Republic of the Philippines vs. Tagle

In expropriation proceedings under Executive Order No. 1035, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession in favor of the government upon deposit of ten percent of the just compensation, even if the government is already in actual physical possession of the property, because the writ secures legal possession and title necessary to prevent ejectment and complete the expropriation.

The case involves a dispute over a parcel of land in Dasmariñas, Cavite intended for the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project. The Philippine government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), had been occupying the property under a lease agreement with the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) that expired in 1988. After failed negotiations to purchase the land from the registered owner Helena Z. Benitez, the government instituted expropriation proceedings under Executive Order No. 1035 to acquire legal title and prevent ejection from the property, which was essential for the Construction Manpower Development Center operations.

• Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite covered by TCT No. 14701 containing an area of 483,331 square meters.
• In September 1982, the Philippine Government through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC) negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources Development Project, which included the Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC).
• On March 30, 1983, PHRDC and Benitez signed a Memorandum of Agreement wherein Benitez undertook to lease for twenty years and/or sell a portion of the property (no less than ten hectares) to PHRDC.
• On September 22, 1983, the Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and Benitez granted PHRDC a permit to occupy and use the land and undertake development works.
• In December 1983, PWU entered into a contract of lease with PHRDC for ten hectares at P200,000.00 annual rental for an initial term of four years (January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988) with an option to renew for up to twenty years.
• PWU entered into the lease contract purporting to be the donee of the property under a deed of donation executed by Benitez, which deed was actually executed only in December 1984, subsequent to the lease contract.
• After the lease expiration on January 1, 1988, negotiations for purchase began, with Benitez offering to sell seven hectares at P70.00 per square meter in 1989 and confirming this price in February 1991.
• PHRDC prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale, but Benitez refused to sign, reneging on her commitment to sell despite an agreement that rental payments would cease effective July 1, 1989 due to the ongoing sale negotiations.
• On August 15, 1995, Benitez and PWU demanded rental payments and vacation of the premises within thirty days, subsequently filing an unlawful detainer suit against petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court.
• Failing to acquire the property through negotiated sale, petitioner through the Department of Trade and Industry instituted a complaint for eminent domain pursuant to Executive Order No. 1035 and deposited P708,490.00 with the Philippine National Bank as provisional value.
• The Municipal Trial Court rendered a decision in the unlawful detainer case ordering petitioner to vacate the property.

• Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1035 imposes a ministerial duty upon courts to issue a writ of possession within five days from the government’s deposit of ten percent of the just compensation, which duty admits of no discretion.
• The writ of possession is necessary even if the government is already in physical possession because expropriation seeks not merely physical entry but the acquisition of title and legal right to possess (possession de jure), distinct from mere actual occupation (possession de facto).
• Without the writ, the government would be forced to vacate the property pursuant to the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, only to be ordered back through the writ of possession, creating an absurd, circuitous, and bureaucratic waste of resources that Executive Order No. 1035 was precisely enacted to prevent.
• The deposit made by petitioner (equivalent to the full assessed value) satisfies the statutory requirement for immediate issuance of the writ.
• Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that should prevail over an ordinary ejectment suit.

• Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42) provides that the plaintiff has the right to take or enter upon possession only if he deposits the assessed value, implying that the writ of possession is intended solely for entering possession, not for maintaining existing possession.
• Since petitioner is already in actual possession of the property, the writ of possession serves no legitimate purpose and is sought only to be used as leverage in the pending ejectment suit.
• Citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Cuatico v. Court of Appeals, the eminent domain case and the writ of possession cannot be entertained to defeat the ejectment case, as the government cannot expropriate property without first paying just compensation.
• The existence of a prior ejectment suit distinguishes this case from ordinary eminent domain actions, making the issuance of the writ improper.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the writ of possession previously issued in favor of the government.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a writ of possession may be issued in expropriation proceedings under Executive Order No. 1035 when the government is already in physical possession of the property.
  • Whether the State’s power of eminent domain prevails over an adverse judgment in an unlawful detainer case involving the same property.

