This case involves a petition to review the Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's ruling declaring null and void a deed of sale of conjugal property executed by the husband without the wife's consent, and an subsequent amicable settlement. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that under Article 124 of the Family Code, the sale of conjugal property without the consent of the other spouse is void, not merely voidable, and therefore cannot be ratified by a subsequent amicable settlement, which itself is also void as it stems from a void contract.
Primary Holding
The sale of conjugal partnership property by one spouse without the consent of the other is null and void under Article 124 of the Family Code; such a void contract cannot be ratified and is not merely voidable.
Background
The dispute arose when Judie Corpuz, without the consent of his wife Gilda Corpuz who was then in Manila seeking employment, sold a one-half portion of their conjugal lot, including their residence, to Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Gilda Corpuz objected to this sale upon her return.
History
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Amended Complaint filed by Gilda Corpuz in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25, seeking declaration of nullity of the deed of sale.
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RTC rendered a Decision on September 9, 1992, declaring the Deed of Transfer of Rights and the amicable settlement null and void.
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Petitioners-Spouses Guiang appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV No. 41758).
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Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision on January 30, 1996, affirming the RTC's decision.
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Petitioners-Spouses Guiang's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 28, 1996.
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Petitioners-Spouses Guiang filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Facts
- Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses since December 24, 1968, with three children.
- On February 14, 1983, Gilda and Judie Corpuz bought a 421 sq. meter lot (Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409) in Koronadal, South Cotabato, via a conditional deed of sale from Manuel Callejo.
- On April 22, 1988, the Corpuz couple sold one-half portion of this lot to defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, who built their house thereon and became adjoining neighbors.
- In June 1989, Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to seek employment abroad, with her husband Judie's consent. She was unsuccessful and returned to Koronadal on March 11, 1990.
- While Gilda was in Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went home. In January 1990, their daughter Harriet learned of Judie's intention to sell the remaining one-half portion of their homelot, including their house, to the Guiangs. Harriet informed Gilda, who replied objecting to the sale. Harriet gave Gilda's letter of objection to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang.
- On March 1, 1990, without Gilda's consent, Judie Corpuz sold the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, and the house thereon to Luzviminda Guiang for P30,000.00 via a "Deed of Transfer of Rights." Their children, Junie and Harriet, signed as witnesses.
- On March 5, 1990, Luzviminda Guiang executed another agreement with Manuela Jimenez Callejo (widow of the original owner) over Lot 9, Block 8, for P9,000.00, with Judie Corpuz signing as a witness, apparently to cure defects in Judie's title.
- Upon Gilda's return on March 11, 1990, she found her children staying elsewhere and learned her husband had taken another wife and sold their house.
- The Guiangs filed a complaint for trespassing against Gilda Corpuz with the barangay authorities. On March 16, 1990, an "amicable settlement" was signed, stating Gilda and her children would voluntarily leave the Guiangs' house by April 7, 1990.
- Gilda later questioned her signature on the amicable settlement before the Barangay Captain, alleging misrepresentation and coercion, but was told nothing could be done. She remained in the house.
- The Guiangs filed a motion for execution of the amicable settlement with the Municipal Trial Court. Gilda Corpuz then filed the complaint to annul the sale and the amicable settlement.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- The Deed of Transfer of Rights dated March 1, 1990, was validly executed by the parties in good faith and for valuable consideration.
- The absence of private respondent Gilda Corpuz's consent merely rendered the Deed of Transfer of Rights voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, not null and void.
- The voidable contract was validly ratified through the execution of the "amicable settlement" by the contending parties on March 16, 1990.
- The Court of Appeals erred in not setting aside the findings of the trial court which recognized Gilda Corpuz's ownership over the remaining one-half portion of the subject property.
Arguments of the Respondents
- The sale of the conjugal property by her husband Judie Corpuz without her consent is null and void under Article 124 of the Family Code.
- Her consent to the contract of sale was totally inexistent or absent, as she was in Manila at the time of the sale and had previously objected to it.
- The "amicable settlement" was also null and void, as it was a direct offshoot of the void Deed of Transfer of Rights, and her signature thereon was obtained through misrepresentation and coercion by barangay authorities.
- A void contract cannot be ratified.
Issues
- Whether the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed by the husband without the wife's consent, was validly executed or merely voidable.
- Whether the "amicable settlement" validly ratified the Deed of Transfer of Rights if it were deemed voidable.
