A state cannot constitutionally apply its unemployment compensation eligibility provisions to deny benefits to an individual who refuses to work on their Sabbath due to sincerely held religious beliefs, as such a denial imposes an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion, unless the state can demonstrate a compelling state interest justifying such infringement and that no alternative forms of regulation would suffice.

The case arose from the conflict between an individual's religious observance, specifically the Seventh-Day Adventist practice of observing Saturday as the Sabbath, and a state's unemployment compensation law requiring availability for work. Appellant Adell Sherbert was a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church and was discharged by her employer when she refused to work on Saturdays after her employer switched to a six-day work week. Her subsequent inability to find other employment that did not require Saturday work led to her claim for unemployment benefits.

• Appellant Adell H. Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was discharged by her employer, a textile mill operator in South Carolina, because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.
• Initially, her employer permitted her to work a five-day week, but in 1959, the work week was changed to six days, including Saturday, for all three shifts.
• Sherbert was unable to obtain other employment in the Spartanburg area because she would not work on Saturdays due to her religious convictions.
• She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.
• The Act provided that a claimant is ineligible for benefits if they have failed, without good cause, to accept available suitable work when offered.
• The Employment Security Commission denied her application, finding that her restriction on Saturday work made her unavailable for suitable work.
• The sincerity of Sherbert's religious beliefs was not questioned.

• The disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute, as applied to her, abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
• The denial of benefits forced her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion to accept work, which imposed an unconstitutional burden on her religious freedom.
• The denial of benefits also deprived her of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

• Appellant's ineligibility for benefits infringed no constitutional liberties because the construction of the statute placed no restriction upon her freedom of religion nor did it prevent her from observing her religious beliefs.
• The State suggested a possibility that fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might dilute the unemployment compensation fund and hinder employers' scheduling of Saturday work.
• The State argued that appellant was not within the class entitled to benefits because her unemployment did not result from discharge or layoff due to lack of work, but from personal reasons (her religious conviction).

• Does the disqualification of the appellant for unemployment compensation benefits, solely because of her refusal to accept employment that would require her to work on Saturday contrary to her religious belief, impose an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of her religion?
• If such a burden exists, is there a compelling state interest that justifies the substantial infringement of the appellant's First Amendment right?
• Does the granting of unemployment benefits to the appellant under these circumstances foster the "establishment" of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion contrary to the First Amendment?

• The Court reversed the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court, holding that the state's application of the unemployment compensation statute abridged Sherbert's right to the free exercise of her religion.
• The disqualification for benefits imposed a substantial burden on Sherbert's free exercise of religion because it forced her to choose between her religious precepts and state benefits, effectively penalizing her for her religious beliefs.
• The Court found no compelling state interest to justify this burden; the state's asserted interest in preventing fraudulent claims and protecting the fund was not supported by evidence and, even if valid, the state had not demonstrated that no alternative forms of regulation would suffice.
• The Court also held that extending benefits to Sabbatarians did not constitute an "establishment" of religion, but rather reflected governmental neutrality in the face of religious differences and did not abridge any other person's religious liberties.

• Free Exercise Clause (First Amendment) — This clause protects an individual's right to practice their religion free from governmental interference. The Court applied this by finding that denying unemployment benefits to Sherbert because she refused to work on her Sabbath due to her religious beliefs constituted a substantial burden on her free exercise of religion, as it pressured her to abandon a central tenet of her faith.
• Compelling State Interest Test — This test requires that for a law to substantially burden a fundamental right (like the free exercise of religion), the government must show that the law serves a "compelling state interest" and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. The Court applied this test by finding that South Carolina failed to demonstrate any compelling state interest (such as preventing widespread fraudulent claims or protecting the unemployment fund from depletion) that would justify the infringement on Sherbert's religious freedom, nor did it show that less restrictive means were unavailable.
• Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine — This doctrine posits that the government cannot condition the availability of a benefit or privilege on an individual's willingness to forgo a constitutional right. The Court invoked this by stating that conditioning unemployment benefits on Sherbert's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalized the free exercise of her constitutional liberties, which is impermissible.
• Establishment Clause (First Amendment) — This clause prohibits the government from establishing a religion. The Court addressed this by concluding that extending unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians did not foster an "establishment" of religion but rather reflected governmental neutrality and accommodated religious practice without endorsing it or involving religious institutions with secular ones.
• Incorporation Doctrine (Fourteenth Amendment) — This doctrine makes provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the basis for applying the First Amendment protections to South Carolina's actions.

