There are 114 results on the current subject filter
| Title | IDs & Reference #s | Background | Primary Holding | Subject Matter |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Silverio vs. Republic (19th October 2007) |
AK402555 537 SCRA 373 , G.R. No. 174689 |
Petitioner Rommel Silverio, born anatomically male, identified as a female from childhood and felt "trapped in a man's body." After consulting with doctors, he underwent hormone therapy, breast augmentation, and ultimately, a sex reassignment surgery in Thailand. Living as a female and engaged to be married to a man, he sought to have his public records, specifically his birth certificate, reflect his new identity and physical state by changing his first name and sex entry. | Philippine law does not permit a person who has undergone sex reassignment surgery to change their name and sex as recorded in their birth certificate to align with their new physical characteristics, as there is no statute that recognizes or governs the effects of such a procedure. |
Persons and Family Law Family Code, Articles 1 and 2 |
|
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc. (28th August 2007) |
AK150634 531 SCRA 436 , G.R. No. 162155 |
The case originated from a claim for a tax refund by Primetown Property Group, Inc. (Primetown) for taxes paid in 1997. Due to the Asian Financial Crisis, the real estate industry slowed down, causing Primetown to suffer significant losses for that year. Despite these losses, the company had paid quarterly corporate income taxes and remitted creditable withholding taxes. Believing it was not liable for income tax due to its net loss, Primetown filed an administrative claim for a refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), which was not acted upon, prompting the company to seek judicial relief. | A "year" for the purpose of computing legal periods is understood to be twelve calendar months, as provided in Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, which has impliedly repealed the definition of a "year" as 365 days under Article 13 of the Civil Code. |
Persons and Family Law Statutory Construction Article 13, Civil Code |
|
Maquilan vs. Maquilan (8th June 2007) |
AK265106 551 Phil. 601 , 524 SCRA 166 , G.R. No. 155409 |
The case stems from a marital dispute between Virgilio and Dita Maquilan. After Virgilio discovered Dita having an illicit affair, he filed a criminal case for adultery, resulting in the conviction of Dita and her paramour. Subsequently, Dita filed a civil case for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage based on psychological incapacity. During the pre-trial of this civil case, the spouses executed a Compromise Agreement to divide their assets, which the trial court approved. Virgilio later attempted to repudiate this agreement, leading to the current legal battle. | A Compromise Agreement effecting a partial voluntary separation of property between spouses is valid and binding even if one spouse has been convicted of adultery, as the penalty for adultery (*prision correccional*) does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction or automatic forfeiture of property rights absent a specific decree of legal separation or nullity requiring such forfeiture; furthermore, the participation of the Solicitor General is not a prerequisite for the validity of a property settlement that does not compromise the validity of the marriage bond. |
Persons and Family Law Nullity of marriage; Effects |
|
Republic vs. Lacap (2nd March 2007) |
AK609364 G.R. No. 158253 , 517 SCRA 255 |
The District Engineer of Pampanga initiated a public bidding for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare. Carlito Lacap, doing business as Carwin Construction and Construction Supply, was one of three pre-qualified contractors. After submitting the lowest bid, Lacap was awarded the contract by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). A formal Contract Agreement was executed, and Lacap proceeded with and completed the project. The dispute arose when the government, through the DPWH, refused to release the payment for the completed project upon the disapproval of the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA). | A contractor with an expired license who fully completes a government project is entitled to payment, as the Contractor's License Law (R.A. No. 4566) does not declare contracts entered into under such circumstances as void. The government cannot refuse payment and retain the benefits of the completed work, as this would constitute unjust enrichment under Article 22 of the Civil Code. |
Persons and Family Law Article 22 of the Civil Code |
|
Ong vs. Ong (23rd October 2006) |
AK031915 535 Phil. 805 , 505 SCRA 76 , G.R. No. 153206 |
William and Lucita Ong were married for over twenty years and had three children. In 1996, Lucita sought legal separation, claiming her life with William was characterized by frequent quarrels, physical assaults, and verbal abuse. The situation escalated during an incident in December 1995 involving physical violence and a gun, which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal home and seek medical treatment. | The Supreme Court affirmed that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when upheld by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court unless specific exceptions apply. Furthermore, the Court established that a witness's relationship to a party does not automatically render their testimony biased or incredible, and **leaving the conjugal dwelling due to abusive conduct does not constitute "abandonment" that would bar a decree of legal separation.** |
Persons and Family Law Legal separation |
|
Muller vs. Muller (29th August 2006) |
AK139276 531 Phil. 460 , 500 SCRA 65 , G.R. No. 149615 |
The case stems from the breakdown of the marriage between a Filipino woman and a German man who had settled in the Philippines. The dispute centers on the financial settlement regarding a residential property in Antipolo, Rizal. The property was purchased and developed using the German husband's inherited funds but was registered solely in the wife's name to comply with Philippine laws prohibiting foreigners from owning land. Upon separation, the husband sought to recover his financial investment. | An alien who knowingly provides funds for the purchase of private land in the Philippines, circumventing the Constitutional prohibition against alien land ownership, is barred from seeking reimbursement for said funds or the cost of improvements based on equity, as he does not come to court with clean hands. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Absolute community |
|
Antonio vs. Reyes (10th March 2006) |
AK471421 484 SCRA 353 , G.R. No. 155800 |
