Aba vs. De Guzman, Jr.

In disbarment or suspension proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to establish the charges by preponderance of evidence, and where the complainant submits fabricated or unauthenticated documents and fails to appear at mandatory conference hearings to substantiate the allegations, the charges must be dismissed for utter lack of merit. The lawyer-respondent enjoys the presumption of innocence and of having performed his duties in accordance with his oath, and the equipoise doctrine requires a decision in favor of the respondent when the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced.

Complainants Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban, and Benjamin Danda filed an administrative complaint seeking the disbarment of Attys. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. (a retired Regional Trial Court judge), Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad (Mayor of Pasay City), and Andresito Fornier, alleging that the respondents instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints for large-scale and syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa against them before the Iligan City Prosecutor's Office. The respondents, for their part, claimed that the complainants were part of an extortion syndicate headed by a certain Joseph Montesclaros, which perfected the filing of fabricated criminal charges in remote areas to harass and extort money from its victims. The administrative complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation.

Complainants Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban, and Benjamin Danda alleged that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. in Cotabato City, who persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31) against certain persons in exchange for money. De Guzman allegedly represented that his group — composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad, Atty. Andresito Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers — were untouchable. In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De Guzman a prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they were directed to sign and file, and which were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De Guzman. During the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor's Office, complainants claimed to have received several phone calls from De Guzman, Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all urging them to pursue the case. When complainants asked De Guzman what would happen if a warrant of arrest was issued, he allegedly replied, "Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila."

Complainants claimed they were bothered by their conscience and told De Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint. They were allegedly offered ₱200,000.00, and later ₱1,000,000.00, to pursue the case until the end, but refused both offers. For this reason, respondents allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants in Iligan City. On 30 November 2006, Aba claimed to have received a text message from De Guzman informing him that a warrant of arrest had been issued in Iligan. In support of their administrative complaint, complainants submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint, supporting documents, a letter from De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, De Guzman's Affidavit of Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and other documents. Complainants subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Trinidad and Fornier, praying that the complaint be pursued only against De Guzman.

Trinidad denied all allegations, claiming he had never communicated with any of the complainants and had never been to Cotabato. He asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros, who was motivated by revenge because Montesclaros mistakenly believed Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den in Pasay City. Trinidad claimed that Montesclaros headed a syndicate that abused court processes by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses of defendants, so that defendants would not be informed of the charges, warrants of arrest would issue, and Montesclaros would then extort money from the defendants to drop the complaints. Fornier similarly denied knowing any of the complainants or having any dealings with them, and claimed he was included in the case for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment. De Guzman, instead of filing a Comment, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the letter-complaint were spurious, which was confirmed by a Certification from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan stating that complainants had not submitted any such document in connection with the charges against them.

During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 2008 and 13 March 2009, none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations despite due notice. The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of charges against Trinidad and Fornier for lack of basis, but recommended a two-month suspension for De Guzman, finding a letter he allegedly sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy to be "truly vicious evidence." The IBP Board of Governors adopted this recommendation with modification, increasing De Guzman's penalty to two years' suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as to Trinidad and Fornier, but reversed the finding of liability as to De Guzman, dismissing all charges against him for utter lack of merit.

• Fabricated Charges and Extortion: Complainants argued that respondents instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against them for large-scale and syndicated illegal recruitment and estafa, and that De Guzman persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case in exchange for money, with the ultimate goal of extorting funds from the accused.
• Offer of Bribe to Pursue Case: Complainants maintained that respondents offered them ₱200,000.00 and later ₱1,000,000.00 to pursue the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 until the end, which they refused, prompting respondents to orchestrate the filing of fabricated charges against them in Iligan City.
• Disbarment Prayer: Complainants prayed for the imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon all respondents.

