AAA vs. Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes

A lawyer's possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to retain membership in the legal profession, and a lawyer who engages in "sextortion" — abusing his position or authority to obtain sexual favors from a subordinate who is not in a position to resist for fear of losing her means of livelihood — commits gross immoral conduct warranting disbarment.

Complainant AAA was hired in February 1997 as secretary to respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes, then Vice-President of the Legal and Administrative Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). AAA held a plantilla position of private secretary 1, pay grade 11, on a co-terminus status with respondent, meaning her employment was tied to his tenure. The case involves the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, grounded in the principle that lawyers must observe the highest degree of morality both in their public and private lives, as required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

AAA was hired in February 1997 as secretary to respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes, then Vice-President of the Legal and Administrative Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). She became a permanent employee with a plantilla position of private secretary 1, pay grade 11, on a co-terminus status with respondent, and later learned that he had facilitated her rapid promotion. Sometime in the last quarter of 1997, respondent offered to take AAA home in his NHMFC-issued service vehicle, claiming her residence on J.P. Rizal Street, Makati was along his route; this became a daily routine that continued even after she moved to Mandaluyong City.

In the last quarter of 1998, AAA began feeling uncomfortable as respondent became overly possessive and demanding: he monitored her telephone calls, got angry when she spoke to males, called her to his office to listen to his personal stories, and sent her love notes. On 11 December 1998, when she refused his offer to take her home, he shouted "putangina mo," blocked her path, grabbed her arm, dragged her to the parking area, pushed her inside his service vehicle, and slapped her twice. She opened the car door and attempted to jump out, but he grabbed her jacket and dropped her off somewhere in Makati. She reported the incident to the police but did not file a formal complaint, thinking it would be futile. She told Atty. Fermin Arzaga, then Senior Vice-President for Finance at NHMFC, what happened and showed him her bruises; he advised her to request a transfer rather than resign.

AAA sent a resignation letter received by the Personnel Department on 22 December 1998, but the manager and assistant manager persuaded her to reconsider, promising reassignment to the Office of the President as stated in an Office Order dated 21 January 1999. On 22 January 1999, she reported to the Office of the President, but even before she could start, she was told to return to her former post as respondent's private secretary. AAA later learned that respondent had called Atty. Arzaga and told him not to interfere ("huwag kang makialam"), and he told her that her position was co-terminus with his. Because she was the sole breadwinner of her family — her father having deserted them when she was eight, leaving her to care for a sick mother, a two-year-old niece, and two sisters still in school — she had no choice but to continue working for him.

Respondent exploited this knowledge, making it clear he was determined to make her his mistress, overpowering her resistance by leaving her no choice but to succumb to his advances or lose her job. From then on, she became his "sex slave" at his beck and call for all kinds of sexual services, from hand-jobs in his vehicle to sexual intercourse in his office. She could not refuse without risking physical, verbal, and emotional abuse. She became despondent, thought of suicide on countless occasions, and suffered from illnesses including fever, stomachaches, sore throat, and migraine. Even when she attempted to stop his obsession by flaunting an American boyfriend, respondent went into a jealous rage. He continued to bring her home even after she moved to Canlubang, Laguna, and continued to see her in his office at least twice a day, even sending an assistant to fetch her when she refused to go.

In January 2003, respondent kept a tight watch over AAA even during her official study leave for CGFNS review classes, insisting on personally bringing her to and from classes or having his official driver take her. She failed to take her exam in March 2003 and requested leave for the July 2003 exam, then stopped seeing and talking to him completely. He sent text messages she ignored, and she changed her cell phone number. After a month of silence, she thought he had given up, but he instead trained his sights on Ma. Victoria "Marivic" Alpajaro, her good friend and officemate, threatening to fire her. On 10 July 2003, AAA met respondent outside the office to plead for her friend; he insisted they return to the office together to show everyone everything was still the same. She refused and ran out of the restaurant; he followed, wrapped his arms around her, and shouted "mahal kita" in public. She threatened to throw herself in the path of oncoming vehicles if he persisted.

