Digests

The case arose from a scheme to seduce a minor by creating the false impression of a legal marriage. The deception involved forging a marriage certificate and impersonating a religious official, raising questions about the proper classification of the crime and the degree of participation of each accused.

The SC held that the crime committed was a complex crime under Article 89 of the Penal Code, as the acts constituted two distinct offenses: (1) seduction and (2) usurpation of functions (Article 321 of the Penal Code). The accused were both principals, with Hernandez being a principal by inducement and Bautista a principal by direct participation.

The case involves land registration claims over parcels within a designated U.S. military reservation in Mindanao. The dispute centers on whether the applicant's predecessors-in-interest held registrable private title under Moro customary law, or whether the land was inalienable tribal common land.

The sale of land by a Moro datto or tribal chief, conveying rights in land that is common tribal property, is void unless expressly authorized by the government. Private land cultivated and owned by an individual Moro may be sold, but the claimant must prove clear, individual title under Moro custom.

The case arose from a criminal action for malversation of public funds. To secure the temporary liberty of the accused, Walter Schultz, the appellees (Addison and Gomez) executed a bail bond. The accused subsequently disappeared and failed to appear for his scheduled trial, leading to a forfeiture proceeding against the sureties.

The sureties on a bail bond become, in law, the jailers of the principal (accused). Their responsibility is not terminated merely because a court refuses to issue an order of arrest; they possess the independent right and duty to arrest the principal themselves and surrender him to the authorities to exonerate themselves from the bond.

The case involves a prosecution for rape. The core legal issue is the required specificity for alleging the time of a crime's commission in a criminal information under the then-governing procedural rules.

An information must allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness to enable the accused to prepare his defense. An allegation that a crime was committed "between October, 1910, to August, 1912" is too indefinite and renders the information defective.

Teodoro Yulo, a property owner, had a borrowing arrangement (current account) with the firm Inchausti & Co. for the cultivation of his haciendas. Upon his death, his widow and children (the "Yulos") continued the account, which grew to a substantial balance. To secure the debt, several of the Yulo children executed mortgage contracts acknowledging the debt as a solidary obligation.

A subsequent contract with some solidary debtors that reduces the debt and alters payment terms does not novate the original solidary obligation unless the intent to extinguish the old obligation is expressly declared or the old and new obligations are entirely incompatible. The benefits of the reduction inure to all solidary debtors.

The case originates from a dispute over the registration of a parcel of land originally owned by Rufino Francisco. Francisco executed a series of conflicting transactions involving the land: a pacto de retro sale, an attachment and execution sale of his repurchase right, and a prior unregistered absolute sale. The opponents to registration were the heirs of the prior unregistered buyer.

The right to repurchase in a pacto de retro sale is a personal right that can be sold at execution sale, but if the original owner validly repurchases the property before the execution purchaser sells his interest, the subsequent purchaser acquires no title or interest in the land.

The case arose from a civil suit for a sum of money filed by Agapito Carranceja against Pedro Rampas before a justice of the peace court. During that trial, Rampas introduced a receipt to prove the alleged debt had been paid.

For falsification of a private document under Article 300 of the Penal Code, the element of "imitation" of a signature does not require a perfect or convincing forgery. It is sufficient that there was an intent to imitate, an attempt to do so, and that the forged signature bears some resemblance to the genuine one.

The case involves a charitable bequest administered by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro. Father Agustin de la Peña was authorized to receive and manage the legacy for constructing a leper hospital. The dispute arose over funds he collected that were later seized by the U.S. military during the Philippine-American War.

A trustee or obligor is not liable for the loss of property due to a fortuitous event or force majeure, as provided in Article 1105 of the Civil Code, even if the trust funds were commingled with personal funds, absent a specific law or contractual stipulation imposing absolute liability.

The case arose under the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines (then based on the Spanish Penal Code of 1884). Following the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, the principle of separation of church and state was established, rendering obsolete those Penal Code provisions that granted special protections to a state religion or discriminated against other sects.

An essential element of the crime defined under Article 223 of the Penal Code is the specific intent of the offender to coercively interfere with the religious beliefs of another person. A mere disturbance or interruption of a religious service, absent this intent, falls under the general public order offense in Article 571.

