R. Transport Corporation vs. Laguesma

The one-year prohibition on certification elections under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code—providing that no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a "final certification election result"—applies only where there has been an actual conduct of an election (i.e., ballots were cast and votes were counted), and does not bar a subsequent petition where the prior petition was dismissed without an election being held due to procedural defects such as an incomplete bargaining unit description.

• On January 4, 1991, respondent Christian Labor Organization of the Philippines (CLOP) filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of petitioner R. Transport Corporation, initially limiting the proposed bargaining unit to drivers, conductors, and conductresses to the exclusion of other employees.
• On April 8, 1991, Med-Arbiter A. Dizon dismissed the first petition on the ground that the bargaining unit description was defective for excluding eligible employees such as inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics, and washerboys.
• On May 10, 1991, respondent CLOP filed a second petition for certification election, this time including all rank-and-file employees holding non-managerial and non-supervisorial positions.
• Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the second petition, arguing that the dismissal of the first petition constituted res judicata and that the one-year bar rule prevented the filing of another petition within one year.
• On July 3, 1991, Med-Arbiter R. Parungo rendered a decision granting the second petition and ordering the conduct of a certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers.
• On October 16, 1991, Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP) filed a motion for intervention alleging it had members in the proposed bargaining unit.
• The National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU) subsequently filed a separate petition for certification election (NCR-OD-M-91-10-058) and sought consolidation with the CLOP case.
• Petitioner appealed the July 3, 1991 Med-Arbiter decision to the DOLE Secretary, who, through Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, affirmed the order for certification election in a Resolution dated July 22, 1992.
• On July 31, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating its arguments on res judicata and the one-year bar rule under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
• On September 3, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial Questions, arguing that the certification election must be suspended pending final resolution of three pending NLRC cases: (a) a case declaring a strike staged by CLOP illegal; (b) a case for illegal dismissal filed by CLOP and its members; and (c) another illegal dismissal case filed by CLOP on behalf of affected members.
• The Undersecretary denied the motion to suspend on September 29, 1992, ruling that the pendency of cases before the NLRC was not a valid ground for suspension because the employees involved legally remained employees of the company until their status was finally resolved.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the September 29, 1992 resolution, which was denied on October 29, 1992.
• Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court without awaiting resolution of its Comment and Objection with Urgent Motion to Dismiss still pending before the Undersecretary.

• The dismissal of the first petition for certification election constitutes res judicata, barring the filing of the second petition because there was a final judgment on the merits, and respondent CLOP should have appealed the dismissal rather than file a new petition.
• The second petition is barred by the one-year rule under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, which prohibits the holding of a certification election within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result, which petitioner interpreted to include the dismissal of the first petition.
• The certification election must be suspended indefinitely pending final resolution of the pending NLRC cases involving illegal dismissal and illegal strike, as the employees who participated in the strike may have lost their employment status and thus should not be allowed to vote.
• The employer has the right to resist the certification election where the employees' status is in question.

• Res judicata does not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits in the first petition; the dismissal was based solely on the defective composition of the proposed bargaining unit which excluded essential employees.
• The parties in the first and second petitions are not identical because the second petition included employees (inspectors, dispatchers, mechanics, washerboys) who were excluded in the first petition.
• The one-year bar rule does not apply because there was no certification election conducted in the first petition; the phrase "final certification election result" presupposes an actual election where ballots were cast and votes counted, not a mere dismissal of a petition.
• The pendency of illegal dismissal cases does not bar the certification election because employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to re-employment remain eligible to vote; they legally remain employees until their dismissal is finally adjudicated.
• The employer is merely a bystander in certification elections and has no right to interfere in the employees' choice of a collective bargaining agent.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed given that petitioner's Comment and Objection with Urgent Motion to Dismiss was still pending before the DOLE Undersecretary.
  • Whether petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping for pursuing the same cause of action before two different fora.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the principle of res judicata bars the filing of the second petition for certification election.
  • Whether the one-year bar rule under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies to prevent the conduct of the certification election.
  • Whether the pendency of illegal dismissal and illegal strike cases constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the certification election proceedings.

• Procedural:
  • The resort to judicial action is premature because petitioner's Comment and Objection to the Order dated October 29, 1992 with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Certification Election was still pending with the Undersecretary of Labor when the instant petition was filed.
  • Petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping for pursuing the same cause of action involving the same issues, parties, and subject matter before two different fora (the DOLE and the Supreme Court).
• Substantive:
  • Res judicata does not apply because the requisites are not satisfied, specifically the requirement of identity of parties. The first petition excluded essential employees (inspectors, inspectresses, dispatchers, mechanics, and washerboys) who were included in the second petition, making the parties different between the two actions.
  • The one-year bar rule does not apply where the prior petition was dismissed without an actual certification election being conducted. The phrase "final certification election result" in Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules contemplates a situation where ballots were cast and votes were counted, not a mere dismissal of the petition on procedural grounds due to an incomplete bargaining unit description.
  • The pendency of illegal dismissal cases does not bar the certification election. Employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment remain eligible to vote in certification elections. Until the motion to declare their employment terminated or their complaint for illegal dismissal is finally resolved by the NLRC, they legally remain employees of the company.
  • The employer has no right to interfere in the certification election and is merely regarded as a bystander; the choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees.

• Res Judicata — Requires (a) a former final judgment on the merits, (b) rendered by a court with jurisdiction, and (c) identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The Court held that where the second petition for certification election includes employees who were excluded in the first petition, there is no identity of parties, and res judicata does not apply.
• One-Year Bar Rule (Certification Year Rule) — Under Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result. The Court interpreted "final certification election result" to mean the result of an actual election where ballots were cast and votes counted, not the dismissal of a petition without an election.
• Employer as Bystander Rule — The choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a bystander.
• Status of Employees in Pending Illegal Dismissal Cases — Employees who have been improperly laid off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment are eligible to vote in certification elections until their dismissal is finally resolved.

• "The phrase 'final certification election result' means that there was an actual conduct of election i.e. ballots were cast and there was a counting of votes." — Explaining the interpretation of the one-year bar rule under the Omnibus Rules.
• "The choice of a collective bargaining agent is the sole concern of the employees. The employer has no right to interfere in the election and is merely regarded as a bystander." — Reiterating the limited role of the employer in certification elections.
• "Employees who have been improperly laid-off but who have a present, unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment, are eligible to vote in certification elections." — Establishing the voting rights of employees with pending illegal dismissal claims.

• Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 (1991) — Cited for the requisites of res judicata: the former judgment must be final, on the merits, rendered by a court with jurisdiction, and there must be identity of parties between the first and second actions.
• Philippine Fruits and Vegetables Industries, Inc. v. Torres, 211 SCRA 95 (1992) — Cited for the doctrine that employees improperly laid off but with a present right to re-employment remain eligible to vote in certification elections.
• Divine Word University of Tacloban v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 213 SCRA 759 (1992) — Cited for the principle that the employer is a bystander in certification elections and has no right to interfere.

• Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code — Provides that no certification election may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result. The Court interpreted this to require an actual election with ballots cast, not merely the dismissal of a prior petition.
• Article 231 of the Labor Code — Referenced regarding the registration of collective bargaining agreements as a condition for the filing of certification elections.