AAA filed another Complaint-Affidavit dated November 19, 2004, alleging respondent continued to harass her and her colleagues Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and Mercedita Lorenzana, who agreed to be her witnesses. She alleged respondent filed baseless charges against her and her officemates before the Office of the Ombudsman and sought their preventive suspension without due process. She was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder with manifested symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder by Dr. Norietta Calma-Balderama, a psychiatrist at the University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. In his defense, respondent denied all allegations, claiming the complaints were insufficient in form and substance, that AAA's affidavits were replete with inconsistencies, that he offered his service vehicle to other employees as well, that the December 1998 incident was incredible, that he never asked for sexual favors, that AAA's transfer requests never mentioned sexual harassment, and that the complaints were retaliation for investigations he was conducting against AAA and her friends. He also argued that assuming the allegations were true, the claims had prescribed since they occurred in 1999, more than three years before the complaints were filed.

• Sexual Harassment and Gross Immoral Conduct: AAA argued that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he committed acts which are unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful, warranting his disbarment. She claimed he sexually exploited her as his subordinate, forcing her to submit to sexual acts ranging from hand-jobs in his vehicle to sexual intercourse in his office, under threat of losing her co-terminus employment.

• Continuing Harassment and Retaliation: AAA alleged that respondent continued to harass her and her colleagues Ma. Victoria Alpajaro and Mercedita Lorenzana, who agreed to be her witnesses, by filing baseless charges against them before the Office of the Ombudsman and seeking their preventive suspension without due process.

• Psychological Harm: AAA claimed that because of respondent's actions, she suffered from various illnesses, insomnia, listlessness, suicidal feelings, and was diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder with manifested symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder by Dr. Norietta Calma-Balderama of UP-PGH.

• Insufficiency of Complaint: Respondent contended that AAA's complaint-affidavits were not sufficient in form and substance as required under the Rules of Court and should be dismissed for being mere scraps of paper, as they failed to state the ultimate facts, approximate dates, and other details of the alleged sexual acts, violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.

• Incredibility of Allegations: Respondent argued that AAA's affidavits were replete with inconsistencies and unrealistic statements contrary to human nature, pointing out that he offered his service vehicle to other employees, that NHMFC had policies prohibiting long personal telephone use, that the alleged dragging incident would have been noticed by many employees, and that his office was accessible to other employees with a security guard by the door.

• Retaliation: Respondent claimed the disbarment complaints were purely in retaliation since he was conducting investigations against AAA and her two friends at NHMFC.

• Prescription: Respondent asserted that assuming the alleged grounds for disbarment regarding sexual harassment were true, the same had already prescribed since they occurred in 1999, more than three years prior to the institution of the complaints.

• Certification Without Probative Value: Respondent countered that the Certification issued by Dr. Calma-Balderama was a mere scrap of paper without probative value since it was not made under oath or subscribed to, and was not supported by any clinical or psychological report.

• Gross Immoral Conduct and Disbarment: Whether respondent Atty. Antonio N. De Los Reyes committed acts amounting to sexual harassment and gross immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility which would warrant his disbarment.

• Gross Immoral Conduct and Disbarment: Yes. Respondent was found GUILTY of gross immoral conduct and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and was DISBARRED from the practice of law. The Court adopted the findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner and Board of Governors but found the recommended penalty of indefinite suspension not commensurate with the gravity of the acts committed.

• Gross Immoral Conduct and Disbarment: The Court ruled that the records of the administrative case sufficiently substantiated the findings of the CBD-IBP Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors that respondent committed acts of gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs with AAA. The Court examined the TSN from the June 30, 2006 hearing, which showed AAA's straightforward testimony that respondent forced her to have sex with him, at most twice a week from 1999 to 2000, and that she consented only as "an exchange to maintain my job" because her position was co-terminus with his. The Court characterized respondent's conduct as "sextortion" — the abuse of his position or authority to obtain sexual favors from his subordinate, his unwilling victim who was not in a position to resist his demands for fear of losing her means of livelihood. The Court emphasized that the sexual exploitation of his subordinate over a period of time amounts to gross misbehavior that affects his standing and character as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court, putting the legal profession in disrepute and placing the integrity of the administration of justice in peril. The Court cited the principle from Valdez vs. Dabon that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. It also cited Ventura vs. Samson for the definition of immoral conduct as acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, showing moral indifference to the opinion of upright and respectable members of the community, and gross when so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. The Court distinguished the penalty from prior cases: while suspension was imposed in De Leon vs. Pedreña (two years for leg-rubbing and touching), Tumbaga vs. Teoxon (three years for extramarital affair), and Zaguirre vs. Castillo (indefinite suspension for illicit relationship and siring a child), disbarment was imposed in Dantes vs. Dantes (illicit relationships with two women during marriage), Arnobit vs. Arnobit (leaving wife and 12 children to cohabit with another woman), and Delos Reyes vs. Aznar (enticing a student to have carnal knowledge under threat of failing her subjects). The Court held that respondent's actions showed he lacks the degree of morality required of him as a member of the legal profession, thus warranting disbarment, even if the misconduct pertained to his private activities, as long as it shows him wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.

