Primary Holding
The Supreme Court ruled that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos met the residency requirement to run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, overturning the disqualification issued by the COMELEC.
Background
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Representative of the First District of Leyte, declaring seven months of residency. Her political opponent, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition to disqualify her on the grounds of failing to meet the one-year residency requirement. Marcos later amended her COC, stating that she had been a resident "since childhood," but the COMELEC refused to accept this correction and ruled her disqualified. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the COMELEC's decision.
History
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March 8, 1995: Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) indicating seven months of residency in the district.
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March 23, 1995: Montejo filed a petition for disqualification.
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March 29, 1995: Marcos filed an Amended COC, changing "seven months" to "since childhood."
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April 24, 1995: COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Marcos, canceling her candidacy.
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May 7, 1995: COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling.
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May 8, 1995: Election day; Marcos won the election with over 70,000 votes.
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May 11, 1995: COMELEC suspended her proclamation.
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September 18, 1995: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Marcos.
Facts
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1.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos indicated in her initial COC that she had been a resident of the First District of Leyte for only seven months.
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2.
Montejo challenged this, citing her voter registration record.
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3.
Marcos attempted to amend her COC to clarify that she had been a resident "since childhood."
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4.
COMELEC refused to accept the amendment and ruled her disqualified.
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5.
Despite winning the congressional election, her proclamation was suspended.
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6.
The Supreme Court later ruled that she had continuously maintained her domicile in Leyte.
Arguments of the Petitioners
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1.
Marcos argued that her initial statement of "seven months" was an honest mistake.
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2.
She claimed that she had always intended to return to Leyte and that Tacloban was her domicile of origin.
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3.
She pointed out that her ties to Leyte, including family properties and public projects, indicated her permanent association with the district.
Arguments of the Respondents
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1.
Montejo and COMELEC asserted that Marcos did not meet the one-year residency requirement.
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2.
They argued that her voter registration and previous declarations indicated that she resided in Metro Manila.
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3.
COMELEC contended that she could not amend her COC after the filing deadline had lapsed.
Issues
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1.
Whether Marcos met the one-year residency requirement for congressional candidates.
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2.
Whether COMELEC acted within its jurisdiction in disqualifying Marcos and preventing her proclamation.
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3.
Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) should have jurisdiction over the case after the election.
Ruling
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1.
The Supreme Court ruled that residence in election law is synonymous with domicile, which Marcos had continuously maintained in Tacloban, Leyte.
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2.
The Court found that the amendment to her COC should have been accepted, as it merely corrected an honest mistake.
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3.
COMELEC’s refusal to accept the amendment and its ruling against Marcos were declared erroneous.
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4.
Marcos was deemed qualified to run, and her proclamation was ordered.
Doctrines
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1.
Residence vs. Domicile: The Court reiterated that "residence" in election law refers to "domicile," which is not lost by temporary relocation.
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2.
Animus Manendi and Animus Non Revertendi: The intent to remain or return determines domicile.
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3.
Jurisdiction of HRET: The jurisdiction over a congressional seat shifts to HRET only after a candidate has assumed office.
Key Excerpts
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1.
“A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.”
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2.
“It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residency qualification requirement.”
Precedents Cited
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1.
Faypon v. Quirino (1955): Residence in election law is synonymous with domicile.
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2.
Romualdez v. RTC-Tacloban (1993): Defined domicile and how it is retained.
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3.
Nuval v. Guray (1915): Established that residence is synonymous with domicile in election cases.
Statutory and Constitutional Provisions
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1.
1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 6: Residency requirement for members of the House of Representatives.
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2.
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), Section 78: Procedure for cancellation of COCs.