Petitioner Leonilo Antonio and respondent Marie Ivonne Reyes met in August 1989 and married in 1990. Their union produced a child who died five months after birth. The couple's relationship quickly deteriorated due to what the petitioner described as the respondent's unusual and deceitful behavior. After a brief separation and a failed attempt at reconciliation, the petitioner left the respondent for good in November 1991. This led him to file a petition for nullity of marriage, claiming that the respondent's constant and elaborate fabrications about her life were manifestations of a deep-seated psychological incapacity to assume the fundamental duties of marriage. | A party's pathological inability to abide by the truth, manifesting as a persistent and constant pattern of fabricating stories about one's self, occupation, and background, is a psychological incapacity that renders one incognitive of the essential marital obligations of mutual trust, respect, and fidelity, and thus constitutes a valid ground for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. |
Persons and Family Law Article 36, Family Code |
|
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Verchez (31st January 2006) |
AK180962 481 SCRA 384 , G.R. No. 164349 |
On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital. Her daughter, Grace Verchez-Infante, sent an urgent telegram through RCPI to her sister, Zenaida Verchez-Catibog, in Quezon City, with the message "Send check money Mommy hospital." The purpose was to secure immediate financial aid for their mother's medical needs. The failure to receive a timely response caused distress and confusion within the family, leading them to believe Zenaida was ignoring their plea for help. | A telecommunications company that fails to deliver a telegram promptly due to its own negligence is liable for damages; its liability is based on _culpa contractual_ to the sender and quasi-delict to the intended recipient and other affected family members. Gross negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation, such as an inordinate delay without notifying the sender, amounts to bad faith and justifies the award of moral damages. |
Persons and Family Law Article 26, New Civil Code |
|
Republic vs. Orbecido III (5th October 2005) |
AK557171 G.R. No. 154380 , 472 SCRA 114 |
The case arose from a legal ambiguity concerning the application of Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The provision's text appears to apply only to "mixed marriages" (between a Filipino and a foreigner at the time of celebration). This case presented a situation of first impression where a marriage was initially between two Filipino citizens, but one party later acquired foreign citizenship and obtained a divorce, raising the question of whether the remaining Filipino spouse was still bound by the marital tie under Philippine law. | Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, which capacitates a Filipino spouse to remarry after their alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad, applies even if both parties were Filipino citizens at the time of marriage, provided that one spouse later becomes a naturalized foreign citizen and then secures the divorce decree; the reckoning point for the application of the provision is the citizenship of the parties at the time the valid divorce is obtained. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Abalos vs. Macatangay (30th September 2004) |
AK624924 482 Phil. 877 , 439 SCRA 649 , G.R. No. 155043 |
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos were the registered owners of a parcel of land with improvements in Makati City. In 1989, amidst a marital squabble, Arturo entered into a transaction with Dr. Galicano Macatangay, Jr. to sell the property, executing a unilateral agreement and receiving a check. Conflicting documents regarding the wife's consent and the subsequent failure to transfer possession led Macatangay to file a legal action to compel the sale. | A husband cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent; any such transaction is void, and the interest of each spouse in conjugal assets is merely inchoate and cannot be sold prior to the liquidation of the partnership. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Absolute community |
|
Joaquino vs. Reyes (13th July 2004) |
AK790023 478 Phil. 343 , 434 SCRA 260 , G.R. No. 154645 |
Rodolfo Reyes was legally married to Lourdes Reyes but cohabited with Milagros Joaquino for nineteen years until his death. During this cohabitation, a house and lot were purchased and registered in Milagros' name, though the funds for the purchase and mortgage payments were sourced from Rodolfo's employment earnings. After Rodolfo's death, his legal wife and legitimate children filed a suit to recover the property, asserting it was conjugal in nature. | Property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage using the husband's salaries and earnings belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains, even if registered in the name of a paramour, and such registration constitutes a void donation between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage under Article 739 of the Civil Code. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Art. 87, Family Code |
|
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals (18th February 2004) |
AK750372 423 SCRA 272 , G.R. No. 150758 |
The case arose from the multiple marriages contracted by petitioner Veronico Tenebro. He first married Hilda Villareyes in 1986. While this marriage was subsisting, he married Leticia Ancajas in 1990. After Tenebro left Ancajas to cohabit with his first wife, he contracted a third marriage with Nilda Villegas in 1993. Upon learning of the third marriage, Ancajas verified the existence of the first marriage and subsequently filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro for contracting their marriage (the second one) while his first marriage was still valid. | A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of a second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of its celebration for the purpose of extinguishing criminal liability for bigamy; the crime is consummated upon the very act of contracting a second marriage while a prior marriage is still valid and subsisting. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (20th April 2001) |
AK928097 357 SCRA 249 , G.R. No. 137873 |
The case arose from a fatal workplace accident on November 2, 1990, where Jose Juego, a construction worker for petitioner D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI), died after falling 14 floors when the platform he was on collapsed. The incident prompted his widow, Maria Juego, to seek compensation. This led to a legal conflict over whether her initial claim for statutory death benefits under the Labor Code prevented her from later seeking higher damages from the employer through a civil lawsuit based on negligence. | An employee's dependent who has claimed and received benefits from the State Insurance Fund under the Labor Code is not barred from subsequently suing the employer for damages under the Civil Code if the initial choice of remedy was made without knowledge of the employer's negligence or of the existence of the alternative remedy, as such ignorance negates a knowing and intelligent waiver. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Ty vs. Court of Appeals (27th November 2000) |
AK843193 399 Phil. 647 , 346 SCRA 86 , G.R. No. 127406 |
