Abalos vs. People of the Philippines

Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code is committed when a person misrepresents their identity and issues unfunded checks belonging to another, inducing the complainant to part with money, even if the checks were issued as collateral for a loan, provided the element of deceit is attendant in the issuance of said checks.

Petitioner Esther P. Abalos and private complainant Elaine D. Sembrano had no prior relationship; Sembrano was employed at Manulife in Baguio City. The case involves estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4885, which penalizes defrauding another by issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has no funds in the bank or insufficient funds. R.A. No. 10951, which adjusts the penalties under the Revised Penal Code based on the amount involved, was enacted on August 29, 2017 during the pendency of the appeal and was relevant to the determination of the proper penalty through its retroactive application insofar as favorable to the accused.

In April 2011, petitioner Esther P. Abalos, who introduced herself as "Vicenta Abalos," accompanied by Christine Molina, went to the office of private complainant Elaine D. Sembrano at Manulife, Baguio City, and offered two EastWest Bank checks for rediscounting. The checks—Check No. 0370031 dated May 3, 2011 for ₱17,500.00 and Check No. 0370032 dated June 1, 2011 for ₱250,000.00, totaling ₱267,500.00—were signed by petitioner in Sembrano's office. Sembrano agreed to rediscount the checks upon assurance from petitioner and Molina that they were good checks, and she gave the amount of ₱250,000.00 less 7% as interest. To bolster her assumed identity, petitioner presented a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Vicenta Abalos, a BIR ID Card, and a Community Tax Certificate, all bearing the name "Vicenta Abalos."

Sometime later, Sembrano learned from friends that petitioner's real name was Esther, not "Vicenta." When she presented the checks for payment on their due dates, both were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Sembrano then engaged the services of Benguet Credit Collectors to collect from petitioner. Petitioner failed to make good the checks, and a demand letter was sent which she received on October 23, 2011. Despite the demand, petitioner made a promise to pay, but nothing was ever received by Sembrano.

Petitioner denied the accusations, claiming that the checks were issued only as collateral for a loan, together with the title to a property in the name of "Vicenta Abalos." She stated that she did not personally transact with Sembrano and that it was Molina who handled the transaction; she merely accompanied Molina to Sembrano's office. As a requirement for the release of the loan, petitioner was asked to present an original certificate of title and a check as collateral, which she agreed to. Before receiving the money, petitioner was asked to sign a real estate mortgage offering the title as collateral. After she and Molina received the money from Sembrano, they went to a convenience store where Molina gave petitioner ₱100,000.00, and petitioner handed back ₱20,000.00 as commission. Petitioner insisted that the checks were meant to serve as collateral for the loan and not for the purpose of rediscounting.

The RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa on November 29, 2012, crediting the prosecution's evidence that petitioner's fraudulent scheme was evident from the outset. The CA affirmed the conviction on May 20, 2015, finding that petitioner's false pretense was apparent through her misrepresentation as "Vicenta Abalos" by showing identification documents and a transfer certificate of title in that name, and by signing the subject checks as "Vicenta Abalos." The CA likewise ruled that the mere issuance of a check and its subsequent non-payment constituted prima facie evidence of deceit.

• Nature of the Transaction: Petitioner argued that the real transaction between the parties, as defined by law, was civil, not criminal, in nature, and therefore not all elements of estafa were established.
• Absence of Deceit: Petitioner maintained that the element of deceit was lacking because the issuance of the checks was not the factor that induced Sembrano to grant the loan; rather, it was Molina's intercession and the interest to be earned on the money lent. Petitioner asserted that it was Molina who maneuvered the transaction by assuring Sembrano that petitioner would pay the loan.
• Inconsistency in Prosecution Evidence: Petitioner zeroed in on the irreconcilable conflict between Sembrano's affidavit—where she stated the checks were offered for rediscounting—and her testimony in open court, where she admitted the checks were used as collaterals. Petitioner argued this inconsistency cast doubt on Sembrano's testimony and strengthened the claim that the checks were meant to be collaterals of the loan, to be encashed only upon non-payment.

• Elements of Estafa: Whether all elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code were established beyond reasonable doubt, particularly the element of deceit, given petitioner's claim that the transaction was civil, not criminal, in nature.

• Elements of Estafa: Yes. All elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) were established beyond reasonable doubt, including deceit, which was present in the petitioner's misrepresentation of her identity and issuance of unfunded checks belonging to another person, even if the checks were issued as collateral for a loan.

• Elements of Estafa: The four elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) are: (1) postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3) knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and (4) damage to the complainant. All were established: petitioner issued two checks totaling ₱267,500.00 in payment for an obligation; the checks had insufficient funds as proven by their dishonoring for "account closed"; petitioner knew she was not the owner of the checks and had no knowledge whether they were sufficiently funded; and Sembrano suffered damages. Deceit, which distinguishes estafa from B.P. 22, was established from the beginning when petitioner misrepresented herself as Vicenta Abalos, the owner of the checks. She fortified this misrepresentation by signing the checks in front of Sembrano and presenting a BIR ID Card, a Community Tax Certificate, and a Transfer Certificate of Title—all in the name of "Vicenta Abalos"—presumably to guarantee her capability to pay. This misrepresentation assured Sembrano that she was dealing with someone who had sufficient means to make good the checks, inducing her to part with her money. The issuance of a worthless check belonging to another who appears to have sufficient means was the efficient cause of the deceit and defraudation; were it not for this circumstance, Sembrano would not have parted with her money. A prima facie presumption of deceit also arises when the drawer of a dishonored check fails to pay the amount within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor. Regarding the alleged inconsistency between Sembrano's affidavit (checks offered for rediscounting) and her testimony (checks used as collaterals), the discrepancy did not refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused and did not attach to any element of the crime. Even if the checks were merely collaterals, petitioner committed deceit by failing to disclose that the checks were not hers and were not sufficiently funded. It is against ordinary human behavior and experience for a person to accept a check, even as a mere guaranty, knowing the account against which it was drawn was already closed, as the check would not even serve its purpose of guaranty. While no criminal liability under the RPC arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment, this principle does not apply where the element of deceit is attendant in the issuance of said checks. The liability is therefore not merely civil, but criminal.