• No Communication or Dealings (Trinidad): Trinidad vehemently denied all allegations, claiming he had never communicated with any of the complainants and had never been to Cotabato. He asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, politically motivated charge spearheaded by Joseph Montesclaros, designed to tarnish his reputation as a lawyer and city mayor.
• Existence of Extortion Syndicate (Trinidad): Trinidad argued that Montesclaros headed a syndicate that abused court processes by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote areas with fabricated addresses, enabling the issuance of warrants of arrest and subsequent extortion from defendants.
• No Knowledge or Involvement (Fornier): Fornier denied knowing any of the complainants or having any dealings or communication with them, and claimed he had not filed any case against them. He argued he was included in the complaint for acting as defense counsel for the Go Tian Brothers, who were victims of Montesclaros's extortion racket.
• Insufficient Evidence (Fornier): Fornier argued that complainants failed to establish the charges against him by clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof, as their affidavits were replete with hearsay, speculations, conjectures, and sweeping conclusions unsupported by specific evidence.
• Spurious Documents (De Guzman): De Guzman moved to dismiss on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint attached to the letter-complaint were spurious, as confirmed by the Certification from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan. He denied any participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31 and claimed he had no familiarity with the complainants or the recruitment agency involved.

• Evidentiary Standard in Disbarment: Whether preponderance of evidence was satisfied to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on the respondents.
• Credibility of Complainants' Evidence: Whether the documents submitted by complainants, including the Joint Counter-Affidavit and the letter allegedly sent by De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, were credible and sufficient to support the charges.
• Liability of De Guzman: Whether De Guzman should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations and evidence presented.
• Liability of Trinidad and Fornier: Whether Trinidad and Fornier should be administratively disciplined, given complainants' own motion to dismiss the complaint against them.

• Evidentiary Standard in Disbarment: No. Preponderance of evidence is required in disbarment or suspension proceedings, and complainants failed to discharge this burden as to all respondents.
• Credibility of Complainants' Evidence: No. The documents submitted by complainants were not credible; the Joint Counter-Affidavit was confirmed spurious by the Iligan City Prosecutor's Office, and the purported letter of De Guzman contained material signature discrepancies and was unauthenticated.
• Liability of De Guzman: No. The charges against De Guzman were dismissed, the Court reversing the IBP's two-year suspension because complainants submitted fabricated documents, failed to appear at mandatory conferences, and did not prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated charges for extortion.
• Liability of Trinidad and Fornier: No. The charges against Trinidad and Fornier were dismissed, the Court affirming the IBP's dismissal, as complainants adduced no proof of their involvement and had themselves filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against them.

• Evidentiary Standard in Disbarment: A lawyer enjoys the legal presumption of innocence of charges until the contrary is proved and is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. The burden of proof in disbarment proceedings rests upon the complainant, and the case must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. While the evidence required is preponderance of evidence — not proof beyond reasonable doubt — this standard was not met here. Complainants submitted fabricated documents, failed to authenticate their submissions, and did not appear at mandatory conference hearings despite due notice. Under the equipoise doctrine, where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision must be against the party with the burden of proof, thus favoring the respondent.

• Credibility of Complainants' Evidence: The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all of complainants' allegations of misconduct, was purportedly subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. However, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying that complainants had submitted any such document. This deception undermined the credibility of all other documents submitted by complainants. Furthermore, the letter allegedly sent by De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy — which the Investigating Commissioner found to be "truly vicious evidence" — bore material signature discrepancies when compared with De Guzman's Affidavit of Clarification. Complainants did not explain how they obtained a copy of the letter, did not present the recipients to authenticate it, and did not appear before the Investigating Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting documents. Given respondents' claim that complainants were part of an extortion syndicate adept at fabricating criminal charges and documents, the Court exercised heightened caution in appreciating the evidence.

• Liability of De Guzman: The Court reversed the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating Commissioner for three reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants were not credible, as the Joint Counter-Affidavit was confirmed spurious and the purported letter bore signature discrepancies and was unauthenticated; (b) complainants did not appear at any mandatory conference to substantiate their allegations; and (c) complainants failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing fabricated illegal recruitment charges for extortion. De Guzman had also denied involvement in the preparation of the criminal complaint in his Affidavit of Clarification. The allegations lacked material details — such as the mobile number De Guzman allegedly used, the warrant of arrest, or the complainants' occupations — because complainants never appeared to testify. Accordingly, the presumption of innocence in De Guzman's favor stood unrebutted.

