A candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted; consequently, the candidate who is the sole remaining qualified candidate does not merely take second place but is the only placer and is entitled to be proclaimed.

Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat and Thomas R. Palileng, Sr. were candidates for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the May 10, 2004 local elections. Cayat had been previously convicted by final judgment for Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, a crime involving moral turpitude, and was under probation when he filed his certificate of candidacy. This conviction became the basis for Palileng's petition to disqualify Cayat.

• Rev. Fr. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet on January 5, 2004, for the May 10, 2004 elections, stating he was eligible for office.
• On January 26, 2004, Thomas R. Palileng, Sr., another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition for Cayat's disqualification (SPA (PES) No. C04-001), alleging Cayat was ineligible due to a final conviction for Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness (Criminal Case No. 110490, MTC Baguio City, Branch 2, conviction dated October 3, 2003).
• Cayat was granted probation on November 6, 2003, and was still under probation when he filed his COC.
• Summons for the disqualification case was served by telegram, which Cayat claimed not to have personally received, and he did not file an answer.
• On April 12, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution in SPA Case No. 04-152, cancelling Cayat's COC based on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude under Sec. 40(a) of R.A. 7160.
• Cayat received a telegram on April 13, 2004, informing him of the promulgation of the COMELEC decision on April 12, 2004.
• On April 16, 2004, Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, arguing lack of jurisdiction and invalid service of summons.
• On May 9, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued an Order dismissing Cayat's motion for reconsideration for failure to pay the required filing fee. Cayat received a photocopy of this order on May 13, 2004.
• In the May 10, 2004 elections, Cayat's name remained on the ballot; he received 8,164 votes, while Palileng received 5,292 votes. Cayat was proclaimed Mayor on May 12, 2004, and took his oath on May 17, 2004.
• On May 26, 2004, Cayat filed G.R. No. 163776 before the Supreme Court, challenging the April 12 and May 9 COMELEC dispositions.
• On July 29, 2004, Palileng filed a motion for execution of judgment in SPA Case No. 04-152.
• On October 25, 2004, the COMELEC First Division granted the motion for execution, annulled Cayat's proclamation, and ordered the creation of a new Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) to proclaim Palileng.
• On November 10, 2004, Cayat filed G.R. No. 165736 before the Supreme Court, challenging the October 25 order.
• On November 12, 2004, the new MBOC proclaimed Palileng as Mayor.
• Feliseo K. Bayacsan, the elected Vice-Mayor, filed a petition-in-intervention in G.R. No. 165736, arguing he should be declared Mayor under the rules of succession.

• Cayat argued that the COMELEC First Division Resolution of April 12, 2004, was void because the COMELEC did not acquire jurisdiction over him due to improper service of summons by telegram.
• Cayat contended that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, allowing service of summons by telegram, is void.
• Cayat claimed his motion for reconsideration was timely filed as he was notified of the April 12 Resolution only on April 13, 2004, giving him until April 16, 2004, to file.
• Cayat prayed for the recall of the October 25, 2004 order for execution and suspension of proceedings pending resolution of G.R. No. 163776.
• Intervenor Bayacsan argued that if Cayat is disqualified, he, as the duly elected Vice-Mayor, should succeed as Mayor, invoking the doctrine of rejection of the second placer.

• Palileng argued that Cayat was disqualified from running for Mayor due to his final conviction for Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, a crime involving moral turpitude, as per Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
• Palileng asserted that Cayat made material misrepresentations in his Certificate of Candidacy by declaring himself eligible for office despite the conviction.
• Palileng contended that Cayat's conviction attained finality when he applied for probation.
• Palileng sought the execution of the COMELEC First Division's April 12, 2004 Resolution disqualifying Cayat and his subsequent proclamation as Mayor.

• Whether Cayat's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division's April 12, 2004 Resolution was validly dismissed for late filing and failure to pay the filing fee.
• Whether the COMELEC First Division's Resolution of April 12, 2004, cancelling Cayat's certificate of candidacy due to disqualification, became final and executory before the May 10, 2004 elections.
• Whether Palileng's proclamation as Mayor was proper.
• Whether the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer applies, entitling the Vice-Mayor (Bayacsan) to succeed if Cayat is disqualified.

• The Supreme Court dismissed Cayat's petitions and Bayacsan's petition-in-intervention.
• Cayat's failure to pay the prescribed filing fee for his motion for reconsideration rendered the motion pro forma, as if no motion was filed. Consequently, the COMELEC First Division's April 12, 2004 Resolution cancelling Cayat's COC became final and executory on April 17, 2004 (three days after Cayat's admitted receipt of notice on April 13, 2004), which was 23 days before the May 10, 2004 elections.
• Since Cayat was disqualified by final judgment before the elections, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) applies, which states that such a candidate shall not be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
• Palileng's proclamation was proper because, with Cayat's disqualification being final before the election and the votes for Cayat being considered stray, Palileng was the sole and only qualified candidate for Mayor, not a mere second placer.
• The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer (which would allow the Vice-Mayor to succeed) does not apply because Cayat's disqualification was final before the elections, meaning Cayat was legally non-existent as a candidate on election day. This situation is distinct from cases where disqualification becomes final only after the elections.