- Whether the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's recognition of private respondent's ownership and possession over the subject property.
Ruling
- The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.
- The Court ruled that the sale of the conjugal property by Judie Corpuz without the consent of his wife, Gilda Corpuz, was not merely voidable but null and void, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. This article explicitly states that in the absence of the other spouse's consent or court authority, the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property shall be void.
- The Court distinguished this from Article 1390, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, which applies to contracts where consent is vitiated (e.g., by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud), not where consent is totally absent, as in this case.
- Since the Deed of Transfer of Rights was void, it could not be ratified by the subsequent "amicable settlement." The Court cited Article 1409 of the Civil Code, which states that contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, or those expressly prohibited or declared void by law, are inexistent and void from the beginning and cannot be ratified.
- Furthermore, the Court held that the "amicable settlement" itself was void under Article 1422 of the Civil Code, which provides that a contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.
- The "amicable settlement" could not be considered a continuing offer accepted by Gilda Corpuz under Article 124 of the Family Code, as its tenor was for her to vacate the property, not an acceptance of an offer to sell.
Doctrines
- Article 124 of the Family Code (Administration and Disposition of Conjugal Property) — This article provides that the administration and enjoyment of conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. Disposition or encumbrance of such property requires the written consent of the other spouse or authority of the court; otherwise, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. The Court applied this to declare the sale of the conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent as null and void, emphasizing the change from the Civil Code regime where such sales were merely voidable.
- Article 1390 of the Civil Code (Voidable Contracts) — This article enumerates contracts that are voidable or annullable, including those where consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud. The Court held this inapplicable because private respondent's consent was totally absent, not merely vitiated.
- Article 1409 of the Civil Code (Inexistent and Void Contracts) — This article lists contracts that are inexistent and void from the beginning, including those expressly prohibited or declared void by law, and states that such contracts cannot be ratified. The Court applied this to rule that the void sale could not be ratified by the amicable settlement.
- Article 1422 of the Civil Code (Contracts Arising from a Previous Illegal Contract) — This article states that a contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract is also void and inexistent. The Court applied this to declare the "amicable settlement" void, as it was a direct offshoot of the void Deed of Transfer of Rights.
- Article 1318 of the Civil Code (Essential Requisites of Contracts) — This article enumerates the essential requisites of a contract: consent of the contracting parties, object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is established. The Court noted that consent was indubitably absent in the case at bar, rendering the contract of sale invalid.
- Article 173 of the Civil Code (Old Law on Annulment by Wife) — This article (now superseded by the Family Code for transactions after August 3, 1988) allowed the wife to annul, within ten years, a contract of the husband entered into without her consent when required. The Court cited this to highlight that under the old law, such alienation was merely voidable, but under the Family Code (Art. 124), it is null and void.
Key Excerpts
- "The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect."
- "In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void." (referring to Art. 124, Family Code)
- "It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void."
- "Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified."
- "'Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.' (Civil Code of the Philippines)."
Precedents Cited
- Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals, 123 SCRA 99, 119-121, June 28, 1983 — Cited in support of the principle that a void contract cannot be ratified (referring to Art. 1409 of the Civil Code).
Provisions
- Family Code, Article 124 — Governs the administration and disposition of conjugal partnership property, stating that disposition without the other spouse's consent is void. This was the primary basis for declaring the sale null and void.
- Civil Code, Article 1390 — Defines voidable contracts. The Court explained why this article was not applicable, as the wife's consent was absent, not merely vitiated.
- Civil Code, Article 1409 — Enumerates inexistent and void contracts that cannot be ratified. This was cited to support the ruling that the void sale could not be ratified by the amicable settlement.
- Civil Code, Article 1422 — States that a contract resulting from a previous illegal contract is also void. This was applied to declare the amicable settlement void.
- Civil Code, Article 1318 — Lists the essential requisites of a contract (consent, object, cause). The absence of Gilda Corpuz's consent was crucial to the invalidity of the sale.
- Civil Code, Article 166 (Old Law) — Stated that the husband cannot generally alienate conjugal real property without the wife's consent, making such alienation merely voidable. Referenced to show the change in law under the Family Code.
- Civil Code, Article 173 (Old Law) — Provided the wife with a ten-year period to annul contracts made by the husband without her consent. Referenced to show the previous voidable nature of such contracts, contrasting with the void nature under the Family Code.