Torres and Alvarez vs. Garchitorena

The Supreme Court held that for a prejudicial question to exist under Section 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the civil action must be instituted prior to the criminal action; furthermore, preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon the filing of a valid information and requires only a fair opportunity for the accused to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings, not a full-blown pre-suspension hearing.

The case arose from a reclamation project initiated by Mayor Torres of Noveleta, Cavite on a submerged portion of land owned by Susana Realty, Inc. (SRI). While SRI claimed ownership based on registered titles, the Republic of the Philippines subsequently filed a civil action for reversion claiming the property was part of the public domain. This created a parallel criminal prosecution for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and a civil suit involving the same property.

• Susana Realty, Inc. (SRI) is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Noveleta, Cavite covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. RT-19732 and RT-19733, which were issued on May 15, 1952.
• The parcels of land are adjacent to the sea and portions thereof became submerged by seawater over time.
• On October 10, 1997, Mayor Dionisio Torres caused the leveling and reclamation of the submerged portion of SRI's property for the relocation of displaced squatters from Tirona, Cavite.
• Domingo Fernandez, SRI's caretaker, protested the reclamation, but Mayor Torres ignored the protests and continued the project.
• On October 16, 1997, SRI representatives conferred with the Mayor and furnished copies of the titles; SRI had the property surveyed to confirm the reclaimed portions were within its titled property.
• On October 27, 1997, SRI sent a formal letter protesting the reclamation and demanding that the Mayor desist.
• On October 31, 1997, the Mayor offered to help SRI with other projects in exchange for not filing suit, but negotiations failed and squatters occupied portions of the reclaimed area.
• On January 7, 1998, SRI filed a petition for prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (Special Civil Case No. N-6639) to enjoin the reclamation.
• On April 16, 1998, SRI filed a criminal complaint with the Ombudsman against Mayor Torres and Municipal Engineer Enrico Alvarez for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
• On August 27, 1998, the Ombudsman filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioners with causing undue injury to SRI through evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence by reclaiming the submerged portion of SRI's property.
• On September 1, 1998, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint for reversion with the RTC of Cavite City (Civil Case No. 7160) alleging the property was part of the Manila Bay and public domain.
• On March 3, 1999, Mayor Torres wrote to SRI offering to acquire a portion of the reclaimed area at P100 per square meter, implicitly recognizing SRI's ownership.
• Petitioners were arraigned on August 1, 2001 and pleaded not guilty to the charges.

• The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash because the material averments in the Information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as the submerged portion was actually foreshore land belonging to the public domain, not private property.
• Since the property was allegedly foreshore land, SRI had no proprietary interest and could not have sustained damage or injury, an essential element of the crime charged.
• The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering preventive suspension pendente lite without conducting a full-blown hearing, thereby depriving the people of Noveleta of the services of their elected officials.
• The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suspend proceedings despite the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 7160, where the issue of ownership is intimately related to the criminal case and determinative of their guilt or innocence.
• The defense that the property was foreshore land was not an evidentiary matter but a jurisdictional issue that should have been resolved in the motion to quash.

• The Sandiganbayan ruled that the nature of the subject property (whether foreshore land or private property) is a factual issue that should be ventilated during trial, not in a motion to quash.
• The petitioners had already been arraigned before filing the motion to quash, making the quashal of the information no longer available as a remedy.
• The suspension pendente lite is mandatory under Section 13 of RA 3019 upon the filing of a valid information, and only requires a fair opportunity to challenge the validity of the proceedings, not a full-blown hearing on the merits.
• The civil action for reversion was filed after the criminal action, and therefore cannot constitute a prejudicial question under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
• Regardless of the outcome of the reversion suit, SRI was the registered owner at the time of the incident and entitled to possession; the pendency of the civil case does not diminish SRI's rights at the time of the alleged offense.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the denial of the motion to quash the Information is subject to certiorari.
  • Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering preventive suspension pendente lite without a full-blown hearing.
  • Whether the petition for certiorari was filed within the prescribed period.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Information sufficiently alleges facts constituting the offense of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
  • Whether the civil action for reversion constitutes a prejudicial question warranting suspension of the criminal proceedings.
  • Whether submerged land automatically becomes foreshore land and part of the public domain.