The case arises from a commission agreement where Igpuara, acting for Ramirez and Co., sold sugar for Juana Montilla. After settling the commission, a balance of P2,498 remained in Igpuara's possession, which he acknowledged in a document stating the sum was held at Veraguth's disposal. Upon demand, Igpuara failed to return the money, leading to a criminal charge for estafa.

The essential element of estafa under Article 535, No. 5 of the Penal Code is the willful appropriation or diversion of property received in trust to the detriment of another; mere failure to return the property is insufficient without proof of such appropriation.

The case arises from a dispute over spousal support following a private agreement of separation. At the time, the Civil Code governed marital relations and property regimes, requiring judicial decree for separation of property during marriage.

A wife's statutory right to support under the Civil Code is not nullified by the invalidity of a private separation agreement between spouses. However, the husband may interpose and prove the wife's adultery as a valid defense to defeat her claim for support.

The case arose in the early American colonial period in the Philippines. The accused, Panglima Indanan, was a recognized headman (a local leader) in Parang, Sulu. The legal framework applied was the Spanish Penal Code, which defined principals in a crime as those who directly force or induce others to commit it.

A person who directly induces another to commit a crime through commands or representations that are the determining cause of the act, and who acts with the intention of producing the criminal result, is liable as a principal by inducement.

The case involves a dispute over ownership of a coconut land in San Pablo, Laguna. The defendant, Nicasio Capule, a clerk for a notary public, prepared a document purporting to be a deed of sale from the landowners to himself. The landowners were illiterate and claimed they only intended to execute a power of attorney for Capule to represent them in a lawsuit.

The SC held that the act of preparing a notarial document (a deed of sale) that attributes false statements and a false transaction to persons who never consented to it constitutes falsification of a public document under Articles 300 and 301 of the Penal Code, even if the document's preparation involved deceit in obtaining the signatories' marks.

The case arose from a robbery in a dwelling (a shop) in Mambajao, Misamis, on December 24, 1911. The accused used force (breaking a wall) to enter and steal property. The legal issue centered on the correct classification of the robbery and the application of aggravating circumstances to determine the proper penalty.

The SC held that the crime was correctly classified as simple robbery, not qualified robbery, because the concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and band did not automatically qualify the offense under the specific provisions of the Philippine Penal Code. The maximum penalty was properly imposed due to the presence of multiple generic aggravating circumstances.

The case involves a nighttime killing inside a home, where the defendant claimed she acted in defense of her honor against what she believed was an imminent sexual assault.

When a person acts in legitimate self-defense but employs means that are reasonably excessive given the nature of the perceived attack, the defense is incomplete. This results in a mitigating circumstance that lowers the penalty, rather than a complete exemption from criminal liability.

The plaintiffs and defendants are sisters who inherited real properties from their mother. The defendants, residing in the Philippines, administered the properties. The plaintiff, residing abroad for much of the time, sought judicial partition and an accounting of rents and profits. The defendants admitted the co-ownership but counterclaimed for reimbursement for major reconstruction expenses on one of the houses.

A co-owner has the right to use and enjoy the entire common property, provided such use is in accordance with the property's nature and does not prejudice the interests of the co-ownership or prevent other co-owners from exercising their rights. A co-owner is entitled to reimbursement from other co-owners for necessary and useful expenses incurred for the preservation or improvement of the common property.

The case arises from a fatal accident involving a streetcar operated by the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company in Manila. The legal issue centers on the standard of care required of a motorman and whether a breach of that duty constitutes criminal negligence.

A motorman operating a streetcar on a public thoroughfare in a densely populated area has a duty, before starting the car from a standstill, to satisfy himself that the track immediately in front is clear. Failure to do so, resulting in a fatal accident, constitutes reckless negligence (imprudencia temeraria) under the law.

Following the cession of the Philippines to the United States via the Treaty of Paris (1898), the political status of inhabitants was determined by U.S. law, primarily the Philippine Bill of 1902. The Chinese Exclusion Acts were applied in the islands, barring Chinese laborers and subjects from entry. The case tested the citizenship of a person born under Spanish rule but seeking entry under American sovereignty.

