Salvador vs. Mapa

The prescriptive period for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 in behest loan cases commences from the date of discovery by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans in 1992, not from the commission of the acts, and Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws as they are not penal in nature.

During the Marcos administration, government financial institutions granted loans at the behest of high officials to cronies, often under-collateralized and to undercapitalized entities, leading to significant losses for the government; post-1986 EDSA Revolution, efforts to recover such ill-gotten wealth prompted the creation of investigative bodies, including the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans under Administrative Order No. 13 in 1992 to inventory and recommend recovery actions for these loans.

In 1978, Metals Exploration Asia, Inc. (later Philippine Eagle Mines, Inc. or PEMI), whose stockholders and officers were cronies of President Ferdinand Marcos, applied for a foreign currency loan and bank investment in preferred shares from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP); the initial approval via Board Resolution No. 1297 on April 25, 1979 was not released due to PEMI's non-compliance with conditions; DBP then amended via Board Resolution No. 2315 in June 1980, increasing and authorizing release of the loan despite ongoing non-compliance; on October 16, 1980, Board Resolution No. 95 granted PEMI a $19,680,267 (P146,601,979) foreign currency loan, released without sufficient collateral as PEMI's assets were valued at only P72,045,700 and paid-up capital at P46,488,834, exhibiting characteristics of a behest loan under later-defined criteria including under-collateralization, undercapitalization, crony involvement, and deviation from standard procedures.

The offenses under Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 had not prescribed as the prescriptive period begins from discovery of the violations in 1992 by the Committee, not from commission in 1978-1981, due to concealment through conspiracy; Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws as they merely create an investigative body and provide criteria for identifying behest loans without imposing new penalties on prior innocent acts.

The petition is procedurally infirm as it was filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of certiorari under Rule 65; the offenses prescribed under the 10-year period of Republic Act No. 3019 as originally enacted, commencing from execution of public documents in 1978-1981, and the complaint was filed in 1996 after more than 15 years; Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post facto as they retroactively classify prior transactions as criminal behest loans, punishing acts innocent when committed; specific respondents like Mapa claimed transactional immunity from PCGG cases, and Zalamea denied involvement in loan approvals.

• Procedural Issues: - Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy to challenge the Ombudsman's resolution dismissing the complaint during preliminary investigation, or if it should be treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion.
• Substantive Issues: - Whether the offenses under Sections 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 for granting behest loans had prescribed by October 4, 1996; whether Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 constitute ex post facto laws by retroactively imposing criminal liability on acts committed in 1978-1981.

• Procedural: - The Court treated the petition captioned under Rule 45 as one under Rule 65 for certiorari, finding that the contents alleged grave abuse of discretion by the Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint, prioritizing substance over form for justice and equity, as prior jurisprudence holds that Rule 45 is not the proper mode for reviewing Ombudsman resolutions in preliminary investigations.
• Substantive: - The offenses had not prescribed, as the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 for Republic Act No. 3019 violations in behest loan cases begins from discovery in 1992 when the Committee was created, not from commission in 1978-1981 due to concealment by conspiracy during the Marcos regime, consistent with settled doctrine; Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are not ex post facto laws as they are not penal, merely creating a fact-finding committee and providing non-punitive criteria for identifying loans without altering criminal liability or evidence rules for prior acts, and the Ombudsman exceeded jurisdiction by ruling on their constitutionality; the case was remanded to the Ombudsman for evaluation on merits, including respondents' defenses like immunity.

• Prescription under Act No. 3326 — This statute governs prescription for violations of special laws like Republic Act No. 3019, providing that the period begins from the day of commission or discovery if not known at the time, and is interrupted by institution of proceedings; in this case, the Court applied it to start prescription from 1992 discovery by the Committee due to conspiratorial concealment, preventing earlier knowledge by the State.
• Ex Post Facto Law Prohibition — Constitutional ban under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution against laws that criminalize prior innocent acts, aggravate crimes, increase punishments, alter evidence rules, impose penalties on civil rights, or deprive lawful protections; here, the Court interpreted it to exclude non-penal administrative orders like Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, which only facilitate investigation without retroactive punishment.
• Presumption of Constitutionality — Laws are presumed constitutional unless a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution is shown beyond reasonable doubt; applied to sustain Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61, as no constitutional infirmity was evident, and doubts favor validity.

• "It is well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the 'beneficiaries of the loans.'" — Emphasizing the rationale for starting prescription from discovery.
• "An ex post facto law has been defined as one — (a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed..." — Defining the scope of ex post facto laws.
• "The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws." — Clarifying that only penal laws are subject to the prohibition.

• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (375 Phil. 697, 1999) — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that prescription for Republic Act No. 3019 violations in behest loans starts from 1992 discovery due to concealment.
• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto (415 Phil. 723, 2001) — Followed to reiterate that counting begins from 1992 post-EDSA investigation, as no one dared question Marcos-era transactions earlier.
• People v. Sandiganbayan (211 SCRA 241, 1992) — Referenced for the principle that prescription under Act No. 3326 for special laws like Republic Act No. 3019 runs from commission or discovery, but distinguished here due to non-public knowledge.
• Estarija v. Ranada (G.R. No. 159314, June 26, 2006) — Cited to hold that the Ombudsman lacks jurisdiction to rule on constitutionality of laws, supporting reversal of its declaration on the administrative orders.
• Cabrera v. Lapid (G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006) — Illustrative of the rule that Rule 45 is improper for reviewing Ombudsman preliminary investigation resolutions, justifying treatment as Rule 65.

• Section 3(e) and (g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Provisions prohibiting public officers from causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality or evident bad faith in government transactions; directly applied as the basis for the criminal complaint against respondents for facilitating behest loans.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 3019 (as originally enacted) — Establishes a 10-year prescriptive period for offenses under the Act; relevant as the Ombudsman initially applied this period, but the Court held discovery delayed its start.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 (March 16, 1982) — Amended Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3019 to extend prescription to 15 years; noted but not applied retroactively, as acts predated it, reverting to original 10-year period starting from discovery.
• Section 2, Act No. 3326 — Governs prescription for special penal laws, starting from commission or discovery if unknown; central to the ruling that prescription began in 1992.
• Section 28, Article II, 1987 Constitution — Mandates full public disclosure of government transactions; invoked in the whereas clauses of Administrative Order No. 13 to justify the Committee's creation for transparency in behest loans.
• Section 15, Article XI, 1987 Constitution — States that recovery of unlawfully acquired properties by public officials is not barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel; supports the policy against prescription in ill-gotten wealth cases like behest loans.