To successfully effect a change of domicile for election purposes, a candidate must demonstrate by clear and positive proof: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) definite acts which correspond with that purpose. Mere registration as a voter or voting in a few elections in a locality is not conclusive proof of domicile.

The case arose from the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. Arsenio Densing Noble filed a Certificate of Candidacy for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, claiming 15 years of residency. Makil U. Pundaodaya, whose wife Judith Pundaodaya was also a mayoral candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Noble, alleging he lacked the residency qualification as he was actually a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.

• On March 27, 2007, Arsenio Densing Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, stating he had been a resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, for 15 years.
• On April 3, 2007, Makil U. Pundaodaya filed a petition to disqualify Noble, alleging Noble lacked the residency qualification, never actually resided in Kinoguitan, had no intention to reside there permanently, and was in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he maintained a business.
• Noble countered that he was a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, married Bernadith Go (daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan) in 1992, had been engaged in electoral activities there, and voted in Kinoguitan in the 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections.
• Noble presented voter registration records, a certification from an Election Officer, his marriage certificate, affidavits from Kinoguitan residents, receipts for water bill payments, certifications of being a water consumer since 2003, and a 1996 Deed of Sale for a real property in Kinoguitan.
• Pundaodaya presented evidence showing Noble's domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, including: a certification from the Barangay Kagawad of Lapasan stating Noble was a resident there; an affidavit from the Barangay Kagawad of Esperanza, Kinoguitan, attesting Noble had not resided there; photos and receipts showing Noble and his wife maintained their residence and businesses in Lapasan; tax declarations of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City under Noble's name; and the "Household Record of Barangay Inhabitants" of Mayor Narciso Go which did not include Noble or his wife.
• Noble was proclaimed the winning candidate on May 15, 2007, after garnering the highest number of votes.

• Petitioner Pundaodaya argued that respondent Noble lacked the one-year residency qualification prescribed by law for elective local officials.
• Pundaodaya claimed Noble never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
• Pundaodaya asserted that Noble did not have the intention of residing in Kinoguitan permanently and was, in fact, a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintained a business.
• Pundaodaya contended that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring Noble qualified, in not annulling Noble's proclamation, and in failing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the winning candidate.

• Respondent Noble averred that he was a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
• Noble stated that he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan, on January 18, 1992, and had since resided in Kinoguitan.
• Noble claimed he had been engaged in electoral activities in Kinoguitan since his marriage and had voted in the said municipality in the 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections.
• Noble argued that his marriage, voter registration, participation in elections, and ownership of property in Kinoguitan sufficiently met the residency requirement.

• Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
• Whether the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to order the annulment of Noble's proclamation.
• Whether Judith Pundaodaya should be proclaimed as the winning candidate if Noble is disqualified.

• The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the COMELEC En Banc's resolution, and declared Arsenio Densing Noble disqualified from running as Mayor of Kinoguitan.
• The Court found that Noble failed to prove by clear and positive evidence that he had successfully effected a change of domicile from his origin in Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, to Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
• Noble's evidence, such as voter registration, marriage to a local, payment of water bills (without specifying the property), and a Deed of Sale (whose veracity was questioned by Noble's own admission of not owning property in Kinoguitan), was deemed insufficient to establish actual physical presence and a bona fide intention to make Kinoguitan his permanent home (animus manendi).
• The Court gave more weight to Pundaodaya's evidence, which indicated Noble's continued residence and business operations in Cagayan de Oro City and lack of actual residence in Kinoguitan.
• The Court ruled that Noble's alleged change of domicile appeared to be solely for the purpose of qualifying as a candidate, which is not permissible.
• Regarding succession, the Court held that Judith Pundaodaya could not be proclaimed mayor. Instead, due to the permanent vacancy created by Noble's disqualification ("fails to qualify"), the proclaimed Vice-Mayor should succeed as Mayor pursuant to Section 44 of the Local Government Code.

• Residence for Election Purposes is Domicile — The term "residence" as used in election law is synonymous with "domicile," which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent, one has the intention of returning (animus manendi). The Court applied this by scrutinizing whether Noble intended Kinoguitan to be his permanent home, not merely a place of temporary stay.
• Requirements for Change of Domicile — To acquire a new domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former domicile and establishing a new one (animus non revertendi and animus manendi); and (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The Court found Noble failed to satisfy these requirements, as his acts did not unequivocally show an abandonment of his Cagayan de Oro domicile and the establishment of a new one in Kinoguitan.
• Animus Manendi (Intent to Remain) — This refers to the intent to make a place one's permanent home. The Court emphasized that personal presence in a place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. Noble's evidence did not sufficiently prove his animus manendi in Kinoguitan.
• Voter Registration Not Conclusive Proof of Domicile — While voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is not conclusive evidence of domicile. The Court held that Noble's registration as a voter in Kinoguitan did not, by itself, prove he had abandoned his domicile in Cagayan de Oro or established a new one in Kinoguitan.
• Purpose of Residency Requirement — The one-year residency requirement aims to exclude outsiders from taking advantage of favorable circumstances in a community for electoral gain and to ensure that officials are familiar with the needs of their constituents. The Court found Noble's attempt to establish residency in Kinoguitan was merely to meet this requirement, defeating its purpose.
• Rule on Succession in Case of Permanent Vacancy in Local Elective Office — If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the mayor (e.g., due to failure to qualify), the vice-mayor concerned shall become the mayor. The Court applied this by ordering the proclaimed Vice-Mayor to succeed Noble, rather than proclaiming the second-placer (Judith Pundaodaya).

• "If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues."
• "To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode."
• "Establishing residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the community."

• Japzon v. Commission on Elections — Cited for the definition of "residence" in election law as "domicile," meaning the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home with the intention to return and remain (animus manendi).
• Domino v. Commission on Elections — Referenced for explaining that domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence, and for outlining the three rules concerning domicile: (1) a man must have a domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one domicile at a time. Also cited for the requirements to effect a change of domicile and that voter registration is not conclusive proof of residence.
• Perez v. Commission on Elections — Cited to support the principle that a person's registration as a voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another, and such registration is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned his original residence.
• Faypon v. Quirino — Cited (via Perez) in relation to the principle that voter registration in a place other than one's residence of origin does not equate to abandonment of the original residence.
• In the Matter of the Petition for Disqualification of Tess Dumpit-Michelena — Referenced for the rule that without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of the three requirements for change of domicile, the domicile of origin continues.
• Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections — Cited for the rationale behind the one-year residency requirement, which is to exclude outsiders from exploiting local communities for electoral gain and to ensure officials are connected to the community.
• Aquino v. Commission on Elections — Cited (via Torayno) for the principle that residency requirement ensures officials are cognizant of community needs.
• Limbona v. Commission on Elections — Cited in relation to the rules on succession when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the mayor due to disqualification.

• Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — This section requires an elective local official to be a resident in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he intends to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the election. The Court applied this to determine Noble's qualification.
• Section 44 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — This section details the rules on permanent vacancies in local elective offices, stating that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the mayor (e.g., when an official "fails to qualify"), the vice-mayor shall succeed. The Court applied this to determine who should assume the mayoralty post after Noble's disqualification.