Private respondent Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case to declare his second marriage to petitioner Ofelia Ty null and void. He argued that at the time he married Ty, his first marriage to another woman was still technically subsisting because the judicial decree declaring that first marriage void *ab initio* was issued only after his wedding to Ty. The lower courts ruled in favor of Reyes, applying modern jurisprudence that strictly requires a judicial declaration of nullity before remarriage, prompting Ty to appeal to the Supreme Court. | For marriages contracted under the Civil Code regime and prior to the ruling in *Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy*, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a void first marriage is not a condition precedent for the validity of a subsequent marriage; Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires such a declaration, cannot be applied retroactively if doing so would impair vested rights. |
Persons and Family Law Rights and Obligations between husband and wife |
|
Marcos vs. Marcos (19th October 2000) |
AK266337 343 SCRA 755 , G.R. No. 136490 |
Brenda and Wilson Marcos were married in 1982 and had five children. Both were members of the military assigned to Malacañang Palace. After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, both left the military service. Wilson struggled with unemployment and failed business ventures, leading to frequent quarrels, his failure to provide financial support, and instances of physical abuse against Brenda and their children. The couple eventually separated in 1992, and a series of violent incidents prompted Brenda to file a petition to declare their marriage null and void based on Wilson's alleged psychological incapacity. | Psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code may be established by the totality of evidence presented, and a personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent is not a mandatory requirement or *conditio sine qua non* for such a declaration. |
Persons and Family Law Article 36, Family Code |
|
Alipio vs. Court of Appeals (29th September 2000) |
AK484811 395 Phil. 661 , 341 SCRA 441 , G.R. No. 134100 |
The dispute arose from a sublease contract for a fishpond involving the respondent as lessor and two married couples (the Alipios and the Manuels) as sublessees. After the husband of the petitioner passed away, the lessor filed a collection suit against the surviving wife and the other couple for unpaid rent. The case centered on whether the surviving wife could be sued directly for the conjugal debt and the nature of the liability of the parties under the contract. | A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership; the proper remedy is to file a claim in the settlement of the estate of the decedent. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Liquidation |
|
University of the East vs. Jader (17th February 2000) |
AK405597 325 SCRA 804 , G.R. No. 132344 |
The case arose from the relationship between an educational institution and its student concerning the fulfillment of academic requirements for a law degree. The dispute centered on the university's responsibility to communicate a student's final grade and academic standing, especially when the student's eligibility for graduation and the bar examinations was at stake. | An educational institution has a contractual obligation to timely inform its students of their academic status and can be held liable for damages if its negligence misleads a student into believing they have completed all graduation requirements, thereby causing injury; this liability is anchored on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code concerning the principle of abuse of rights and liability for negligent acts. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Ventura vs. Militante (5th October 1999) |
AK289105 374 Phil. 562 , 316 SCRA 226 , G.R. No. 63145 |
A proprietor of an auto supply business sought to recover an unpaid debt of P48,889.70 for automotive spare parts purchased by a customer, Carlos Ngo. However, at the time the creditor decided to file the lawsuit, Carlos Ngo had already passed away. Instead of initiating estate proceedings, the creditor filed a direct collection suit against the "Estate of Carlos Ngo," leading to a legal dispute regarding the proper party to be sued and the jurisdiction of the trial court. | A deceased person or their estate lacks the legal capacity to be sued in a civil action for a sum of money; consequently, a complaint filed against such a non-entity is void ab initio and cannot be cured by amending the pleading to substitute the surviving spouse, as the court never acquired jurisdiction over the person or subject matter in the first instance. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Liquidation |
|
Sumbad vs. Court of Appeals (21st June 1999) |
AK628629 368 Phil. 52 , 308 SCRA 575 , G.R. No. 106060 |
George K. Tait, Sr., after the death of his first wife, entered into a common-law relationship with Maria F. Tait. In 1974, George executed a Deed of Donation transferring a property in Sum-at, Bontoc, to Maria. After George died in 1977, Maria sold portions of this property to several buyers who subsequently built homes and lived there. Years later, George's daughters from his first marriage sought to recover the properties, claiming the donation to Maria was invalid. | The Court established that a claim of forgery regarding a public document requires clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity, and legal prohibitions (such as donations between common-law spouses) cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, particularly when the claimants are barred by laches for failing to assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Art. 87 |
|
Palmares vs. Court of Appeals (31st March 1998) |
AK070111 288 SCRA 422 , G.R. No. 126490 |
Private respondent M.B. Lending Corporation extended a loan of P30,000.00 to the spouses Osmeña and Merlyn Azarraga. Petitioner Estrella Palmares signed the corresponding promissory note as a co-maker. The terms of the note stipulated that Palmares was "jointly and severally or solidarily liable" with the principal debtors. After partial payments were made, the Azarraga spouses defaulted on the remaining balance, prompting the lending corporation to seek collection. | A person who signs a promissory note as a co-maker and explicitly binds herself to be "jointly and severally" or "solidarily" liable with the principal debtor is considered a surety, not a guarantor; as a surety, she is an insurer of the debt itself, directly and primarily liable, and may be sued by the creditor alone for the entire obligation upon the principal debtor's default. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Agapay vs. Palang (28th July 1997) |
AK081573 276 SCRA , G.R. No. 116668 |