• Good Moral Character as Continuing Requirement — Possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that respondent's grossly immoral conduct, even in his private activities, showed him wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor, warranting disbarment.

• Definition of Gross Immoral Conduct — Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. It is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community's sense of decency. The Court applied this definition to respondent's sexual exploitation of his subordinate over a period of time.

• Sextortion — The abuse of a lawyer's position or authority to obtain sexual favors from a subordinate who is an unwilling victim not in a position to resist the lawyer's demands for fear of losing her means of livelihood. The Court held that respondent's sexual exploitation of his subordinate over a period of time amounts to gross misbehavior affecting his standing and character as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the Court.

• Disbarment Proceedings as Sui Generis — Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis: neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit but rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, they are in no sense a criminal prosecution. Public interest is the primary objective, and the real question is whether the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. The Court applied this doctrine to reject respondent's prescription argument, holding that there is no prescriptive period for grave misconduct in disbarment proceedings.

• "Clearly, the above-quoted excerpt from the TSN dated June 30, 2006, shows that respondent Atty. De Los Reyes is guilty of 'sextortion' which is the abuse of his position or authority to obtain sexual favors from his subordinate, the complainant, his unwilling victim who was not in a position to resist respondent's demands for fear of losing her means of livelihood." — This passage defines the core concept of "sextortion" and establishes the basis for finding respondent guilty of gross misbehavior affecting his standing as a member of the Bar.

• "Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by the Court that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's bounden duty to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the Bar's integrity, and the legal profession exacts from its members nothing less." — This passage, quoted from Valdez v. Dabon, articulates the foundational principle that good moral character is a continuing requirement for membership in the legal profession.

• "Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. x x x Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." — This passage, quoted from Pena v. Aparicio, defines the nature of disbarment proceedings and explains why the Court's disciplinary power is exercised to preserve the purity of the legal profession.

• Valdez vs. Dabon, 773 Phil. 109 (2015) — Cited as controlling precedent for the principle that possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the legal profession.

• Ventura vs. Samson, 699 Phil. 404 (2012) — Cited for the definition of immoral conduct and gross immoral conduct, and for the reminder that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the Bar.

• Arnobit vs. Arnobit, 590 Phil. 270 (2008) — Cited as precedent for disbarment where a lawyer left his wife and 12 children to cohabit and have children with another woman, constituting grossly immoral conduct.

• Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 259 Phil. 231 (1989) — Cited as precedent for disbarment where a respondent, Chairman of the College of Medicine, enticed a student to have carnal knowledge with him under threat that she would fail all her subjects if she refused.

• Dantes vs. Dantes, 482 Phil. 64 (2004) — Cited as precedent for disbarment where a respondent engaged in illicit relationships with two different women during the subsistence of his marriage.

• Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 446 Phil. 861 (2003) — Cited as precedent for indefinite suspension where a lawyer had an illicit relationship with a woman not his wife and sired a child with her, whom he later refused to recognize and support.

• De Leon vs. Pedreña, 720 Phil. 12 (2013) — Cited as precedent for two-year suspension for rubbing complainant's leg, putting her hand on his crotch area, and pressing his finger on her private part.

• Tumbaga vs. Teoxon, A.C. No. 5573, November 21, 2017 — Cited as precedent for three-year suspension for committing gross immorality by maintaining an extramarital affair with complainant.

• Pena vs. Aparicio, 552 Phil. 512 (2007) — Cited for the doctrine that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.

• Nakpil vs. Valdes, 350 Phil. 412 (1998) — Cited for the principle that a lawyer may be disbarred for gross misbehavior even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good demeanor.

• Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. The Court found respondent guilty of violating this rule through his acts of sextortion and gross immorality.

• Rule 7.03, Canon 7, Code of Professional Responsibility — Provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. The Court found respondent guilty of violating this rule.

• Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Expressly states that members of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of their oath. The Court cited this provision as the basis for disciplinary action against respondent.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Bersamin, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred. Carpio, J., was on official leave; Peralta, J., was on official business; Perlas-Bernabe, J., took no part.