Abalos vs. Heirs of Torio

Possession by mere tolerance of the lawful owner does not constitute adverse possession and cannot serve as the foundation for acquisitive prescription, regardless of its duration. To ripen into ownership through prescription, possession must be en concepto de dueño — in the concept of an owner — and must be adverse, not permissive. Further, intervenors who do not appeal an adverse judgment are bound by its finality, and questions of fact are not reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, except under specific recognized exceptions.

Respondents, as the children and heirs of Vicente Torio, who died intestate on September 11, 1973, sought to recover possession of a 2,950-square-meter parcel of land located in San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan. During Vicente's lifetime, and continuing after his death, petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest occupied portions of the land and built houses thereon, allegedly through Vicente's tolerance. In 1985, respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the property; petitioners refused, claiming they and their predecessors had been in continuous, peaceful possession as owners since time immemorial, paying real property taxes and introducing improvements. The dispute centered on whether petitioners possessed the land as owners or merely by the tolerance of the registered owners.

• The Parties: Respondents are the children and heirs of Vicente Torio, who died intestate on September 11, 1973. Petitioners included Jaime Abalos and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar (original defendants), as well as Glicerio Abalos and the heirs of Aquilino and Aquilina Abalos (intervenors). All petitioners claimed ownership of the disputed land through their respective deceased predecessors.

• The Disputed Property: The subject of the dispute was a parcel of land measuring approximately 2,950 square meters, located in San Isidro Norte, Binmaley, Pangasinan, designated as Lot Nos. 869 and 870, Cad. 467-D, Binmaley Cadastre.

• Possession by Tolerance: During Vicente Torio's lifetime, Jaime Abalos and the Spouses Salazar were permitted to stay and construct houses on the land through Vicente's tolerance. After Vicente's death in 1973, respondents continued to tolerate their presence until 1985, when respondents demanded that petitioners vacate the premises.

• Petitioners' Claim of Ownership: Petitioners asserted that their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession of the land as absolute and exclusive owners since time immemorial. They claimed to have paid real property taxes, introduced improvements including houses and ornamental plants, and asserted that respondents' cause of action was barred by acquisitive prescription.

• Evidence of Acknowledgment of Vicente's Ownership: A Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime Abalos for the year 1984 contained a statement acknowledging that Jaime's house was built on the land belonging to Vicente Torio. Petitioners did not dispute this acknowledgment.

• Respondents' Title: Respondents traced their ownership to a duly notarized deed of sale by which the disputed land was sold to Marcos Torio, who subsequently assigned it to his son Vicente, respondents' father. The deed of sale was acknowledged before a notary public and carried the presumption of regularity.

• Tax Declarations: The earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners or their predecessors was recorded in 1974. From that year, petitioners declared the property for tax purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-interest.

• Acquisitive Prescription: Petitioners claimed that they and their predecessors-in-interest had acquired absolute and exclusive ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription, having been in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession in the concept of owners since time immemorial.

• Character of Possession: Petitioners argued that their possession was adverse and in the concept of an owner (en concepto de dueño), not by mere tolerance of respondents. They contended that the Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the nature and duration of their possessory acts, which included payment of real property taxes and introduction of permanent improvements.

• Defective Title of Respondents: Petitioners raised, for the first time before the CA, that the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale upon which respondents anchored their ownership were not properly proven during trial.

• Possession by Mere Tolerance: Respondents maintained that petitioners' occupancy of the land was purely by tolerance of Vicente Torio during his lifetime, and thereafter by tolerance of respondents as his heirs. Such permissive possession, regardless of duration, could not ripen into ownership through prescription.

• Acknowledgment of Vicente's Ownership: Respondents pointed to the 1984 Tax Declaration of Jaime Abalos, which expressly admitted that his house stood on land owned by Vicente Torio, as conclusive proof that petitioners recognized the ownership of respondents' predecessor-in-interest and therefore could not claim possession in good faith.

• Validity of Title: Respondents asserted that their ownership was established by a duly notarized deed of sale, which carried the presumption of regularity and was entitled to full faith and credit absent clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant evidence to the contrary.

• Finality as to Intervenors: Whether the MTC judgment had become final and executory as against the intervenors who failed to perfect an appeal.

• Reviewability of Factual Issue: Whether the question of the character of petitioners' possession — whether as owners or by mere tolerance — was a question of fact reviewable in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Acquisitive Prescription — Ordinary: Whether petitioners had acquired ownership through ordinary acquisitive prescription, requiring possession in good faith and with just title for ten years.

• Acquisitive Prescription — Extraordinary: Whether petitioners had acquired ownership through extraordinary acquisitive prescription, requiring uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.

• Validity of Notarized Deed of Sale: Whether the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale in respondents' chain of title was properly raised and sufficiently proven.

• Finality as to Intervenors: The MTC judgment had become final and executory as against the intervenors. Records established that the intervenors in the MTC did not appeal the adverse decision rendered against them. Under settled jurisprudence, the failure to perfect an appeal renders a judgment final and executory. Consequently, the intervenors could no longer seek affirmative relief from the Supreme Court.

• Reviewability of Factual Issue: The character or nature of petitioners' possession — whether in the concept of owner or by mere tolerance — was a question of fact not generally reviewable in a Rule 45 petition, which is limited to questions of law. However, because the findings of the MTC and the CA conflicted with those of the RTC, the case fell within one of the recognized exceptions permitting review of factual issues. Upon such review, no error was found in the CA and MTC findings: petitioners possessed by mere tolerance.