A child born in the Philippines to a domiciled alien father and a native mother, whose father dies during the child's minority and whose mother thereafter reacquires Philippine citizenship, is deemed a Philippine citizen, especially when the child returns upon majority and elects the nationality of his birthplace.

During the American colonial period, election disputes were governed by special statutes creating summary proceedings. Confusion existed regarding whether these special tribunals (CFIs) could adjudicate candidate qualifications or only vote counts. This case clarified the separation between election contests (ballot scrutiny) and eligibility disputes (qualifications), assigning the latter to administrative officers or regular judicial proceedings (quo warranto).

Courts of First Instance exercising special jurisdiction under Section 27 of the Election Law (Act No. 1582, as amended) have no power to determine the eligibility or legal qualifications of candidates; their jurisdiction is confined strictly to contests regarding the casting and counting of ballots.

The dispute involved a parcel of land in Ilocos Sur that was previously submerged under the river running between Vigan and Bantay. The river naturally shifted its course northward, leaving the land dry. The plaintiffs, heirs of Mariano Villanueva, claimed ownership as the land was adjacent to their inherited property. The defendant, Valeriano Claustro, had occupied the land for many years.

Land from an abandoned riverbed due to a natural change in course belongs to the owners of the adjoining riparian estates by right of accretion, and mere occupation of such land without a valid title cannot serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription.

The case involves a dispute over the issuance of a clearance certificate to a bonded government employee who had resigned. The Auditor’s clearance was required under Act No. 1605 for the employee to collect accrued leave, salary, and transportation, and to legally depart the Philippine Islands. The Auditor’s refusal was based on a perceived risk of a future lawsuit against the government related to the petitioner’s former duties.

The writ of mandamus will not lie to control the judgment and discretion of the Auditor for the Philippine Islands in the examination, audit, and settlement of government accounts, as such duties are discretionary, not ministerial. The aggrieved party must exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal provided by law.

Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, suffered from left-side paralysis for 14-15 years before his death, lost his hearing and speech, but retained the use of his right hand and could communicate via signs. He executed a will in 1908 and died in 1909. His widow, Juliana Bagtas, the named executrix, sought to probate the will. His son and grandchildren by a former marriage opposed it.

The presumption of law is in favor of a testator's mental capacity, and the burden of proving lack of testamentary capacity rests squarely on the will's contestants. Mere physical infirmity, old age, or impaired speech do not, by themselves, establish mental incapacity to make a will.

This case arose from a civil suit for recovery of possession of land. After a justice of the peace court ruled against Cayetano Ramayrat and ordered him to return land to Sabino Vayson, a writ of execution was issued directing the sheriff to place Vayson in possession. Ramayrat refused to deliver the land, leading to a criminal complaint for gross disobedience under Article 252 of the Penal Code.

The crime of gross disobedience to authorities under Article 252 of the Penal Code requires the disobedience of a direct, specific order issued by an authority in the exercise of its official duties. A civil judgment merely declaratory of rights, and the writ of execution for its enforcement which is directed to a sheriff, does not constitute such a direct order to the judgment obligor.

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 124, amending its building code to require that any new building "shall abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a private street or alley which has been officially approved." The ordinance was justified as a measure to improve sanitation, prevent overcrowding, and ensure access for emergency services.

A municipal ordinance that restricts building permits to structures abutting public or officially approved private streets is a valid exercise of police power, provided it is reasonably necessary for public health and safety and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

Teofilo Osorio, a clerk of the Cebu police force, conspired with two municipal policemen to extort money from Yap Buyco, a Chinese merchant. The scheme involved Osorio's brother planting a can of opium in the merchant's store. Osorio and his accomplices then entered the store, pretended to be police officers (with Osorio posing as the chief), conducted a warrantless search, and "found" the opium. They threatened Yap Buyco with immediate arrest and prosecution for illegal possession of opium unless he paid them P1,000, later reduced to P300. The money was paid, and the accused left, assuring the merchant he would "take responsibility" for the opium.

The taking of personal property through intimidation is robbery when the intimidation consists of acts that inspire immediate fear in the victim, compelling the on-the-spot delivery of property. The essential element is the use of threats that restrict the victim's free will, analogous to violence, distinguishing it from estafa (which involves deceit) or the crime of threats (which involves future injury).

