Republic of the Philippines vs. Linney Jean L. Tangarorang and Ramer R. Tangarorang

Children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents retain their legitimate status even if said marriage is later declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, pursuant to the explicit exception provided in Article 54 of the same Code.

Linney Jean Tangarorang filed a petition to declare her marriage to Ramer Tangarorang void based on his psychological incapacity. The couple had a daughter, Sharemahlyne, born prior to their marriage. While the trial court granted the petition for nullity, it simultaneously declared Sharemahlyne an illegitimate child because she was born before the marriage and the marriage was deemed never to have existed. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) challenged this specific portion of the ruling to protect the child's legitimate status.

• Sharemahlyne was born on September 9, 2006, to Linney and Ramer, who had no legal impediment to marry each other at the time of her conception.
• Linney and Ramer subsequently married on April 12, 2007, shortly after the child's birth.
• Linney filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing Ramer's psychological incapacity (narcissistic personality disorder, abuse, and addiction).
• The RTC granted the petition, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
• In its Decision, the RTC declared Sharemahlyne an illegitimate child because she was born prior to the marriage and her birth certificate lacked an annotation of legitimation.
• The OSG filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, arguing the child should remain legitimate despite the nullity of the marriage.
• The RTC denied the motion, ruling that Article 165 of the Family Code applied (children born outside valid marriage are illegitimate) and noting the absence of legitimation annotation in the civil registry.

• The status of Sharemahlyne as a legitimate child cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
• Linney is not the proper party contemplated under Article 182 of the Family Code to impugn the legitimacy of her daughter.
• The subsequent marriage of Ramer and Linney ipso facto made Sharemahlyne a legitimate child, regardless of the lack of annotation in the civil registry.
• Article 54 of the Family Code applies as an exception to Article 165, expressly recognizing that a child conceived or born before a marriage is declared void under Article 36 is legitimated.

• The RTC was correct in applying Article 165 in conjunction with Articles 177 and 178 of the Family Code.
• Children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their parents revert to being illegitimate when that subsequent marriage is declared void ab initio.
• Since a void marriage is deemed to have never existed at any point in time, no benefits (such as legitimation) should arise from it.
• With the child's status reverting to illegitimate, sole custody should belong to the mother.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to resolve the issue of the child's civil status within the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a child legitimated by a subsequent marriage retains legitimate status after that marriage is declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that the civil status of children is not a collateral issue but a legal consequence of the validity of the marriage. Therefore, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over incidental and consequential matters, including the child's legitimacy status, upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity. The Court cited Section 22 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which mandates courts to order the amendment of birth records in nullity cases.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that Sharemahlyne is a legitimate child. Under Articles 177 and 178, she was legitimated by the subsequent marriage of her parents, who were not disqualified from marrying at the time of her conception. Crucially, Article 54 of the Family Code provides a specific exception for marriages voided under Article 36, stating that children conceived or born before the judgment becomes final shall be considered legitimate. The Court held that legitimated children enjoy the same rights as legitimate children, and the law does not provide for a scenario where a legitimated child reverts to illegitimacy. The lack of annotation on the birth certificate is a mere administrative matter that cannot impair substantive rights.

• Legitimation — A process under Articles 177 and 178 of the Family Code whereby children conceived and born outside of wedlock to parents with no legal impediment to marry at the time of conception become legitimate through a subsequent valid marriage. In this case, the Court applied this to confirm the child was legitimated upon the parents' marriage in 2007.
• Status of Children in Void Marriages (Article 54 Exception) — While a void marriage is generally deemed never to have taken place, Article 54 creates a statutory exception for Article 36 cases. It mandates that children conceived or born before the finality of the judgment of nullity shall be considered legitimate. The Court interpreted this to include legitimated children, preventing their reversion to illegitimacy.
• Jurisdiction over Incidental Matters — Upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the marriage, such as the custody and status of children. The Court used this to affirm the RTC's authority to rule on the child's status, even though the RTC's specific ruling was incorrect.

• "Legitimated children retain their legitimacy status in the event of a declaration of nullity of their parents' marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code."
• "It would thus be absurd to relegate children 'to the status of illegitimacy, when they are already enjoying the rights accorded to legitimated children.'"
• "Indeed, the formal requirement of annotating the legitimation is a mere administrative procedure which cannot impair substantive rights."

• Republic v. Boquiren — Cited to clarify the rule against collateral attacks on legitimacy. The Court distinguished this case, noting that Boquiren involved a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries where the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the marriage's validity, whereas the present case is a direct petition for nullity where the child's status is a consequential issue.
• Tanyag v. Tanyag — Cited to support the principle that trial courts acquire jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the marriage upon the filing of a petition for declaration of nullity.
• Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay — Cited to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has previously determined the validity of a marriage and ruled on a child's legitimacy status in a single action.

• Family Code, Article 36 — The legal ground used for the declaration of nullity of the parents' marriage (psychological incapacity).
• Family Code, Article 54 — The controlling provision stating that children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity under Article 36 becomes final shall be considered legitimate.
• Family Code, Articles 177 and 178 — Provisions defining the requirements and effects of legitimation by subsequent marriage.
• Family Code, Article 165 — The general rule stating children born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate; the Court ruled this was incorrectly applied by the RTC.
• A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, Section 22 — Procedural rule directing courts to issue decrees indicating the new civil status of children in nullity cases, explicitly excepting children under Articles 36 and 53 from being declared illegitimate.

• Leonen, SAJ. — Justice Leonen concurred with the result but wrote separately to criticize the use of the term "illegitimate" as discriminatory and stigmatizing. He argued that the classification violates the Constitution and international commitments (UN Convention on the Rights of the Child) to protect children from discrimination. He advocated for the term "nonmarital children" and emphasized that the best interest of the child must prevail over archaic statutory distinctions.