• "The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship."
• "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."
• "[I]n this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.'"
• "For 'if the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.'"
• "Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest."

• Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 — Distinguished. While Braunfeld upheld Sunday closing laws despite the economic burden on Sabbatarian merchants, the Court in Sherbert found a more direct burden on religious practice and no equivalent compelling state interest (like a uniform day of rest) as was present in Braunfeld. The burden in Sherbert was deemed less justifiable.
• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 — Cited for the principle that the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.
• Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 — Cited for the principle that government may not compel affirmation of a repugnant belief or penalize individuals for their religious views. Also distinguished because the state interest in ensuring veracity of Notaries Public was insufficient to justify infringement on religious freedom, similar to the insufficient state interest in Sherbert.
• Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 — Cited for the principle that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
• Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 — Cited for the principle that no State may exclude individuals from receiving public welfare benefits because of their faith or lack of it, supporting the idea that granting benefits to Sherbert is not an establishment of religion.
• School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 — Cited to support the argument that extending benefits to Sabbatarians does not constitute an "establishment" of religion but rather reflects governmental neutrality.
• NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 — Cited for the standard that an incidental burden on free exercise may be justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate."
• Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 — Cited for the high standard required to justify limitations on First Amendment rights: "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Its Free Exercise Clause was central, prohibiting the government from unduly burdening an individual's religious practice. Its Establishment Clause was also discussed to clarify that accommodating Sherbert did not violate it.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Its Due Process Clause makes the First Amendment applicable to the states. The Equal Protection Clause was also raised by the appellant but not reached by the Court.
• South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act (S.C. Code, Tit. 68, §§ 68-1 to 68-404) — Specifically § 68-113 (Conditions of eligibility for benefits, requiring claimant to be "able to work and . . . available for work") and § 68-114(3) (Disqualification for failure to accept suitable work without good cause). The Court found the application of these provisions to Sherbert unconstitutional.
• S.C. Code, § 64-4 — This South Carolina statute, which protects employees conscientiously opposed to Sunday work during national emergencies, was cited by the Court to highlight that South Carolina itself recognized the principle of accommodating religious objections to work schedules, thereby compounding the discrimination against Sabbatarians by not offering similar protection.

• Mr. Justice Douglas — Argued that the South Carolina law directly prohibited the free exercise of religion by denying benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on her Sabbath. He emphasized that the harm is the interference with individual conscience, an important area of privacy fenced off by the First Amendment, and that the case is about what government cannot do to an individual, not what an individual can exact from government.
• Mr. Justice Stewart — Concurred in the result but disagreed with the Court's opinion, highlighting a "double-barreled dilemma" between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause as interpreted by the Court. He argued that the Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause (as in Schempp) would logically require denying benefits to avoid aiding religion, while the Free Exercise Clause, as applied here, mandates providing them. He believed Braunfeld v. Brown was wrongly decided and should be overruled, and that the Free Exercise Clause affirmatively requires government accommodation of religious practices.

• Mr. Justice Harlan (joined by Mr. Justice White) — Argued that the Court's decision overruled Braunfeld v. Brown and that South Carolina's law was a neutral rule uniformly applied. He contended that Sherbert was denied benefits not because of her religious beliefs, but because she was "unavailable for work" for personal reasons, consistent with the statute's purpose to provide relief for involuntary unemployment. He believed the state was not constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception for religious unavailability, and that doing so singles out religious conduct for special financial assistance, potentially raising Establishment Clause concerns, though he thought such an accommodation might be permissible if the state chose to make it. He found the indirect financial burden on Sherbert far less than that in Braunfeld.