Reyes vs. Belisario

An Ombudsman decision exonerating a respondent from administrative charges, while final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules, may be challenged via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, rendering the decision void and susceptible to collateral attack at any time.

The case arose from a dispute between the LWUA Administrator and his Deputy Administrators following the filing of a criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the latter against the former. The Administrator responded by reassigning the Deputy Administrators and subsequently removing them from their positions, leading to parallel proceedings before the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman regarding the validity of the reassignments and the administrative charge of oppression and harassment.

• On March 3, 2000, respondents Simplicio Belisario, Jr. and Emmanuel Malicdem, Deputy Administrators of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), filed a criminal complaint against petitioner Prudencio M. Reyes, Jr., LWUA Administrator, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
• On March 16, 2000, petitioner issued Office Order No. 69 reassigning respondents to the Office of the Administrator as part of a LWUA Task Force, with Officers-in-Charge (OICs) designated for their former offices.
• On March 17, 2000, the OIC for Administration directed security to bar respondents from using their previous offices and facilities.
• On March 20, 2000, petitioner issued Office Order No. 82 directing respondents to vacate their offices and transfer to the former PROFUND Office.
• On March 30, 2000, petitioner issued Office Order No. 99 directing respondents to desist from performing functions of their previous positions and relieving them of their designations; respondents' office locks were replaced and cabinet drawers were sealed in their absence.
• On April 3, 2000, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued a legal opinion ruling that the reassignments were not in order, tainted with bad faith, and constituted constructive dismissal due to the diminution in rank and the timing relative to the graft complaint.
• On April 13, 2000, respondents filed an administrative complaint for Oppression and Harassment before the Office of the Ombudsman.
• On July 19, 2000, the Ombudsman issued a decision desisting from ruling on the validity of the reassignments (acknowledging CSC's primary jurisdiction) but denying weight to the CSC legal opinion as not final, declaring the reassignments presumptively regular, and exonerating the petitioner.
• On July 26, 2000, the CSC en banc issued Resolution No. 001729 affirming the CSC legal opinion, declaring the reassignments invalid, and ordering respondents' reinstatement.
• The Ombudsman denied respondents' motion for reconsideration, stating the CSC resolution was not yet final due to petitioner's pending motion for reconsideration, and affirmed that its July 19, 2000 decision was final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules.
• On October 17, 2000, the CSC en banc denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Resolution No. 002348).
• On October 31, 2000, respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
• On November 27, 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the Ombudsman's decision, finding grave abuse of discretion.
• On August 1, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

• The Ombudsman's July 19, 2000 decision exonerating him is final and unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman and Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770.
• The Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the respondents' appeal and in reversing the Ombudsman's decision since the law does not provide complainants the right to appeal an exoneration.
• The reassignments were made in the interest of public service and enjoyed the presumption of regularity.
• He had the authority to terminate the respondents' employment and the CSC had not yet issued a final and categorical ruling on the validity of the reassignments at the time of the Ombudsman's decision.

• The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in exonerating the petitioner despite evidence showing the reassignments were illegal, tainted with bad faith, and constituted constructive dismissal as ruled by the CSC.
• The Ombudsman improperly disregarded the CSC rulings on the validity of the reassignments, which was a prior question that needed determination before ruling on harassment and oppression.
• The reassignments were retaliatory measures taken barely ten days after they filed the graft complaint against the petitioner.
• The presumption of regularity should not apply because the petitioner acted without legal authority, as the power to reassign LWUA officers lies with the LWUA Board of Trustees, not the Administrator.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to entertain the respondents' petition for review of the Ombudsman's decision exonerating the petitioner, given the finality and unappealability provision under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the decision exonerating the petitioner from the administrative charge of oppression and harassment.

• Procedural:
  • While Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules and Section 27 of RA 6770 provide that an Ombudsman decision exonerating a respondent is final and unappealable, this statutory finality does not preclude a challenge via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when the decision is rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
  • The Constitution's Section 1, Article VIII empowers courts to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion, which is an overriding authority that cuts across all branches of government.
  • Although respondents filed a petition for review under Rule 43 (which is effectively an appeal not allowed in exoneration cases), the Court exercised liberality and treated it as a Rule 65 petition for certiorari since it addressed grave abuse of discretion and invoked the constitutional authority of the courts.
• Substantive:
  • The Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in exonerating the petitioner.
  • The Ombudsman correctly acknowledged that the CSC has primary jurisdiction over the validity of reassignments but erred in refusing to accord due respect to the CSC's legal opinion and en banc resolution declaring the reassignments invalid.
  • The Ombudsman improperly applied the presumption of regularity to the reassignments despite the CSC's clear ruling that the LWUA Administrator had no authority to issue reassignment orders (such authority belonging to the LWUA Board of Trustees under Executive Order No. 286).
  • The presumption of regularity applies only to official acts specified by law; it does not apply when an official acts without legal authority or when acts properly pertain to another entity.
  • The validity of the reassignments was a prior question that needed determination before ruling on harassment and oppression; the Ombudsman's failure to consider the CSC's definitive ruling on this matter rendered its decision premature and arbitrary.
  • The reassignments were tainted with bad faith, constituted constructive dismissal, and were retaliatory acts following the filing of the graft complaint, satisfying the elements of oppression.
  • The Court affirmed the finding of guilt for oppression but modified the penalty from suspension of six months and one day to one year, reflecting the gravity of the offense given its graft-related origin.

• Finality of Ombudsman Decisions — Under Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules and Section 27 of RA 6770, decisions of the Ombudsman exonerating a respondent from administrative charges are final and unappealable. However, this finality does not preclude collateral attack via certiorari when the decision is void for grave abuse of discretion.
• Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction — Administrative agencies with specialized competence, such as the Civil Service Commission regarding personnel matters, have primary jurisdiction to determine issues within their domain. Other bodies, including the Office of the Ombudsman, must defer to or await the rulings of such agencies on matters within their special competence before rendering decisions on related issues.
• Presumption of Regularity of Official Acts — Official acts enjoy the presumption of regularity only when they are within the duties specified by law. The presumption does not apply when an official acts without legal authority or when the acts properly pertain to another entity or official.
• Constructive Dismissal in the Civil Service — Reassignment without consent that results in diminution of rank, status, or salary, or that lacks specificity as to functions and duties (floating assignment), constitutes constructive dismissal.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion — A decision rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and cannot become final; it may be impugned at any time through certiorari. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

• "The clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the administrative charge, as in this case."
• "Over and above our statutes is the Constitution whose Section 1, Article VIII empowers the courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
• "In the absence of any authority to take cognizance of a case and to render a decision, any resulting decision is necessarily null and void. In turn, a null decision, by its very nature, cannot become final and can be impugned at any time."
• "As a general rule, 'official acts' enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the presumption may be overthrown only by evidence to the contrary... But not all acts of public officers are 'official acts,' i.e., acts specified by law as an official duty or as a function attached to a public position, and the presumption does not apply when an official's acts are not within the duties specified by law."
• "An administrative decision, in order to be valid, should have, among others, 'something to support itself.' It must supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence adequate and acceptable enough for a reasonable mind to justify a conclusion or support a decision."

• Barata v. Abalos, Jr. — Cited for the proposition that if a sentence of censure, reprimand and one-month suspension is final and unappealable, so should exoneration be considered final and unappealable.
• Fabian v. Desierto — Cited to establish that in disciplinary cases where the penalty is higher than public censure, reprimand, or one-month suspension, the respondent may appeal to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43.
• Active Realty and Development Corp. v. Fernandez — Cited for the definition of certiorari as a remedy when a tribunal acts without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Ang Tibay v. CIR — Cited for the principle that an administrative decision must have "something to support itself" and be supported by substantial evidence.
• Republic v. Principalia — Cited for the rule that the presumption of regularity does not apply when an official's acts are not within the duties specified by law or properly pertain to another entity.

• Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman — Provides that decisions exonerating the respondent are final and unappealable.
• Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) — Provides for the effectivity and finality of Ombudsman decisions, stating that findings of fact supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and that orders imposing penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month are final and unappealable.
• Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provision allegedly violated by the petitioner in the criminal complaint filed by the respondents.
• Section 3.1 of Executive Order No. 286 (s. 1995) — Provides that the LWUA Board of Trustees is the proper appointing power with authority over personnel movements.
• Section 6a of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, s. 1998 — Defines reassignment and provides that reassignment without consent is allowed only for a maximum of one year and is presumed regular unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive dismissal.
• Section 52(A)(14) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service — Classifies oppression as a grave offense punishable by suspension of six months and one day to one year for the first offense.
• Section 22(n) of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 — Also classifies oppression as a grave offense with the same penalties.
• Article IX-B, Section 3 of the Constitution — Provides for the Civil Service Commission's power as the central personnel agency of the government.
• Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — Provides for the remedy of certiorari against grave abuse of discretion.
• Rule 43 of the Rules of Court — Provides for appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals (noted as the procedural vehicle used by respondents, though treated as Rule 65 petition by the Court).