Wee vs. Mardo

An application for original registration of land already covered by a Torrens title constitutes a collateral attack prohibited under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, as the issue of validity of title may only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose and not in proceedings seeking different relief.

Respondent Felicidad Gonzales, married to Leopoldo Mardo, obtained Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284 dated April 26, 1979 covering Lot No. 8348 in Puting Kahoy, Silang, Cavite. On February 1, 1993, respondent allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying a portion thereof (Lot 8348-B) to petitioner Josephine Wee for ₱250,000.00. Respondent refused to deliver possession, claiming the sale was falsified. On June 10, 2003, during the pendency of registration proceedings, respondent secured Original Certificate of Title No. OP-1840 over the subject land.

• Nature of the Action: Petitioner sought original registration of Lot 8348-B pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, claiming ownership through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 1, 1993.
• Prior Registration: Respondent had been granted Free Patent No. (IV-2) 15284 on April 26, 1979 covering the mother lot (Lot 8348). During the pendency of the registration proceedings, respondent secured OCT No. OP-1840 on June 10, 2003 under Patent No. 042118-03-6111.
• Possessory Claim: Petitioner admitted that respondent never turned over physical possession of the subject property due to objections and oppositions to petitioner's title. Respondent continued to occupy the land and presented tax declarations as proof of ownership, though she presented no deed of sale.
• Fraud Allegation: Respondent claimed the Deed of Absolute Sale was surreptitious and falsified, asserting that she remained the true owner of the subject parcel.
• Procedural Posture: The RTC granted the application, finding petitioner qualified to register. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner failed to establish open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.

• Constructive Possession: Petitioner maintained that she must be deemed in possession and occupation through her predecessor-in-interest (respondent), who continued to occupy the property after the 1993 sale. The period of possession by a predecessor-in-interest benefits the applicant under the Public Land Act and P.D. No. 1529.
• Fortuitous Event: Petitioner argued that her inability to obtain actual possession resulted from circumstances amounting to a fortuitous event, which under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act does not affect her vested right to registration.
• Predecessor's Possession: Petitioner contended that respondent had possessed the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
• Reconveyance: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals should have ordered reconveyance of the property, alleging that respondent fraudulently secured registration after having sold the land. Respondent thus held the title in an implied trust for petitioner's benefit as the true owner.

• Falsified Sale: Respondent countered that the Deed of Absolute Sale was surreptitious and falsified, denying the validity of the conveyance.
• True Ownership: Respondent asserted true and lawful ownership of the parcel, supported by tax declarations and prior free patent registration.
• Jurisdictional Bar: Respondent argued that the land having been registered under OCT No. OP-1840, the RTC lacked jurisdiction to order a second registration of the same land.

• Collateral Attack: Whether an application for original registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 may be maintained against land already registered under a Torrens title.
• Indefeasibility of Title: Whether the validity of a registered title may be assailed collaterally on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation in a land registration proceeding.
• Reconveyance in Registration Proceedings: Whether a court may order reconveyance of property in an application for original registration where fraud is alleged.

• Collateral Attack: An application for registration of land already covered by a Torrens title constitutes a collateral attack prohibited under Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529. Once a patent is registered and a certificate of title issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. A land registration court lacks jurisdiction to order registration of land already decreed in another's name; a second decree for the same land is null and void.
• Indefeasibility: A certificate of title becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from issuance. The validity of title can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for such purpose, not collaterally. The rule applies notwithstanding allegations of fraud in securing the title.
• Reconveyance: Reconveyance cannot be granted in an application for original registration. The remedy of reconveyance based on Section 55 of Act No. 496 requires a separate action in personam, available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. Registration does not vest title; it merely confirms existing title.

• Prohibition Against Collateral Attack — A certificate of title cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. An attack is collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment or proceeding is made as an incident thereof. An application for registration of already titled land is per se a collateral attack.
• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title — A public land patent, when registered, becomes a veritable Torrens title and becomes indefeasible upon expiration of one year from issuance. No title to registered land in derogation of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession (Section 47, P.D. No. 1529).
• Registration Does Not Vest Title — Registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership but merely confirms title already existing. A certificate of title is merely evidence of ownership and cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or as a shield for fraud.
• Requisites for Original Registration — Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, an applicant must establish: (1) the land forms part of disposable and alienable public lands; (2) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant and predecessors-in-interest; and (3) possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

• "A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." — Section 48 of P.D. No. 1529, cited as the statutory basis for the prohibition against collateral attacks on registered titles.
• "Once a patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of public domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction." — Principle governing the conversion of public land to private status upon registration.
• "Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein." — Distinction between registration as evidence of title versus registration as a mode of acquisition.
• "Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value." — Limitation on the availability of reconveyance as a remedy against fraudulently obtained titles.

• Republic v. Umali, 253 Phil. 732 (1989) — Followed for the principle that registration of a public land patent converts the land to private property and places it under the operation of the Property Registration Decree.
• Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 238 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine that questions regarding the validity of title procured by fraud must be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose, not collaterally.
• Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 592 (1997) — Applied for the rule that an application for registration of already titled land constitutes a collateral attack.
• Republic v. Manimtim, G.R. No. 169599, March 16, 2011 — Cited for the enumeration of requisites for registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
• Naval v. Court of Appeals, 518 Phil. 271 (2006) — Followed for the principle that registration does not create title but merely evidences it, and that a registered owner may hold title in trust for the true owner.

• Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Governs applications for original registration based on open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
• Section 47, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Provides that no title to registered land shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Prohibits collateral attacks on certificates of title, limiting challenges to direct proceedings instituted expressly for such purpose.
• Section 103, Presidential Decree No. 1529 — Mandates that public land alienated by the government shall be brought under the operation of the Decree, with certificates of title issued pursuant to patents deemed registered land.
• Section 55, Act No. 496 (as amended by Act No. 3322) — Provides the statutory basis for reconveyance actions where registration is procured by fraud.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. Diosdado M. Peralta Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (Acting Member) Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen