defense does not speak at all.

• "The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct participation." — This passage articulates the essential requirement of community of design for accomplice liability, distinguishing mere presence or incidental assistance from knowing concurrence in a criminal design.

• "The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction." — This is the canonical formulation of the equipoise rule as applied in this case, explaining why evidence susceptible to dual interpretation cannot sustain a conviction.

• "Paz's testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela's criminal design. 'Tumigil' literally means 'stop.' Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from helping Quejong." — This passage captures the Court's critical reinterpretation of the factual evidence, overturning the lower courts' reading of Abarquez's conduct as assistance to the principal.

• People vs. Fabros, 429 Phil. 701 (2002) — Followed. The Court cited this case for the principle that to be deemed an accomplice, one must have had both knowledge of and participation in the criminal act, and that the principal and accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Mere prior knowledge of the principal's criminal design does not automatically make one an accomplice.

• People vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 132895, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 136 — Followed. Cited for the principle that mere commission of an act which aids the perpetrator is not enough for accomplice liability, and for the presumption of innocence doctrine requiring the prosecution to prove every fact establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Cachola, G.R. Nos. 148712-15, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 520 — Followed. Cited for the two-element test for accomplice liability under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Manambit, 338 Phil. 57 (1997) — Followed. Cited for the rule that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of testimony, with the exception where the trial court failed to consider facts of substance that might affect the result.

• People vs. Natividad, G.R. No. 151072, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 587 — Followed. Cited for the equipoise rule: where evidence on an issue of fact is in doubt, the party having the burden of proof loses.

• Vergara vs. People, G.R. No. 160328, February 4, 2005, 450 SCRA 495 — Followed. Cited for the application of the equipoise rule where inculpatory facts are capable of two or more explanations.

• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts." Applied as the controlling provision for determining Abarquez's liability; the Court found that the two required elements — community of design and cooperation by previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to the crime — were not both satisfied.

• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Defines principals. Referenced as the threshold provision that must be excluded before Article 18 (accomplice liability) applies; the trial court found insufficient evidence of conspiracy to convict Abarquez as a principal.

Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Chairman, Third Division) and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales concurred. Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga also concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.