• Elements of Estafa under Article 315(2)(d) — The crime of estafa by issuing a bad check requires four elements: (1) postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack of sufficient funds to cover the check; (3) knowledge on the part of the offender of such circumstances; and (4) damage to the complainant. All four elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt to warrant conviction.

• Deceit as the Efficient Cause of Defraudation — Deceit is the element that distinguishes estafa from B.P. 22. It is defined as "the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury." To constitute estafa, deceit must be the efficient cause of the defraudation, such that the issuance of the check should be the means to obtain money or property from the payer, resulting in the latter's damage. The issuance of the check must have been the inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property.

• Prima Facie Presumption of Deceit — A prima facie presumption of deceit arises when the drawer of a dishonored check is unable to pay the amount of the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor.

• Estafa Through Checks Issued as Collateral — While no criminal liability under the RPC arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment, criminal liability attaches when the element of deceit is attendant in the issuance of said checks, such as when the issuer misrepresents ownership of the checks or conceals the insufficiency of funds. It is against ordinary human behavior for a person to accept a check as guaranty knowing the account was already closed.

• Retroactive Application of Penal Laws Favorable to the Accused — R.A. No. 10951, which modifies penalties in estafa cases, has retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the accused. When the penalty under the RPC presents a lower minimum period but a higher maximum period compared to that under R.A. No. 10951, the RPC penalty is more beneficial because the benefits accruing from a lower minimum sentence—particularly the earlier availability of parole—outweigh the longer maximum sentence, consistent with the spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Inconsistency as Ground for Acquittal — For a discrepancy to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused. An inconsistency that has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground to reverse a conviction.

• "To constitute estafa, deceit must be the efficient cause of the defraudation, such that the issuance of the check should be the means to obtain money or property from the payer resulting to the latter's damage." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the relationship between deceit and the issuance of checks in estafa cases, establishing that the check must be the inducing cause of the complainant's loss.

• "It is against ordinary human behavior and experience for a person to accept a check, even as a mere guaranty for a supposed loan or obligation, if one knew beforehand that the account against which the check was drawn was already closed." — This passage explains why deceit is present even when checks are issued merely as collateral, as no reasonable person would accept an unfunded check as guaranty, thereby negating the defense that the transaction was purely civil.

• "While it is true that no criminal liability under the RPC arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment, this is not true in the instant case where the element of deceit is attendant in the issuance of the said checks. The liability therefore is not merely civil, but criminal." — This passage delineates the boundary between civil and criminal liability when checks are issued as guarantees, affirming that the presence of deceit transforms a civil transaction into criminal estafa.

• Juaquico vs. People, G.R. No. 223998, March 5, 2018 — Followed. The Court reiterated that in estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements that must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.

• Ilagan vs. People, 550 Phil. 791 (2007) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the issuance of the check must be the means to obtain money or property from the payer.

• People vs. Cuyugan, 440 Phil. 637 (2002) — Followed. Cited for the principle that the issuance of the check must have been the inducement for the surrender of money or property, and that no criminal liability arises from the mere issuance of postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment.

• Hisoler vs. People, G.R. No. 237337, June 6, 2018 — Followed. Controlling authority on the retroactive application of R.A. No. 10951 and the determination that the RPC penalty is more beneficial to the accused when it presents a lower minimum period, as the benefits of a shorter minimum sentence outweigh the longer maximum sentence.

• Batac vs. People, G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018 — Followed. Cited for the definition of deceit and for the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• People vs. Almazan, 417 Phil. 697 (2001) — Followed. Cited for the principle that an inconsistency not related to the elements of the crime cannot be a ground to reverse a conviction.

• People vs. Dimalanta, 483 Phil. 56 (2004) — Followed. Cited for the enumeration of the elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d).

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code — Penalizes estafa committed by issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender has no funds in the bank or insufficient funds. The failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor constitutes prima facie evidence of deceit. Applied to establish the elements of estafa and the penalty imposable.

• Article 65, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the penalty prescribed by law is composed of only two periods or one period, it must be divided into three equal portions forming one period for each of the three portions. Applied to determine the proper periods of the penalty under both the RPC and R.A. No. 10951.

• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium period when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. Applied in computing the penalty under R.A. No. 10951.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires imposition of an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term within the range of the penalty next lower in degree and a maximum term within the prescribed penalty. Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment under both the RPC and R.A. No. 10951.

• Section 100, R.A. No. 10951 — Provides that R.A. No. 10951 shall have retroactive effect only insofar as it is favorable to the accused. Applied to compare penalties under the RPC and R.A. No. 10951, ultimately concluding the RPC penalty was more favorable.

• Section 85, R.A. No. 10951 — Amends Article 315 of the RPC, adjusting the penalty tiers based on the amount of fraud. For amounts over ₱40,000 but not exceeding ₱1,200,000, the penalty is prision mayor in its medium period. Applied to compute the alternative penalty, which was found less beneficial than the RPC penalty.

Caguioa, Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ., concurred. Carpio (Chairperson), J., was on official leave.