• Liability of Trinidad and Fornier: The Court adopted the Investigating Commissioner's findings that complainants failed to substantiate their charges against Trinidad and Fornier, offering only bare allegations without proof of their involvement. The allegation that six persons called complainants during a preliminary investigation was deemed unbelievable and absurd. Moreover, complainants had themselves filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Trinidad and Fornier, effectively admitting their non-participation. Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the case was deemed terminated because the IBP's disposition (dismissal) was less than suspension or disbarment, and complainants did not file a petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen days from notice; in fact, they filed a motion to dismiss.

• Presumption of Innocence in Disbarment Proceedings — An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the contrary is proved, and as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. The Court relied on this presumption in favor of De Guzman, finding that complainants failed to rebut it with preponderant evidence.

• Burden of Proof in Disbarment — In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof. The evidence required is preponderance of evidence, which is higher than substantial evidence in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants here failed to discharge this burden.

• Equipoise Doctrine — When the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that even if the evidence were evenly balanced, the ruling must favor De Guzman.

• Hierarchy of Evidentiary Values — In order of stringency: proof beyond reasonable doubt is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then preponderance of evidence, and lastly substantial evidence. The Court placed preponderance of evidence as the standard for disbarment or suspension proceedings, emphasizing that the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension warrant this level of proof.

• Termination of Administrative Case Under Rule 139-B — Under Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, if the IBP Board of Governors imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine), or exonerates the respondent, the case is deemed terminated unless the complainant files a petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen days from notice. The Court applied this rule to confirm the termination of the case against Trinidad and Fornier, as complainants did not appeal and in fact filed a motion to dismiss.

• "Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar." — This passage states the evidentiary standard governing disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, a threshold the complainants failed to meet.

• "When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine." — This formulation of the equipoise doctrine was applied to rule in De Guzman's favor, reinforcing that the burden of proof in disbarment rests squarely on the complainant.

• "Complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor. This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse, complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of Governors, and this Court." — This passage articulates the Court's central rationale for reversing the IBP's finding of liability against De Guzman: the fabrication of evidence by complainants destroyed the credibility of their entire case.

• In Re: De Guzman, 154 Phil. 127 (1974) — Cited for the proposition that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption of innocence of charges until the contrary is proved and is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
• De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554 (1939) — Cited alongside In Re: De Guzman for the presumption of innocence in disbarment proceedings.
• In Re: Tiongko, 43 Phil. 191 (1922) — Cited for the same presumption of innocence doctrine applicable to lawyers in disciplinary proceedings.
• Santos vs. Dichoso, 174 Phil. 115 (1978) — Cited for the proposition that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
• Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734, 743 (1998) — Cited for the equipoise doctrine, which mandates a decision against the party bearing the burden of proof when evidence is evenly balanced.
• Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 324 Phil. 400, 413 (1996) — Cited for the rule that weight and sufficiency of evidence is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of witnesses but by its practical effect in inducing belief.

• Section 3(a), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Provides that a person is presumed innocent of crime or wrongdoing. The Court applied this presumption in favor of all respondents, holding that complainants failed to rebut it with preponderant evidence.
• Section 1, Rule 131, Rules of Court — Defines burden of proof as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. The Court placed this burden on complainants, who failed to discharge it.
• Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets out the factors for determining preponderance of evidence, including all facts and circumstances, witnesses' manner of testifying, their interest or want of interest, and the number of witnesses. The Court referenced these factors in assessing the insufficiency of complainants' evidence.
• Section 12(c), Rule 139-B, Rules of Court — Provides that if the IBP Board of Governors exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the case is deemed terminated unless the complainant files a petition with the Supreme Court within fifteen days from notice. The Court applied this provision to confirm the termination of the case against Trinidad and Fornier.

Justice Arturo D. Brion, Justice Jose Portugal Perez, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, and Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred with the decision of Justice Antonio T. Carpio.