Miguel Palang left his legal wife and daughter in the Philippines to work in Hawaii, returning years later to cohabit with a much younger woman, Erlinda Agapay, with whom he contracted a void second marriage. During this second union, a rice land and a house and lot were purchased and registered either jointly or in Erlinda's name. Following Miguel's death, his legal family sought to recover these properties, claiming they belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first and valid marriage. | In a union between a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other (such as a bigamous or adulterous relationship), property ownership is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which strictly requires proof of actual contribution of money, property, or industry to establish co-ownership; absent such proof, the property is presumed to belong to the partner who provided the funds. |
Persons and Family Law Article 87, Family Code |
|
Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina Case) (13th February 1997) |
AK581680 268 SCRA 198 , G.R. No. 108763 |
The introduction of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code created a novel ground for declaring a marriage void, leading to a surge in petitions and inconsistent interpretations by lower courts. The Solicitor General expressed concern that the provision was being applied so liberally that it was effectively becoming a "divorce procedure," which is contrary to Philippine law and culture. This case presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to clarify the provision's meaning and establish uniform standards for its application by the bench and bar. | Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be a medically or clinically identified, grave, and permanent or incurable psychological illness existing at the time of the marriage that renders a spouse truly incapable of knowing and assuming the essential marital obligations; mere refusal, neglect, difficulty, or irreconcilable differences are not sufficient grounds. |
Persons and Family Law Article 36, Family Code |
|
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals (16th January 1997) |
AK887142 266 SCRA 324 , G.R. No. 119190 |
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. Throughout their cohabitation, which lasted until March 15, 1989, they never engaged in sexual intercourse. The wife, Gina, alleged that her husband consistently refused to consummate the marriage, leading her to believe he was either impotent or a closet homosexual who married her merely to maintain his residency status in the Philippines. This complete lack of sexual intimacy and the husband's emotional distance prompted the wife to file a complaint for the annulment of their marriage. | The persistent and unjustified refusal of a spouse to engage in sexual intercourse, an essential marital obligation, for a prolonged period is equivalent to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as it demonstrates an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. |
Persons and Family Law Article 36, Family Code |
|
Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City (31st July 1996) |
AK015093 328 Phil. 1289 , 260 SCRA 221 , G.R. No. 122749 |
The case originated from a petition filed by the husband to declare his marriage null and void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. After the trial court granted the nullity, a dispute arose regarding the applicable laws for liquidating the couple's common properties, specifically the family dwelling. The trial court issued a clarification order stating that the rules of co-ownership applied, which the petitioner contested, arguing for the application of laws governing valid or voidable marriages. | In a marriage declared void *ab initio* due to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation are governed by the rules on co-ownership under Article 147, not by the rules on conjugal partnership of gains or absolute community of property. |
Persons and Family Law Nullity of marriage; Effects |
|
Tuason vs. Court of Appeals (10th April 1996) |
AK243331 326 Phil. 169 , 256 SCRA 158 , G.R. No. 116607 |
The dispute arises from a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the wife against the husband on grounds of psychological incapacity, physical abuse, drug addiction, and infidelity. The husband participated in the initial stages of the trial but failed to appear during the presentation of his evidence, leading to a judgment by default against him which became final and executory. | Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform the client of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of the right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face; a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy available only when there is no other adequate remedy and cannot be availed of when the loss of the remedy at law was due to the party's own negligence. |
Persons and Family Law Legal separation |
|
Apa vs. Fernandez (20th March 1995) |
AK915647 G.R. No. 112381 , 242 SCRA 509 |
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Squatting Law (P.D. 772) for allegedly occupying a portion of Lot No. 3635-B and constructing their houses thereon without the consent of the registered owner, private respondent Rosita Tigol. However, three years prior to the filing of the criminal case, the petitioners had already initiated a civil action against the private respondents. This civil case sought to annul Rosita Tigol's title (TCT No. 13250) over the same lot and to have the property partitioned among them as co-heirs, asserting that they were co-owners of the land in question. | A pending civil action that directly questions the ownership of a property constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal prosecution for squatting on the same property, as the resolution of the ownership issue is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Santos vs. Court of Appeals (4th January 1995) |
AK322702 240 SCRA 20 , 310 Phil. 21 , G.R. No. 112019 |
The case arose from the application of the then-novel provision of Article 36 of the Family Code, which took effect in 1988. This provision, which introduced "psychological incapacity" as a ground to void a marriage, was adopted from Canon Law but was not defined in the statute itself. This lack of a clear definition led to varying interpretations and necessitated a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court to establish jurisprudential guidelines for its application by the courts. | Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability; it refers to a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants, and it must be a malady so deep-seated that it renders the person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations of marriage, which must be proven to have existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. |
Persons and Family Law Philosophy of Law Article 36, Family Code |
|
Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals (14th February 1994) |
AK393504 300 Phil. 78 , G.R. No. 106169 , 230 SCRA 79 |
Samson Sabalones was a member of the diplomatic service who, during his assignments abroad, left the administration of their conjugal properties to his wife, Remedios, for fifteen years. Upon his retirement in 1985, Samson returned to the Philippines but did not return to his legitimate family, choosing instead to live with a paramour, Thelma Cumareng, with whom he had contracted a bigamous marriage. | A writ of preliminary injunction may be validly issued to prevent a spouse from interfering with the administration of conjugal properties during the pendency of an appeal in a legal separation case, particularly when there is a threat of asset dissipation and the trial court has already decreed the forfeiture of that spouse's share due to adultery. |
Persons and Family Law Legal separation |
|
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (19th February 1993) |
AK910606 219 SCRA 115 , G.R. No. 97336 |
The case arose from a romantic relationship between Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian medical student residing in Dagupan City, and Marilou T. Gonzales, a 22-year-old Filipina working at a luncheonette. Baksh courted Gonzales and promised to marry her, which led her to live with him with her parents' consent. The dispute began when Baksh later repudiated his promise, prompting Gonzales to file a suit for damages based on the alleged fraudulent promise and the resulting injury to her honor. | A breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, but it can be the basis for recovering damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code if the promise was made in a fraudulent and deceptive manner to entice a woman into sexual congress (moral seduction), thereby causing willful injury to her honor and reputation in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Yu vs. Court of Appeals (21st January 1993) |
AK986897 G.R. No. 86683 , 217 SCRA 328 |
Petitioner Philip S. Yu held an exclusive sales agency agreement with the House of Mayfair in England to be the sole distributor of its wallcovering products in the Philippines since 1987. Private respondent Unisia Merchandising Co., Inc., which was previously a dealer for the petitioner, began importing and selling the same Mayfair products in the Philippine market. Unisia sourced the products not directly from House of Mayfair, but through FNF Trading, a firm in West Germany, which allegedly misled House of Mayfair into believing the products were intended for Nigeria. This created direct competition and led the petitioner to seek legal action to protect his exclusive rights. | A third party or a stranger to an exclusive distributorship contract can be enjoined from interfering with that contract; the right to perform such an agreement and reap the profits therefrom is a proprietary right, and its violation through deceptive means that results in continuous and repeated injury to a party's business and goodwill constitutes irreparable harm warranting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (11th January 1993) |
AK134873 217 SCRA 16 , G.R. No. 88694 |
Albenson Enterprises Corporation delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. but was paid with a check that was subsequently dishonored for "Account Closed." The check was drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks. In an attempt to collect the payment, Albenson conducted inquiries which led them to believe that Eugenio S. Baltao, the president of Guaranteed Industries, was the same "Eugenio Baltao" who owned E.L. Woodworks and issued the check. This belief was based on records from the SEC, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the drawee bank. This case of mistaken identity led to the filing of a criminal complaint and the subsequent civil suit for damages. | A party who files a criminal complaint against another based on probable cause and in good faith cannot be held liable for damages under the principle of abuse of rights or for malicious prosecution, even if it is later discovered that the complaint was filed against the wrong person due to an honest mistake of identity. The law does not penalize the right to litigate, and an adverse result of an action does not, by itself, make the act wrongful or subject the actor to payment of damages. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals (18th December 1992) |
AK343261 290-A Phil. 488 , 216 SCRA 692 , G.R. No. 82606 |
The case arises from a marital dispute where the husband, a Chinese citizen, admitted to cohabiting with three different women and fathering fifteen children, while denying the validity of his marriage to the petitioner. After being refused entry to the conjugal home in 1942 and denied financial support since 1968, the petitioner sought legal remedies to secure support and separate the conjugal assets accumulated during the marriage, some of which were registered in the names of dummies. | The Supreme Court held that a technical omission in the dispositive portion of a final judgment may be corrected to conform with the body of the decision when necessary to serve substantive justice, and that under the Family Code, physical separation coupled with a refusal to provide support constitutes abandonment and failure to comply with family obligations, which are valid grounds for judicial separation of property. |
Persons and Family Law Legal separation |
|
Amelita Constantino and Michael Constantino vs. Ivan Mendez and the Honorable Court of Appeals (14th May 1992) |
AK349766 G.R. No. 57227 |
In August 1974, Amelita Constantino, a 28-year-old waitress in Manila, met Ivan Mendez, a prosperous businessman from Davao City. Mendez allegedly professed his love and, through a promise of marriage, convinced Constantino to have sexual intercourse with him in his hotel room. Immediately after, he confessed that he was already married. Despite this revelation, they continued their sexual relationship in the succeeding months. Constantino became pregnant and later gave birth to a son, Michael Constantino. When her pleas for support were ignored, she filed a suit for acknowledgment, support, and damages against Mendez. | Paternity and filiation must be established by clear and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof rests on the claimant. Furthermore, moral damages for breach of promise to marry are not recoverable when sexual intercourse is a product of voluntariness and mutual desire, rather than deceit or fraud. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals (19th October 1990) |
AK911327 G.R. No. 83122 , 191 SCRA 1 |
Arturo P. Valenzuela had been a General Agent for the Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. (Philamgen) since 1965. Over thirteen years, he built a successful insurance agency. The dispute arose from a particularly large marine insurance account he secured from Delta Motors, Inc., which entitled him to a 32.5% commission. In 1977, Philamgen expressed its desire to share in this specific commission on a fifty-fifty basis, which Valenzuela consistently refused, asserting his rights under their existing General Agency Agreement. | A principal's power to revoke an agency agreement is not absolute and may not be exercised in bad faith or with an abuse of right; a termination tainted with bad faith makes the principal liable for damages. Furthermore, an agency is considered "coupled with an interest" and is not freely revocable by the principal when the agent has been induced to assume a responsibility or incur a liability, such that the agent would be exposed to personal loss if the authority were withdrawn. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera (30th June 1989) |
