Romualdez vs. Marcelo

In computing the prescriptive period for offenses under special laws governed by Act No. 3326, the absence of the offender from the Philippines does not toll the running of the prescriptive period because Act No. 3326 is a specific statute governing prescription for special laws, and its silence on the matter negates the suppletory application of Article 91 of the RPC; moreover, proceedings instituted before a body without jurisdiction do not interrupt the prescriptive period.

The case involves the prosecution of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a former government official during the Marcos regime, for alleged failure to file his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) from 1963 to 1985. The cases were initially filed by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 but were dismissed in 2004 because the PCGG had no authority to file informations for such offenses. The Ombudsman subsequently conducted a new preliminary investigation and filed new informations in 2004, prompting Romualdez to seek dismissal on grounds of prescription.

• Petitioner Benjamin "Kokoy" T. Romualdez served as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1963-1966 and as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from 1967-1985 during the Marcos administration.
• He allegedly failed to file his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the years 1963-1985.
• On May 8, 1987, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed a complaint against petitioner with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
• In 1989, the PCGG filed informations with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429) charging petitioner with violations of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019.
• On February 10, 2004, the Sandiganbayan dismissed these cases pursuant to the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan which held that the PCGG had no authority to file informations for violations of RA 3019.
• On March 3, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor required petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit in connection with a preliminary investigation using the same docket numbers (Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429).
• The Ombudsman subsequently filed new informations: Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-231860 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
• Petitioner was absent from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000.
• The applicable prescriptive periods are 10 years for offenses committed before March 16, 1982 (under the original Section 11 of RA 3019) and 15 years for offenses committed from March 16, 1982 onwards (as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195).

• The Ombudsman gravely abused discretion in recommending the filing of 24 informations for violation of Section 7 of RA 3019.
• The Ombudsman cannot revive cases previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004.
• The defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal, eliminating the necessity for presentation of evidence before the court a quo.
• The criminal cases should be dismissed on the ground of prescription because the offenses were discovered on May 8, 1987, and the new informations were filed only in 2004, beyond the 10-year and 15-year prescriptive periods.
• The filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 and the filing of informations with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 did not interrupt the prescriptive period because the PCGG lacked jurisdiction over the offenses.
• Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that prescription does not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, should not apply suppletorily to RA 3019 because Act No. 3326 is the specific law governing prescription for special laws and is silent on this matter.

• The dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not exempt petitioner from criminal prosecution; new informations may be filed if probable cause exists.
• The filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 and the filing of informations with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period.
• Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code applies suppletorily to RA 3019; thus, petitioner's absence from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27, 2000 prevented the prescriptive period from running.
• The Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number to conduct preliminary investigation, pursuant to the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
• The issue of prescription requires a full-blown trial and cannot be resolved in a preliminary investigation or petition for certiorari.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity given the previous dismissal of these cases by the Sandiganbayan.
  • Whether the Supreme Court may properly resolve the issue of prescription despite the case not having progressed beyond the filing of informations.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the offenses charged have already prescribed.
  • Whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in 1987 and the informations with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.
  • Whether Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which tolls prescription during the offender's absence from the Philippines, applies suppletorily to RA 3019 via Act No. 3326.

• Procedural:
  • The preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was valid despite the previous dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 by the Sandiganbayan.
  • The dismissal was based on the lack of authority of the PCGG to file the informations (Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court), not on the extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy; thus, it is not a bar to another prosecution.
  • The use of the same docket numbers was merely for reference and internal record-keeping; new docket numbers were eventually assigned to the new informations.
  • The Supreme Court may resolve the issue of prescription even before trial on the merits because Rule 117 allows the accused to move to quash on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished by prescription at any time before entering a plea.
• Substantive:
  • The prescriptive period for offenses under RA 3019 is 10 years for offenses committed before March 16, 1982, and 15 years for offenses committed thereafter (as amended by BP Blg. 195).
  • The prescriptive period began to run from the discovery of the offense on May 8, 1987, when the complaint was filed with the PCGG (applying Section 2 of Act No. 3326).
  • The filing of the complaint with the PCGG and the informations with the Sandiganbayan did not interrupt the prescriptive period because the PCGG had no jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019; thus, no proceedings were "instituted against the guilty person" within the meaning of Act No. 3326.
  • Article 91 of the RPC does not apply suppletorily to Act No. 3326. Act No. 3326 is the specific law governing prescription for special laws, and its silence on the effect of the offender's absence from the Philippines indicates that the legislature did not intend such interruption (expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
  • Even if Article 91 were to be applied suppletorily, Act No. 3326 as the specific law would prevail over Article 91 of the RPC as the general law.
  • The offenses for 1963-1982 prescribed on May 8, 1997 (10 years from discovery), and those for 1983-1985 prescribed on May 8, 2002 (15 years from discovery).
  • When the Ombudsman initiated the preliminary investigation on March 3, 2004, the offenses had already prescribed. Thus, Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857-04-231860 were ordered dismissed.

• Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. Applied to hold that the silence of Act No. 3326 regarding the offender's absence from the Philippines indicates legislative intent not to include it as a ground for interrupting prescription, unlike Article 91 of the RPC which explicitly provides for it.
• Special Law Prevails Over General Law — Where there is a conflict between a specific statute (Act No. 3326 governing prescription for special laws) and a general provision (Article 91 of the RPC), the specific statute prevails.
• Liberal Construction of Prescription Laws in Favor of the Accused — Statutes of limitation in criminal cases are construed liberally in favor of the accused because they are acts of amnesty and grace by the State, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense.
• Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court — An order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense unless the motion was based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
• Interruption of Prescriptive Period — Proceedings instituted against the guilty person interrupt the prescriptive period under Act No. 3326; however, proceedings instituted before a body without jurisdiction do not constitute valid interruption.

• "The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out." — Citing People v. Moran, on the nature of prescription statutes.
• "Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers."
• "An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission."
• "The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the simple expedient of escaping from the State's jurisdiction." — From Justice Carpio's dissenting opinion.

• Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. Nos. 143618-41, 434 Phil. 670) — Controlling precedent holding that the PCGG had no authority to conduct preliminary investigation or file informations for violations of RA 3019, rendering the 1989 informations void and the proceedings invalid for purposes of interrupting prescription.
• Domingo v. Sandiganbayan (379 Phil. 708) — Cited for the three elements to consider in resolving prescription issues: (1) period of prescription; (2) when it starts to run; and (3) when it was interrupted.
• People v. Pacificador (G.R. No. 139405, 354 SCRA 310) — Cited for the rule that the amendment to Section 11 of RA 3019 (extending prescription from 10 to 15 years) does not apply retroactively; thus offenses before March 16, 1982 prescribe in 10 years.
• People v. Duque (G.R. No. 100285, 212 SCRA 607) — Cited for the interpretation of Section 2 of Act No. 3326 regarding the commencement of the prescriptive period from discovery.
• Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (415 Phil. 723) — Cited for the application of the discovery rule to violations of RA 3019 committed during the Marcos regime.
• Cudia v. Court of Appeals (348 Phil. 190) — Cited for the principle that dismissal of an information filed by an unauthorized party is not a bar to subsequent prosecution.
• People v. Moran (44 Phil. 387) — Cited extensively for the rationale behind prescription statutes as acts of amnesty and liberality.
• United States v. Serapio (23 Phil. 584) — Cited for the definition of "special laws" under Article 10 of the RPC as referring to penal laws punishing acts not defined and penalized by the RPC.

• Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the offense of failure to file Statements of Assets and Liabilities.
• Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3019 — Provides for the 15-year prescriptive period for offenses under the Act (as amended by BP Blg. 195); originally 10 years prior to amendment.
• Act No. 3326 (An Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) — Governs the computation of prescription for offenses under special laws; Section 2 provides that prescription begins from discovery if the violation was not known at the time of commission, and is interrupted only when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person.
• Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code — Provides that the term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago; held not applicable to Act No. 3326.
• Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code — States that the RPC is supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary; discussed in relation to the applicability of Article 91 to RA 3019.
• Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court — Provides that an order sustaining a motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution unless based on extinction of liability or double jeopardy.
• Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code — Enumerates prescription as a ground for total extinction of criminal liability.

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio — Argued that Article 91 of the RPC should apply suppletorily to RA 3019 via Article 10 of the RPC because Act No. 3326 is silent on the effect of the offender's absence. He contended that the prescriptive period should be tolled during petitioner's absence from 1986 to 2000, preventing the offenses from prescribing. He warned that the majority opinion allows an accused to prevent prosecution simply by leaving the jurisdiction, unjustifiably tilting the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused.