Primary Holding

Certiorari and prohibition do not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod authorizing expropriation because a resolution is a legislative act, not a judicial or quasi-judicial one. Furthermore, initiating expropriation requires an ordinance, not a resolution, under the Local Government Code.

Background

Spouses Yusay owned land in Mandaluyong City, part of which they rented out. The City Council passed a resolution authorizing the City Mayor to initiate expropriation of the land for low-cost housing. The Yusays, fearing immediate action, filed certiorari and prohibition to annul the resolution.

Facts

• 1. Spouses Yusay owned a 1,044 square meter land in Mandaluyong City.
• 2. Half of the land was their residence, and the other half was rented to nine families.
• 3. On October 2, 1997, the Mandaluyong City Council passed Resolution No. 552 authorizing the City Mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings for the land.
• 4. The purpose was to develop the land for low-cost housing for less privileged city inhabitants.
• 5. The City claimed that the families occupying the land had been negotiating to buy it but were refused by the Yusays.
• 6. The Yusays filed certiorari and prohibition against the resolution, arguing it was unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without effect.
• 7. The City argued the resolution was merely authorization to initiate expropriation and was not yet an expropriation itself.

Arguments of the Petitioners

• 1. Resolution No. 552 was unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect.
• 2. The petition for certiorari and prohibition was not premature.
• 3. The resolution was invalid and could be assailed even before implementation as it already paved the way for deprivation of property.
• 4. The resolution was passed without due process as they were not invited to subsequent hearings.
• 5. The purpose of expropriation was not for public use or benefit to the greater number of inhabitants.
• 6. They argued a resolution was insufficient for expropriation, suggesting an ordinance was needed.

Arguments of the Respondents

• 1. Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization for the City Mayor to initiate legal steps for expropriation, including making an offer to purchase.
• 2. The petition for certiorari and prohibition was premature because no actual expropriation had occurred.
• 3. Resolution No. 552 was a legislative act of the City Council and not subject to certiorari.
• 4. The resolution was valid and in accordance with the city's power of eminent domain.

Issues

• 1. Can the validity of Resolution No. 552 be assailed even before its implementation?
• 2. Must a citizen await the takeover of property before challenging unjust expropriation?
• 3. Was certiorari and prohibition a proper remedy against Resolution No. 552?
• 4. Is a resolution sufficient to initiate expropriation proceedings, or is an ordinance required?

Ruling

• 1. The Supreme Court held that certiorari and prohibition were not proper remedies against Resolution No. 552.
• 2. Certiorari is only available to correct judicial or quasi-judicial acts performed without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolution No. 552 was a legislative act, not judicial or quasi-judicial.
• 3. Prohibition is also not applicable as the City Council was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions in passing the resolution, but was expressing its sentiment.
• 4. The Local Government Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, to initiate expropriation. Resolution No. 552 was therefore insufficient to initiate expropriation proceedings.
• 5. The suit was premature as the City had not yet filed a complaint for expropriation in court.

Doctrines

• 1. Certiorari: A special civil action to review and correct errors of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, committed by a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
• 2. Prohibition: A special civil action to prevent a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person from unlawfully exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
• 3. Eminent Domain: The inherent power of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Local Government Units can exercise this power, but must follow specific legal procedures.
• 4. Ordinance vs. Resolution: An ordinance is a law passed by a local legislative body, possessing a general and permanent character, requiring specific procedures for enactment (like three readings). A resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion, temporary in nature, and with simpler enactment procedures. For expropriation under the Local Government Code, an ordinance is required, not just a resolution.

Key Excerpts

• 1. "Certiorari does not lie to assail the issuance of a resolution by the Sanggunian Panglungsod."
• 2. "A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding."
• 3. "An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature."
• 4. "Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people."

Precedents Cited

• 1. Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals: Cited for the requisites of certiorari.
• 2. Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation: Cited for the requisites of certiorari.
• 3. Republic v. Yang Chi Hao: Cited for the purpose of certiorari as correcting defects in jurisdiction.
• 4. Chua v. Court of Appeals: Cited for the purpose of certiorari as correcting defects in jurisdiction.
• 5. Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation: Cited to emphasize that expropriation complaint based on resolution is insufficient and requires an ordinance.
• 6. Beluso v. The Municipality of Panay (Capiz): N/A (Not directly discussed in detail, just listed in citation).
• 7. Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong: N/A (Listed as "see also", indicating related context but not explicitly discussed).
• 8. Magallanes v. Sarita: Cited for the purpose of prohibition as preventing unlawful exercise of legal authority.
• 9. Tan v. Court of Appeals: N/A (Listed in citations regarding prohibition).
• 10. Vergara v. Rugue: N/A (Listed in citations regarding prohibition).
• 11. Lopez v. City Judge: N/A (Listed in citations regarding prohibition).
• 12. Navarro v. Lardizabal: N/A (Listed in citations regarding prohibition).
• 13. Commissioner of Immigration v. Go Tieng: Cited for grave abuse of discretion as a ground for prohibition.
• 14. Solidum v. Hernandez: Cited for grave abuse of discretion as a ground for prohibition.
• 15. Apurillo v. Garciano: N/A (Listed in citations regarding prohibition).
• 16. Lee v. People: Cited for the requirement of speedy and adequate remedy for certiorari and prohibition.
• 17. Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain: Cited for the nature of eminent domain and limited judicial review.
• 18. Manila Railroad Company v. Paredes: N/A (Listed in citations regarding eminent domain).
• 19. Republic v. Mangotara: N/A (Listed in citations regarding eminent domain).
• 20. Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan: N/A (Listed in citations, potentially for related procedural points).
• 21. Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals: Distinguished to show that it was decided under a previous law (BP 337) where resolution was sufficient, unlike RA 7160.

Statutory and Constitutional Provisions

• 1. Section 19, Local Government Code (RA 7160): Governs the power of eminent domain of local government units, requiring an ordinance for its exercise.
• 2. Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Defines certiorari and its requisites.
• 3. Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: Defines prohibition and its requisites.
• 4. Section 9, Article III, Constitution: (Mentioned generally regarding just compensation for eminent domain).
• 5. Section 1, Rule 67, Rules of Court: N/A (Citation likely a typo, should likely be Rule 65 for certiorari/prohibition, or irrelevant citation).
• 6. Section 19, Local Government Code of 1991: (Cited contextually as the provision granting eminent domain power to LGUs, referenced in Resolution 552).