Poblete vs. Court of Appeals

A petition for review on certiorari concerning bail issues becomes moot and academic when the underlying criminal case has been dismissed and the accused acquitted; furthermore, in estafa cases under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 74, not reclusion perpetua.

The case arose from a dispute involving the issuance of checks amounting to P2,318,047.60 which led to the filing of an information for estafa. The controversy centered on whether bail is a matter of right in estafa cases involving amounts exceeding P22,000.00 where the penalty under Presidential Decree No. 818 exceeds thirty years and is termed reclusion perpetua only in connection with accessory penalties.

• Aida Poblete was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree No. 818 for allegedly issuing checks amounting to P2,318,047.60 to William Lu with deliberate intent to defraud.
• The information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina did not recommend bail.
• On December 18, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation praying that the warrant of arrest be held in abeyance pending reinvestigation.
• On January 17, 1996, the trial court presided by Judge Reuben P. De La Cruz denied the motion for reinvestigation and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest, fixing bail at P40,000.00 on the basis that the offense was not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, making bail a matter of right.
• Private respondent William Lu filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 818 in relation to Section 3 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the imposable penalty exceeded thirty years and should be termed reclusion perpetua, thus bail was not a matter of right and a hearing was mandatory.
• On May 2, 1996, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
• Private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals.
• On March 31, 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order, ruling that Presidential Decree No. 818 needs no further interpretation, that the penalty should be termed reclusion perpetua, and that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting bail ex parte.
• On October 15, 1999, the trial court (now presided by Judge Olga Palanca-Enriquez) dismissed the criminal case and acquitted the accused via a demurrer to evidence.
• The Supreme Court discovered the dismissal only after ordering the complete records of the case on May 7, 2004.

• That the trial court correctly fixed bail as a matter of right since the offense charged was not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
• That the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order granting bail and in ruling that Presidential Decree No. 818 imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• That under Presidential Decree No. 818, the imposable penalty for estafa involving amounts exceeding P22,000.00 exceeds thirty years and should be termed reclusion perpetua.
• That pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is not a matter of right when the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
• That a hearing on the application for bail is mandatory when the evidence of guilt is strong.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition has become moot and academic in view of the dismissal of the criminal case and acquittal of the accused.
  • Whether counsel for the parties should be held liable for indirect contempt for failure to inform the Court of the dismissal of the criminal case.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether bail is a matter of right in estafa cases under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 where the amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00.

• Procedural:
  • The petition is dismissed as moot and academic because the criminal case was dismissed on October 15, 1999 via a demurrer to evidence resulting in the acquittal of the accused, rendering the issue of bail for provisional liberty irrelevant.
  • Both counsel (Atty. Roberto T. Neri for petitioner and Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro for respondent) are directed to explain why they should not be held liable for indirect contempt of court under Rule 71, Section 3(d) for failing to inform the Court of the dismissal of the criminal case and acquittal of the accused, which constitutes improper conduct tending to impede or obstruct the administration of justice.
• Substantive:
  • The substantive issue regarding bail computation for estafa under Presidential Decree No. 818 was definitively resolved in Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 149276) where the Court adopted Department of Justice Circular No. 74.
  • For amounts of fraud of P32,000.00 or over where the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum multiplied by P2,000.00 plus an additional P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total amount shall not exceed P60,000.00.

• Mootness and Academic Question — Courts will decline jurisdiction over cases that have become moot and academic because there is no actual controversy requiring judicial resolution; in this case, the dismissal of the criminal case and acquittal of the accused rendered the bail issue moot.
• Bail Computation under PD 818 — In estafa cases under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818 involving amounts of P32,000.00 or over, bail is computed based on reclusion temporal maximum, not reclusion perpetua, pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 74 as adopted in Lim v. People.
• Duty of Candor to the Court — Lawyers have a duty to inform the court of material developments affecting pending cases; failure to disclose the dismissal of a case constitutes improper conduct that may be punished as indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court.

• "With the acquittal of the accused, the instant case which involves the issue of bail for the provisional liberty of the accused has become moot and academic."
• "This Court has no alternative but to dismiss the Petition."
• "From the records, it appears that the lawyers of the parties, Atty. Roberto T. Neri for petitioner and Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro for respondent, have both failed to inform this Court of the dismissal of the criminal case and the acquittal of the accused."
• "Obviously, this case could have been dismissed much earlier had both or either counsel bothered to advise the Court about the Order dated October 15, 1999 of the lower court."

• Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149276 — Controlling precedent adopting DOJ Circular No. 74 regarding bail computation for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by PD 818; established that bail should be based on reclusion temporal maximum, not reclusion perpetua.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of estafa by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneous with the issuance of checks.
• Presidential Decree No. 818, Section 1 — Amends Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty for estafa involving checks to reclusion temporal if the amount is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00, and if exceeding P22,000.00, the penalty is imposed in its maximum period adding one year for each additional P10,000.00 but not exceeding thirty years, termed reclusion perpetua only in connection with accessory penalties.
• Rule 114, Section 3 of the Rules of Court — Provides that bail is not a matter of right when the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Rule 71, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court — Defines indirect contempt as any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.