• Moral Turpitude — An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. The Court affirmed the COMELEC's finding that Forcible Acts of Lasciviousness, for which Cayat was convicted, is a crime involving moral turpitude, making him disqualified under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
• Finality of Judgment (in criminal cases upon application for probation) — A judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation. This was applied to establish that Cayat's conviction was final when he filed his COC.
• Effect of Failure to Pay Filing Fee for Motion for Reconsideration (COMELEC Rules) — Failure to pay the required filing fee for a motion for reconsideration renders the motion merely pro forma, as if no motion had been filed, leading to the finality of the assailed resolution. This was applied to determine that the COMELEC First Division's resolution disqualifying Cayat became final before the elections.
• Effect of Disqualification by Final Judgment Before Election (Section 6, R.A. 6646) — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. This provision was central to the ruling, as Cayat's disqualification was final 23 days before the election, rendering the 8,164 votes for him stray.
• Rejection of the Second Placer Doctrine — Generally, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes is not entitled to be declared the winner if the winning candidate is disqualified. The Court held this doctrine inapplicable because Cayat's disqualification was final before the election, making Palileng the only qualified candidate, not a second placer to a disqualified winner whose disqualification became final after the election.

• "The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law."
• "Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng's proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none."
• "To allow a candidate disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the elections to be voted for and have his votes counted is a blatant violation of a mandatory provision of the election law."

• Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (211 SCRA 297) — Referenced to distinguish the present case. In Labo, the disqualification became final after the elections, making the doctrine of rejection of the second placer applicable under specific conditions. In Cayat's case, disqualification was final before the elections, rendering the doctrine inapplicable and making Section 6 of RA 6646 (first sentence) directly operative.
• Loyola v. COMELEC (337 Phil. 134 (1997)) — Cited in relation to the effect of non-payment of filing fees for a motion for reconsideration, supporting the view that such failure renders the motion pro forma.
• IRRI vs. NLRC (May 12, 1993) and Dela Torre vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996) — Cited for the definition and understanding of "moral turpitude."

• Section 40(a) of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Disqualifies persons sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence, from running for any elective local position. This was the primary basis for Cayat's disqualification.
• Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — States that any candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. If disqualification is not final before election, the Commission shall continue trial, and may suspend proclamation if evidence of guilt is strong. The first sentence was directly applied to Cayat.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, Section 7 (Promulgation) — Requires advance notice of promulgation to be served on parties. Cayat argued non-compliance, but the Court found the issue mooted by his failure to pay the MR filing fee.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, Section 8 (Motion for Reconsideration) — Provides a three-day period from promulgation to file a motion for reconsideration. The Court reckoned the finality from Cayat's receipt of notice due to his failure to pay the filing fee.
• 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 40, Section 7 — Imposes a fee for filing a motion for reconsideration. This was the basis for dismissing Cayat's MR.
• 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 40, Section (succeeding section, likely Section 8 or 19 as per dissent) — Provides that the COMELEC may refuse to take action until the fee is paid. This was crucial for the finding that the MR was pro forma.

• Justice Dante O. Tinga
  • Argued that Cayat's motion for reconsideration (MR) should not have been considered fatally defective for late filing or non-payment of filing fee, emphasizing liberality in election cases.
  • Contended that Cayat did not receive advance notice of the April 12, 2004 Resolution's promulgation, and the period to file the MR should be reckoned from Cayat's actual notice.
  • Stated that non-payment of filing fee for an MR under COMELEC Rules is not a mandatory ground for dismissal; the COMELEC has discretion and could have allowed Cayat to pay.
  • Asserted that Cayat's MR should have been resolved by the COMELEC En Banc, not the Division, as per the Constitution, and the Division's dismissal of the MR was a nullity.
  • Believed that the May 9, 2004 Order dismissing the MR could not have attained finality immediately, as Cayat received it only on May 13, 2004 (after elections), and resolutions in such cases become final only after five days.
  • Argued that Cayat's candidacy remained active on election day, and the COMELEC implicitly acknowledged this by not removing his name from the ballot and allowing his proclamation.
  • Maintained that even if Cayat were disqualified, Palileng (second placer) should not be proclaimed, citing the doctrine that the electorate's will, expressed by voting for Cayat in good faith (unaware of his disqualification's finality), should not be disenfranchised by proclaiming a candidate who lost.
  • Pointed out that Palileng's filing of a motion for execution with the COMELEC First Division while a petition was pending with the Supreme Court was improper.