The case arose during the American colonial period under the Philippine Bill of 1903 (the then-applicable constitution), which guaranteed the inviolability of the dwelling. The defendants were charged with illegal possession of morphine, a prohibited drug under Act No. 1761 (the Opium Law).

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not render evidence inadmissible if it was obtained from a lawful search incident to a lawful arrest. A person's dwelling is not a sanctuary for crime, and evidence discovered therein during a valid arrest is admissible.

The case arose from the theft of municipal funds in Calabanga, Ambos Camarines. The municipal treasurer, Rufino Ponte, was charged with malversation. Several municipal policemen were charged as co-principals for allegedly helping him remove the safe containing the funds from the treasury.

Under Act No. 1740, the crime of malversation can be committed not only by the bonded officer or employee who has direct custody of the funds, but also by any other person who directly participates in the misappropriation as a co-principal.

The case involves the falsification of a civil registry entry. The municipal secretary of Libacao, Capiz, was accused of making a false entry in the register of births, recording a child as legitimate when she was not, and then issuing a certificate based on that false entry.

The SC held that a birth certificate, which is a certified copy of an entry in an official registry, does not fall within the category of "certificates" penalized under Article 310 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the issuance of such a certificate, even if it contains falsehoods from the registry, cannot be prosecuted as falsification under that specific article.

The case involves the application of Articles 249 and 250 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1887 (as then in force in the Philippines), which penalize attempts (attacks, employments of force, or intimidation) against persons in authority or their agents.

An attack on a person in authority is considered to be in relation to and by reason of the exercise of their official duties if the motive for the assault originates from an official act, even if the physical attack occurs outside the court premises and after the official proceeding has concluded.

The case arose from the prosecution of Ignacio Carlos for systematically stealing electricity by installing a "jumper" device on his electric meter. This device diverted current so that the meter registered only a fraction of the electricity actually consumed, defrauding the utility company of payment for the difference over a period of about one year.

Electric current, though not a tangible chattel in the traditional sense, is a valuable article of merchandise capable of appropriation by another and thus constitutes "personal property" (cosa mueble) subject to theft under Articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code.

This case arose during the American colonial period, involving a dispute over land in Surigao that was originally part of the seashore and had been gradually raised by alluvial deposits. The government sought to recover possession from a private commercial firm that had occupied and built upon the land for years.

Land reclaimed from the sea by accretion and the adjacent seashore are part of the public domain intended for public use; they are outside the commerce of man and cannot be acquired by private persons through prescription or occupation without express authorization from the competent government authority.

The applicant sought to register a small lot in Manila under the Land Registration Act. The Government opposed, arguing the land was part of the public domain as defined by the Civil Code and the Law of Waters of 1886, as it was alternately covered and uncovered by the tide (the playa or shore).

Private property does not automatically become part of the public domain due to gradual tidal encroachment if the owner has not abandoned it and the property has not been totally destroyed or lost its utility for the owner's purposes.

The case involves a justice of the peace who, in handling appealed civil cases, ordered the cancellation of appeal bonds, dismissed the appeals for failure to file new bonds, and released the cash deposits to the prevailing plaintiff to satisfy the judgments. This led to a criminal charge for malversation under Act No. 1740.

Malversation of public funds requires criminal intent; a public officer's good-faith exercise of judicial functions, even if erroneous, does not constitute the crime.

This case arose during the American colonial period under the Philippine Opium Law (Act No. 2381), which prohibited the possession and sale of opium except for medicinal purposes. The legal context involved the complex interplay between local penal laws and the international law principle that treats a foreign vessel in port as an extension of its home nation's territory (the "French Rule").

Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try offenses involving prohibited articles (like opium) when those articles are landed from a foreign vessel in transit onto Philippine territory, as this act constitutes a distinct violation of local penal law within the country's jurisdiction.

The Esmedia and Abando families were neighbors in Sibalom, Antique, with a pre-existing land dispute. A violent confrontation erupted in a rice field between Gregorio Esmedia (father of the accused) and Santiago Abando. Santiago stabbed Gregorio, and Santiago then attacked Gregorio with a bolo. The accused, Ponciano and Mena Esmedia, intervened, leading to the deaths of Santiago, his father Ciriaco Abando, and eventually Gregorio Esmedia from his wounds.