• Procedural:
  • The Court held that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated July 26, 1996 and February 20, 1997 that quashed the writ of possession.
  • The trial court’s reliance on the fact that petitioner was already in actual possession was a whimsical and quaint ground that violated the mandatory, ministerial duty imposed by Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1035.
  • The assailed orders were declared void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and were annulled and set aside.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that mere physical entry or occupation of land (possession de facto) is not equivalent to the taking of title in expropriation, which includes the acquisition of all rights of ownership and legal possession (possession de jure).
  • The writ of possession is necessary and practical even when the government is already physically occupying the property because the lease authorizing such possession had lapsed, and the government needed to secure the legal right to possess against the ejectment proceedings.
  • Executive Order No. 1035 was enacted precisely to prevent pernicious and unreasonable delays in government infrastructure projects by requiring immediate issuance of the writ upon deposit.
  • The State’s power of eminent domain is inherent and need not be granted by the Constitution, which merely imposes the limitation of just compensation; thus, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over eminent domain proceedings.
  • The deposit of the provisional value (in this case, the full amount of P708,490.00) entitles the government to the writ as a matter of right.

• Ministerial Duty to Issue Writ of Possession — Under Section 7 of Executive Order No. 1035, courts are mandated to immediately issue a writ of possession within five days from the government’s deposit of ten percent of the just compensation, without discretion to refuse or evaluate the necessity thereof.
• De Facto vs. De Jure Possession — Physical occupation of property (possession de facto) does not confer the legal right to possess (possession de jure) or ownership; expropriation proceedings are required to convert physical possession into legal title and to secure the full bundle of rights appurtenant to ownership.
• Eminent Domain as Inherent State Power — The power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and need not be granted by constitutional or statutory provision; the Constitution merely limits its exercise by requiring just compensation and public use, but does not create the power itself.

• "Executive Order No. 1035 was enacted to facilitate government acquisition of private property to be used for infrastructure or other development projects."
• "Under this statutory provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession."
• "The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land."
• "Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership."
• "Petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as well."
• "It would be circuitous, if not legally absurd, for this Court to require petitioner to first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards, order the trial court to issue in petitioner’s favor a writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings."

• J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals (3 SCRA 696) — Cited by private respondent to argue that eminent domain cannot defeat ejectment cases; distinguished by the Court which noted that the cited case merely enforced constitutional limitations regarding payment of just compensation.
• Cuatico v. Court of Appeals (6 SCRA 595) — Similarly cited by respondent and distinguished by the Court as merely enforcing the constitutional limitation on just compensation.
• Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (26 SCRA 628) — Cited for the principle that eminent domain may involve taking only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights constituting ownership.
• Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation (G.R. No. 127820) — Cited for the doctrine that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need not be granted by the fundamental law.
• Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus (40 Phil. 550) — Cited regarding the constitutional limitation that private property shall not be taken without just compensation.
• Governor Pablo P. Garcia et al. v. Hon. Jose P. Burgos et al. (G.R. No. 124130) — Cited regarding the standard for determining grave abuse of discretion.
• United States v. Causby (328 U.S. 256) — Cited for the concept that there may be compensable taking of only some, not all, property interests.

• Section 7, Executive Order No. 1035 — Mandates that courts shall give priority to expropriation cases and immediately issue writs of possession within five days from the government’s deposit of ten percent of the just compensation as provided under P.D. No. 1533.
• Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution — Provides that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
• Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court (as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42) — Grants the plaintiff the right to take or enter upon possession of the real property involved upon deposit of an amount equivalent to the assessed value.
• Presidential Decree No. 1533 — Governs the determination of just compensation for property acquired through expropriation.
• Presidential Decree No. 42 — Amends Rule 67 of the Rules of Court regarding the deposit of provisional value to enter possession.