• Procedural:
  • The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order that is not appealable and cannot be the subject of certiorari; the remedy is to proceed with trial and raise the issue on appeal.
  • The petition for certiorari was filed out of time; petitioners waited almost a year from the denial of their motion to suspend proceedings on August 1, 2001 to file the petition on June 11, 2002, without justification.
  • Preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory upon the filing of a valid information; it does not require a full-blown hearing but only a fair and adequate opportunity for the accused to challenge the validity of the criminal proceedings.
• Substantive:
  • The Information sufficiently alleges the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019; in resolving a motion to quash, the court must hypothetically admit the truth of the averments in the information, which alleged the property was owned by SRI.
  • Submerged land is not necessarily foreshore land; foreshore land is defined as the part of the land between high and low water left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides, and if submergence is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore land.
  • The issue of whether the property is foreshore land is a factual question to be resolved during trial; until the title is declared null and void by a competent court, the property remains private.
  • No prejudicial question exists because the civil action for reversion was filed on September 1, 1998, after the criminal Information was filed on August 27, 1998; under Section 7, Rule 111, the civil action must be instituted prior to the criminal action.
  • Furthermore, the resolution of the civil case would not determine the guilt or innocence of petitioners because at the time of the incident, SRI was the registered owner entitled to possession, and the State's claim of ownership does not retroactively justify the petitioners' actions.

• Hypothetical Admission Rule in Motion to Quash — In resolving a motion to quash on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the court must hypothetically admit the truth of the averments in the information; facts constituting the defense must be proved during trial and cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
• Submerged Land vs. Foreshore Land — Submerged land is not necessarily foreshore land; foreshore land is that part of the land between high and low water mark left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides, whereas land submerged due to precipitation or other natural causes remains private property capable of registration.
• Prejudicial Question — A prejudicial question requires that the civil action be instituted prior to the criminal action, and that the resolution of the issue in the civil action determines whether the criminal action may proceed.
• Mandatory Preventive Suspension under RA 3019 — Upon the filing of a valid information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the accused is mandatorily suspended for 90 days; the pre-suspension hearing is limited to determining the applicability of Section 13 of RA 3019 and does not require a determination of the strength of the evidence or the guilt of the accused.
• Interlocutory Orders — Orders denying motions to quash are interlocutory and not subject to appeal or certiorari; the proper remedy is to proceed with trial and raise the issue on appeal from the final judgment.

• "The barefaced fact that under the information, the subject property is alleged to be submerged in sea water does not necessarily make the said property foreshore land and hence part of the public domain that can be reclaimed by the Municipality of Noveleta, Cavite."
• "Submerged land is not necessarily foreshore land. Where the rise in water level is due to ordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question."
• "Considering the mandatory suspension of the accused under a valid information, the law does not contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence..."
• "Nobody is indispensable in a public office. There will always be other persons who can be appointed to the temporarily vacated offices..."
• "The rule on prejudicial questions was conceived to afford parties an expeditious and just disposition of cases... The Court has said that it will not countenance the misuse of the rules of procedures to frustrate or delay the delivery of justice."

• People vs. Melitona Alagad, et al. — Cited for the definition that submerged land is not necessarily foreshore land, and that foreshore land is the part between high and low water left dry by the flux and reflux of tides.
• Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. — Cited for the rule that a resolution denying a motion to quash is an interlocutory order not subject to certiorari.
• People vs. Albano, et al. — Cited for the principle that preventive suspension under RA 3019 does not require a full-blown hearing on the strength of evidence, only a fair opportunity to challenge the validity of the proceedings.
• Bunye vs. Escareal — Cited for the principle that preventive suspension does not paralyze government as there are mechanisms to fill temporary vacancies.
• First Producers Holdings Corporation vs. Luis Co — Cited for the purpose of the rule on prejudicial questions to prevent delay in the administration of justice.
• Pablo Ocampo, et al. vs. Hon. Tiburcio Tansinco, et al. — Cited for the principle that titles remain valid until declared null and void by a competent court.
• Gregoria Javelosa vs. Court of Appeals, et al. — Cited for the principle that a registered owner is entitled to possession until title is nullified.
• National Irrigation Administration vs. Court of Appeals, et al. — Cited for the requirement in Rule 65 that certiorari is not available if there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the offense of causing undue injury to any party through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of official functions.
• Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 — Mandates the preventive suspension of any public officer upon the filing of a valid information for violation of the Act.
• Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the petition for certiorari and requires that petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Sections 6 and 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure — Define the requirements for suspension of criminal action by reason of prejudicial question, specifically that the civil action must be previously instituted and that its resolution determines whether the criminal action may proceed.