The justifying circumstance of defense of a relative requires unlawful aggression from the victim being defended against. When an accused kills an aggressor (Santiago) in defense of a relative (Gregorio), the killing is justified. However, attacking and killing a third party (Ciriaco) who arrives after the aggression has terminated and poses no threat constitutes homicide, not justified self-defense.

The case arose from a murder investigation of a Roman Catholic priest in Escalante, Negros Occidental. In the related murder case (United States v. Gil Gamao et al.), the accused, Lope Estraña, testified for the defense, providing an alibi for a suspect by stating that Dionisio Tambolero was at his house on the night of the murder. The prosecution believed this testimony was false and charged Estraña with perjury.

Under Act No. 1697, materiality of the false testimony is an essential element of the crime of perjury. A complaint for perjury that fails to allege the materiality of the false statement is fatally defective.

Jose de la Peña y Gomiz executed a power of attorney in 1887 in favor of Federico Hidalgo and others to administer his properties in Manila while he resided in Spain. Hidalgo acted as agent from November 1887 until his departure for Spain in March 1894 due to serious illness. Before leaving, he rendered final accounts and turned over the administration to his cousin, Antonio Hidalgo, notifying the principal and requesting a new power of attorney for Antonio. The principal did not respond but allowed Antonio to administer the properties for nearly nine years until his death in 1902. A third administrator, Francisco Hidalgo, then managed the properties until 1904. The plaintiff, the principal…

An agent who renounces his agency for a valid cause and gives proper notice to the principal is released from liability for the subsequent administration of the property by a third party, if the principal, with knowledge, tacitly consents to the new arrangement.

Chuoco Tiaco, a Chinese national and long-time resident of Manila, was deported to China in August 1909 on the orders of Governor-General Forbes, acting on a request from the Chinese Consul-General and citing public interest. Tiaco later returned and filed a suit in the CFI against Forbes, the Chief of Police, and the Chief of Secret Service, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent a second deportation. The CFI judge (Crossfield) issued a preliminary injunction and overruled the defendants' demurrer. The defendants then filed an original action for prohibition in the SC.

The power to deport objectionable aliens is an inherent political power of the Philippine Government, vested in the executive department (specifically the Governor-General). The exercise of this power is not subject to judicial review or control, and no action for damages will lie against the executive for acts performed in its exercise.

• The case originated from a dispute appealed to the SC.
• On December 26, 1908, the SC issued a minute resolution reversing the lower court's judgment and absolving the defendant, with a note that an extended opinion would follow.
• No extended opinion was ever filed. Two of the four justices who signed the resolution later left the Court.
• The plaintiffs (appellees) moved to cancel the entry of judgment and recall the records, arguing no valid final judgment existed because the required grounds were never stated.

A statutory requirement that courts state the grounds for their decisions in writing is directory, not mandatory. The failure to comply with such a procedural directive does not invalidate a judgment that is otherwise duly and formally rendered.

The case arose during the American colonial period. The defendant was charged with murder for the fatal shooting of Feliciano Sanchez. The prosecution alleged premeditation, but the evidence showed a single, accidental discharge during a lawful hunting trip.

A killing committed by accident or misfortune while the accused is performing a lawful act with due care, and without any criminal intent or negligence, does not give rise to criminal liability.

The case arose from a master-servant dispute in 1907. The defendant, a barrio lieutenant, used his authority to detain his servant following a domestic argument, raising issues about the limits of an official's power to arrest.

An agent of authority (such as a barrio lieutenant) commits arbitrary detention when they arrest and detain a person without legal grounds, thereby depriving them of liberty without lawful basis.

The case arises from the enforcement of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission, which aimed to prevent cruelty to animals during maritime transport. The defendant, a foreign shipmaster, contested the application of these laws to his vessel and actions.