AK800714 174 SCRA 653 , G.R. No. 80116 |
The case arose from the marital relationship between Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, who were married in Germany in 1979. After living in Manila and having a child, the couple experienced marital discord and separated de facto. This led to Geiling filing for divorce in Germany and Pilapil filing for legal separation in the Philippines, which culminated in Geiling filing criminal complaints for adultery against Pilapil after their divorce was finalized. | For the crime of adultery, the complainant's status as an "offended spouse" must exist at the time of the filing of the criminal complaint, not just at the time of the alleged offense. Consequently, a foreigner who has obtained a valid final divorce decree under his national law is no longer the husband of his former Filipino spouse and thus lacks the legal personality and capacity to file an adultery case against her. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals (15th April 1988) |
AK841741 G.R. No. L-54598 , 160 SCRA 449 |
Violeta Delmo, a student and treasurer of the Student Leadership Club at West Visayas College, extended loans from club funds to other students pursuant to a club resolution. The College President, petitioner Jose B. Ledesma, considered this action a violation of school rules. Consequently, he dropped Delmo from the club's membership and declared her ineligible for any academic awards or citations, which jeopardized her chance of graduating with honors as a consistent full scholar. | A public officer who refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform an official duty, causing material or moral loss to another, is personally liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code. Defiance of a lawful directive from a superior, coupled with actions showing bad faith and callousness, constitutes a wrongful act that justifies the imposition of moral and exemplary damages. |
Persons and Family Law Article 27 of the Civil Code |
|
De Lima vs. Laguna Tayabas Co. (15th April 1988) |
AK258258 160 SCRA 70 , G.R. No. L-35697-99 |
The case originated from a vehicular collision on June 3, 1958, between a passenger bus owned by Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. (LTB) and a delivery truck of the Seven-Up Bottling Co. The incident resulted in the death of Petra de la Cruz and serious physical injuries to Eladia de Lima and Nemesio Flores, who were all passengers of the LTB bus. This led to the filing of three separate civil suits for damages against the respondents, which were consolidated for trial. | As an exception to the well-settled rule that a party who does not appeal a judgment cannot obtain affirmative relief, an appellate court may, on equitable grounds, modify the judgment in favor of the non-appealing party, especially when said party is an indigent litigant, the opposing party's appeal is dilatory, and substantial justice would otherwise be denied due to procedural technicalities. |
Persons and Family Law Article 24, Civil Code |
|
Aberca vs. Ver (15th April 1988) |
AK179011 G.R. No. L-69866 , 160 SCRA 590 |
The case arose from a series of "pre-emptive strikes" ordered by then-General Fabian Ver against alleged communist-terrorist underground houses in Metro Manila. These operations were carried out by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, collectively known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM). The petitioners were individuals whose homes were raided and who were subsequently arrested, detained, and subjected to various forms of abuse by TFM elements during these operations. | A civil action for damages based on violations of constitutional rights, as provided for under Article 32 of the Civil Code, may be filed against public officers, including military personnel, and is not barred by either the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the doctrine of state immunity. Furthermore, superior officers may be held liable as joint tortfeasors for the wrongful acts of their subordinates if they are found to be directly or indirectly responsible for the constitutional violations. |
Persons and Family Law Article 32, New Civil Code |
|
Hagosojos vs. Court of Appeals (28th October 1987) |
AK806672 155 SCRA 175 , No. L-59690 |
The dispute centered on the conjugal partnership assets of Anastacio Hagosojos's first marriage to Jacinta Jaucian. Upon Jacinta's death in 1959, the conjugal partnership assets should have been partitioned among her surviving spouse and their three children (Luis, Araceli, and Lourdes). Instead, Anastacio remarried in 1965 and had three more children. In 1973, Anastacio donated a large portion of the first marriage's conjugal assets (Lot No. 2736) to his minor son from the second marriage, Henry. This led to a lawsuit filed by the first marriage's children to compel partition. | A compromise agreement approved by the court becomes final and executory immediately upon approval and cannot be set aside on grounds of mistake or excusable negligence if the petition for relief under Rule 38 is not filed within the reglementary periods. Additionally, a donation of specific property from a co-owned mass, made after an alleged liquidation and partition has designated the property to others, is null and void. |
Persons and Family Law Property relations; Liquidation |
|
Tañada vs. Tuvera (29th December 1986) |
AK242154 146 SCRA 446 , G.R. No. L-63915 |
This case arose from a prior petition where the petitioners demanded the publication of numerous presidential decrees issued during the Marcos administration, which had not been published as required by law. The Supreme Court's initial decision on April 24, 1985, ordered the government to publish all unpublished presidential issuances "which are of general application." Finding this directive ambiguous, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification to precisely define the scope of laws requiring publication, the meaning of "publication," and the proper medium and timing for such publication. | Publication in the Official Gazette is an indispensable prerequisite for the effectivity of all statutes, presidential decrees, executive orders, and administrative rules intended to enforce or implement existing laws; the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code pertains only to the fifteen-day effectivity period and does not grant the legislature the power to dispense with the publication requirement itself. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr. (8th October 1985) |
AK986888 No. L-68470 , 139 SCRA 139 |