• Acquisitive Prescription — Ordinary: Ordinary acquisitive prescription was unavailable because petitioners could not establish possession in good faith. The 1984 Tax Declaration of Jaime Abalos explicitly acknowledged that his house was built on land owned by Vicente Torio, respondents' immediate predecessor-in-interest. Possession in good faith requires a reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing was received was the owner and could transmit ownership. Petitioners' own acknowledgment precluded any finding of good faith.

• Acquisitive Prescription — Extraordinary: Extraordinary acquisitive prescription also failed for two reasons. First, possession by mere tolerance is legally insufficient to serve as the basis for prescription; acts of possessory character executed by license or tolerance of the owner are inadequate because the possession must be en concepto de dueño — adverse and in the concept of an owner. Second, even assuming the character of possession had become adverse when petitioners declared the property for tax purposes in 1974, the thirty-year period for extraordinary prescription would have been completed only in 2004. Respondents' complaint was filed in 1996, and the service of summons upon petitioners constituted civil interruption of the prescriptive period under Article 1123 of the Civil Code, preventing its completion.

• Validity of Notarized Deed of Sale: The issue of the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale was not raised in petitioners' Answer or Pre-Trial Brief but only in their Comment before the CA. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Even if properly raised, a notarized document enjoys a presumption of regularity and is admissible without further proof of authenticity. Petitioners' bare denials were insufficient to overcome this presumption.

• Doctrine of Finality of Judgment — A judgment becomes final and executory upon the lapse of the period to appeal without an appeal having been perfected. The failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment immutable and unalterable. Applied here: intervenors in the MTC who did not appeal could no longer seek relief from the Supreme Court.

• Doctrine of Possession by Mere Tolerance — Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the lawful owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. The possession must be en concepto de dueño — adverse and in the concept of an owner. No matter how long permissive possession continues, it does not start the running of the prescriptive period. This doctrine was decisive in affirming that petitioners could not have acquired ownership.

• Doctrine of Civil Interruption of Prescription — Article 1123 of the Civil Code provides that prescription is civilly interrupted by the service of judicial summons upon the possessor. The filing of a complaint and subsequent service of summons effectively halts the running of the prescriptive period. The complaint in 1996 interrupted petitioners' possession before the thirty-year extraordinary prescription period could be completed in 2004.

• Elements of Ordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Under Articles 1117 and 1134 of the Civil Code, ordinary acquisitive prescription of ownership requires: (1) possession for ten years; (2) possession in good faith; and (3) just title. "Good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing was received was the owner and could transmit ownership. "Just title" exists when the adverse claimant came into possession through a mode recognized by law, but the grantor was not the owner.

• Elements of Extraordinary Acquisitive Prescription — Under Article 1137 of the Civil Code, extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of good faith or just title. However, the possession must still be en concepto de dueño and not merely permissive.

• Presumption of Regularity of Notarized Documents — A notarized document carries the presumption of regularity and the evidentiary weight of due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. To overcome this presumption, the evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.

• Rule on Questions Not Raised Below — Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. To permit otherwise would offend basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.

• "Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by mere tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive prescription. Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueño, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not start the running of the period of prescription." — This passage encapsulates the ratio decidendi on why petitioners' extended occupancy could not ripen into ownership.

• "There is no doubt that the deed of sale was duly acknowledged before a notary public. As a notarized document, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face." — This excerpt articulates the Court's application of the presumption of regularity to the respondents' chain of title.

• Province of Camarines Sur v. Heirs of Agustin Pato, G.R. No. 151084, July 2, 2010 — Cited for the settled rule that failure to perfect an appeal renders the judgment final and executory.

• Spouses Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011 — Enumerated the recognized exceptions to the rule that questions of fact are not reviewable under Rule 45.

• Villanueva v. Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011; Imuan v. Cereno, G.R. No. 167995, September 11, 2009 — Cited for the definition of possession "in good faith" under the Civil Code.

• Lamsis v. Donge-e, G.R. No. 173021, October 20, 2010 — Affirmed the principle that possessory acts by mere tolerance are insufficient for acquisitive prescription.

• Esguerra v. Manantan, G.R. No. 158328, February 23, 2007; Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131803, April 14, 1999 — Established that possession must be en concepto de dueño to serve as the foundation for a prescriptive right.

• American Home Insurance Co. of New York v. F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 174926, August 10, 2011 — Applied for the rule that issues not raised before the trial court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.

• Spouses Palada v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172227, June 29, 2011; Heirs of the Deceased Spouses Arcilla v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008 — Cited for the evidentiary weight of notarized documents and the standard of proof required to overcome the presumption of regularity.

• Article 1117, Civil Code — Defines ordinary and extraordinary acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights. The Court applied this to determine which prescriptive regime governed petitioners' claim.

• Article 1134, Civil Code — Prescribes the requirement of possession in good faith and with just title for ten years for ordinary acquisitive prescription. Petitioners failed to meet the good faith requirement.

• Article 1137, Civil Code — Prescribes the requirement of uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years for extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Petitioners failed to complete the thirty-year period due to civil interruption.

• Article 1120, Civil Code — Defines interruption of possession for purposes of prescription. Referenced in discussing how the prescriptive period was halted.

• Article 1123, Civil Code — Provides that civil interruption of prescription is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. The service of summons in the 1996 complaint interrupted petitioners' possession.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limits petitions for review on certiorari to questions of law. Cited as the basis for the general rule that factual questions are not reviewable.

Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, and Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous with no dissenting opinions.