The SC has jurisdiction over a continuing offense committed partly within Philippine territorial waters, even if on a foreign vessel, and the Philippine government possesses the delegated authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

The case arises from a criminal complaint for estafa filed against Emilio Bedoya, a commission agent. He received merchandise from The Schweiger Import and Export Company with an obligation to either return the unsold goods or pay for them within thirty days. After the period lapsed without return or payment, and after Bedoya tendered a draft that was later dishonored, the company initiated criminal proceedings.

The delivery of a bill of exchange or promissory note to order produces the effects of payment when, by the fault of the creditor, its value has been affected. Here, the creditor's failure to protest the draft after its dishonor constituted such fault, legally extinguishing the debt and negating the crime of estafa.

Domingo Ubag, suffering from tuberculosis and asthma, executed a will leaving his entire estate to his widow, Catalina Bugnao. His siblings, who would inherit under intestacy, contested the will's validity.

A will is valid if the testator, at the time of execution, possesses testamentary capacity—meaning they comprehend the transaction, recollect their property and potential heirs, and understand how the will distributes their estate—even if suffering from physical illness or weakness.

Following the Philippine-American War, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1696 to suppress symbols of the recent insurrection and maintain public order. The law criminalized the public display of flags, emblems, or devices used by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

For crimes classified as mala prohibita, the criminal intent (mens rea) of the accused is not an element of the offense; the mere commission of the prohibited act is sufficient for conviction. Furthermore, a statute must be construed according to its spirit and intent to avoid absurdity and effectuate its purpose, which in this case includes prohibiting duplicates of insurrectionist symbols.

• In 1890 and 1891, Cenona Rama executed two contracts borrowing money from Victoriano Osmeña, payable in sugar, and pledged her property as security.
• Victoriano Osmeña died; his heir, Agustina Rafols, acquired the contracts and later ceded them to the plaintiff, Tomas Osmeña.
• In 1902, Rama signed an acknowledgment of the debt to Tomas Osmeña, adding: "if the house... is sold, I will pay my indebtedness."
• Rama failed to pay, leading Osmeña to file suit in 1906.

A written acknowledgment of a debt that includes a condition dependent solely on the debtor's will (a potestative condition) voids only the condition, not the obligation itself. Such an acknowledgment is treated as an absolute admission of the debt, which interrupts the prescriptive period for filing an action.

The case arose from a dispute between owners of adjacent lots in the municipality of Iloilo. The defendant was constructing a house of strong materials on its lot. The plaintiff objected to the placement of windows and balconies on the side of the defendant's house facing his property, alleging they violated the Civil Code's rules on easements of light and view.

The owner of a building constructed less than two meters from the boundary line of an adjoining property is prohibited by Article 582 of the Civil Code from making windows with direct views, balconies, or similar openings overlooking that adjoining property. The adjoining owner has the right to demand the closure of such prohibited openings.

This case arose during the transition from Spanish procedural law to the new American-inspired Code of Civil Procedure. There was confusion among the bar and bench regarding the proper use of the equitable remedy of injunction, with many conflating it with the former summary interdictos (possessory actions) under Spanish law.

An injunction will not be granted to take property out of the possession of one party and put it into the possession of another whose title has not been established by law, especially when an adequate remedy at law (such as an action for recovery of possession) exists.

The case arose from a claim for professional fees by a physician (Dr. Arturo Pelayo) against the parents-in-law (Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella) of a woman he assisted during a difficult childbirth. The core legal question was whether the act of summoning the doctor created an obligation for the in-laws to pay, or if that duty belonged to the patient's husband.

The obligation to pay for necessary medical services rendered to a spouse during childbirth or illness falls upon the other spouse as part of the mutual duty of support under Articles 142 and 143 of the Civil Code. Third parties who summon a doctor in an emergency are not automatically liable for the fees unless they expressly contract to pay.

This case arose during the American colonial period, when the Philippine legal system was a hybrid of Spanish civil law and newly introduced American statutes. Act No. 1461, known as the "Opium Law," penalized the sale of opium. The Philippine Commission later passed Act No. 1761, which repealed Act No. 1461. The central legal conflict was which rule of statutory construction governed the effect of this repeal on pending prosecutions.

The repeal of a penal statute does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders for violations committed prior to the repeal, unless the new law wholly decriminalizes the act or imposes a more favorable penalty.