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Richard Upton, a US citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines. They had two children. In 1982, they obtained a divorce decree from a court in Nevada, USA, where Upton acknowledged that they had no community property. Subsequently, Van Dorn remarried. A year after the divorce, Upton filed a lawsuit in the Philippines, claiming that a business owned by Van Dorn was conjugal property and seeking an accounting and the right to manage it. | An absolute divorce obtained abroad by an alien spouse is valid and binding in the Philippines, and it effectively terminates the marital bond from the perspective of the alien spouse; consequently, the alien spouse loses the standing to sue the Filipino spouse in the Philippines for rights arising from the marriage, such as the management or division of alleged conjugal property. |
Persons and Family Law Article 15, Civil Code |
|
Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation (30th April 1985) |
AK256751 136 SCRA 141 , G.R. No. 30642 |
The case arose from a tragic mining accident where several employees of Philex Mining Corporation died. At the time, two distinct legal frameworks governed compensation for work-related injuries and deaths. The Workmen's Compensation Act (WCA) provided a system of limited, no-fault liability, ensuring that employees or their heirs received swift but modest compensation regardless of who was at fault. In contrast, the Civil Code allowed for actions based on tort (quasi-delict) or breach of contract, which could result in significantly higher awards for actual, moral, and exemplary damages, but required the claimant to prove the employer's fault or negligence. This created a legal conflict over which remedy was proper, particularly in cases where an employer's negligence was the direct cause of the accident. | An injured worker or their heirs have a choice of remedies between availing of the limited, no-fault compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act or suing for greater damages under the Civil Code where the injury or death is caused by the employer's gross negligence; however, these remedies are mutually exclusive. An initial choice to receive compensation under the Act will not bar a subsequent civil suit for damages if that choice was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, such as being unaware of the employer's culpable negligence at the time. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Marcia vs. Court of Appeals (27th January 1983) |
AK812962 G.R. No. 34529 , 205 Phil. 147 , 120 SCRA 193 |
The case originated from a vehicular collision on December 23, 1956, in Lubao, Pampanga, between a passenger bus operated by Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by Felardo Paje, and a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia. The collision resulted in the death of Clemente Marcia and physical injuries to the petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, who were passengers in the jeep. This led to the filing of both a criminal action against the bus driver and a separate civil action for damages by the injured parties against the driver and the bus company. | An acquittal of an accused in a criminal case for reckless imprudence, which is based on a final judicial declaration that the fact from which civil liability may arise did not exist, bars a subsequent civil action for damages arising from the same incident. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals (23rd November 1981) |
AK972092 108 SCRA 314 , 195 Phil. 174 , G.R. No. L-38287 |
Antonio and Filomena Macadangdang married in 1946 and amassed significant wealth through various businesses in Davao. They separated in 1965 following the deterioration of their relationship and allegations of Antonio's illicit affairs. In 1971, Filomena filed a complaint for legal separation. The trial court granted the separation in 1973 but did not immediately divide the property due to the lack of an inventory, reserving this for a later decision. Antonio did not appeal this initial decision but later contested the court's jurisdiction to appoint an administrator, claiming the main case was not yet final. | A trial court judgment granting legal separation is final and appealable immediately upon issuance, even if it reserves the actual liquidation and division of conjugal properties for a later supplemental decision, because the dissolution of the property regime is a mandatory legal consequence of the decree under Article 106 of the Civil Code and the partition is merely incidental to the main judgment. |
Persons and Family Law Legal separation |
|
Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (30th October 1980) |
AK184426 100 SCRA 602 , G.R. No. L-44190 |
Manila Gas Corporation, a public utility, supplied gas to the residence and 46-door apartment complex of Isidro M. Ongsip, a prominent businessman. After new appliances were installed in 1965, the gas meter readings remained unusually low, registering zero consumption in May and June 1966. This discrepancy prompted Manila Gas to investigate, leading to the discovery of an alleged illegal "jumper" or by-pass valve, which became the basis for the ensuing legal conflict. | A public utility corporation that files a baseless criminal complaint for qualified theft against a customer with malicious intent to vex and humiliate, and subsequently disconnects the customer's service without the required prior notice in breach of contract and in bad faith, is liable for moral and exemplary damages; however, the amount of such damages may be reduced by the court based on the specific circumstances of the case, including the financial capacity of the utility and any mitigating actions or faults of the customer. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals (21st November 1978) |
AK844009 86 SCRA 641 |
The dispute originated from a double sale of a parcel of land originally owned by Petre Galero. Galero first engaged the services of Atty. Benito Laig to recover the property in a civil case. After winning the case and after the decision became final, Galero transferred the entire property to Atty. Laig—one-half by sale and the other half as contingent attorney's fees. Years later, Galero, with the assistance of Atty. Jose L. Lapak, fraudulently obtained a new owner's duplicate title and sold the same property to Carmen Verso. This second sale was registered by the Register of Deeds, Atty. Baldomero M. Lapak, who was the father of Atty. Jose L. Lapak. This prompted the heirs of Atty. Laig to file a suit to annul the second sale and for reconveyance, leading to the present protracted legal battle. | The prohibition under Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code, which prevents lawyers from acquiring by purchase the property and rights which are the object of litigation in which they take part, applies only during the pendency of the litigation. A sale of such property to the lawyer after the judgment has become final and the property is no longer in litigation is valid. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Lim vs. Ponce de Leon (29th August 1975) |
AK198759 66 SCRA 299 , G.R. No. L-22554 |
Jikil Taha sold a motor launch to Alberto Timbangcaya. A year later, Timbangcaya filed a criminal complaint, alleging that Taha had forcibly retaken the launch. Based on this, Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon initiated a criminal case for robbery against Taha. In the interim, Taha had sold the same motor launch to Delfin Lim. The fiscal, upon learning of the launch's location and its subsequent sale to Lim, ordered its seizure as evidence in the pending criminal case, leading to the present civil suit for damages. | A public officer, such as a provincial fiscal, has no authority to order the seizure of private property without a valid search warrant, even if the property is the *corpus delicti* of a crime. A violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures by a public officer gives rise to civil liability for damages under Article 32 of the New Civil Code, and the officer's good faith is not a valid defense. |
Persons and Family Law Article 32, New Civil Code |
|
People vs. Licera (22nd July 1975) |
AK629032 G. R. No. L-39990 , 65 SCRA 270 |
The case arose from a legal uncertainty created by two conflicting Supreme Court decisions regarding the illegal possession of firearms. The earlier doctrine, established in _People vs. Macarandang_, interpreted Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code to include secret agents appointed by governors as "peace officers" exempt from firearm licensing requirements. A later case, _People vs. Mapa_, explicitly overturned this interpretation. The accused, Rafael Licera, was appointed as a secret agent and apprehended for possessing a firearm while the _Macarandang_ doctrine was still in effect, but was tried and convicted after the _Mapa_ doctrine had been established. | A new judicial doctrine in the field of penal law that abrogates a previous one must be applied prospectively and cannot be given retroactive effect if it would be prejudicial to an accused who acted in reliance on the old doctrine. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
People vs. Jabinal (27th February 1974) |
AK908521 55 SCRA 607 , G.R. No. L-30061 |
The legal context of this case revolves around the interpretation of firearm laws, specifically the exemption for "peace officers." Initially, in the cases of _People vs. Macarandang_ (1959) and _People vs. Lucero_ (1958), the Supreme Court held that individuals appointed as secret agents with duties related to maintaining peace and order were considered "peace officers" and thus exempt from the requirement of a license to possess firearms. This interpretation was abruptly overturned in 1967 by the ruling in _People vs. Mapa_, which adopted a strict and literal interpretation of the law, holding that secret agents are not included in the list of exempted persons and are therefore liable for illegal possession. The present case arose from an act committed in 1964, when the old, more lenient doctrine was still in effect, but was decided by the trial court in 1968, after the new, stricter doctrine was established. | When a judicial doctrine is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not retroactively prejudice parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof, especially in the construction and application of criminal laws. |
Persons and Family Law |
|
Lapuz vs. Eufemio (31st January 1972) |
AK747709 150 Phil. 204 , G.R. No. L-30977 |
The case arose from a marital dispute where the wife sought legal separation due to her husband's abandonment and cohabitation with another woman, while the husband countered that their marriage was void due to his prior existing marriage. The legal proceedings were interrupted when the wife died in a car accident, raising the legal question of whether her heirs could continue the lawsuit to secure the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the forfeiture of the husband's share of the profits. | An action for legal separation is purely personal in nature and abates upon the death of one of the spouses; it does not survive the death of the plaintiff even if property rights are involved, as those rights are mere effects of a decree of legal separation which cannot be rendered after death has already dissolved the marriage. |
Persons and Family Law |
Silverio vs. Republic
19th October 2007
ak402555Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc.
28th August 2007
ak150634Maquilan vs. Maquilan
8th June 2007
ak265106Republic vs. Lacap
2nd March 2007
ak609364Ong vs. Ong
23rd October 2006
ak031915Muller vs. Muller
29th August 2006
ak139276Antonio vs. Reyes
10th March 2006
ak471421Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Verchez
31st January 2006
ak180962Republic vs. Orbecido III
5th October 2005
ak557171Abalos vs. Macatangay
30th September 2004
ak624924Joaquino vs. Reyes
13th July 2004
ak790023Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals
18th February 2004
ak750372DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
20th April 2001
ak928097Ty vs. Court of Appeals
27th November 2000
ak843193Marcos vs. Marcos
19th October 2000
ak266337Alipio vs. Court of Appeals
29th September 2000
ak484811University of the East vs. Jader
17th February 2000
ak405597Ventura vs. Militante
5th October 1999
ak289105Sumbad vs. Court of Appeals
21st June 1999
ak628629Palmares vs. Court of Appeals
31st March 1998
ak070111Agapay vs. Palang
28th July 1997
ak081573Republic vs. Court of Appeals (Molina Case)
13th February 1997
ak581680Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals
16th January 1997
ak887142Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City
31st July 1996
ak015093Tuason vs. Court of Appeals
10th April 1996
ak243331Apa vs. Fernandez
20th March 1995
ak915647Santos vs. Court of Appeals
4th January 1995
ak322702Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals
14th February 1994
ak393504Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
19th February 1993
ak910606Yu vs. Court of Appeals
21st January 1993
ak986897Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
11th January 1993
ak134873Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals
18th December 1992
ak343261Amelita Constantino and Michael Constantino vs. Ivan Mendez and the Honorable Court of Appeals
14th May 1992
ak349766Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals
19th October 1990
ak911327Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera
30th June 1989
ak800714Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals
15th April 1988
ak841741De Lima vs. Laguna Tayabas Co.
15th April 1988
ak258258Aberca vs. Ver
15th April 1988
ak179011Hagosojos vs. Court of Appeals
28th October 1987
ak806672Tañada vs. Tuvera
29th December 1986
ak242154Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.
8th October 1985
ak986888Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation
30th April 1985
ak256751Marcia vs. Court of Appeals
27th January 1983
ak812962Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals
23rd November 1981
ak972092Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
30th October 1980
ak184426Vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals
21st November 1978
ak844009Lim vs. Ponce de Leon
29th August 1975
ak198759People vs. Licera
22nd July 1975
ak629032People vs. Jabinal
27th February 1974
ak908521Lapuz vs. Eufemio
31st January 1972
ak747709