People vs. Pinuela

Treachery qualifies an attack to murder even when the victim was forewarned of danger, provided that at the moment the blow was struck, the victim was helpless and unable to defend himself; consequently, where the accused performs all acts of execution for murder but the victim survives due to causes independent of the accused's will, the crime is Frustrated Murder, not Frustrated Homicide.

• On January 30, 1999, at approximately 8:00 a.m., Salvador Galvez, Jr. was standing in front of his store at the corner of Rizal and Mabini Streets, Iloilo City, talking to Henry Hualde.
• David Galvez, Salvador's brother, along with helper Rodney Albito, was cleaning their trisikad at the side of the road nearby.
• Victor Peñasales, a water vendor, was also in the vicinity.
• Accused-appellant Raquim Pinuela suddenly alighted from a trisikad in front of Salvador's store and shot David Galvez at close range in the head.
• Accused-appellant then turned his firearm toward Salvador Galvez, Jr. and fired five shots, hitting him in the abdomen and right thigh.
• Salvador, who was also armed, drew his gun and fired back at accused-appellant but missed because the latter immediately fled toward the supermarket.
• Both victims were brought to St. Paul's Hospital where David expired, while Salvador survived after successful surgery performed by Dr. Michael Martinez.
• Post-mortem examination by Dr. Tito D. Doromal revealed that David died of asphyxia by aspiration of blood secondary to a gunshot wound with entry at the bridge of the nose and exit beside the left ear.
• Dr. Martinez found that Salvador's abdominal wound penetrated the retroperitoneal right area and could have been fatal were it not for timely medical attendance; a slug was recovered from his right thigh.
• In his defense, accused-appellant testified that he was in his house in Zarraga from noon of January 29, 1999 until February 1, 1999 because he was sick (alibi).
• Accused-appellant admitted knowing the Galvez brothers for nine years and that David Galvez had killed his brother sometime in 1995.
• Accused-appellant also admitted bearing a grudge against Abraham Galvez (another brother) prior to the incident.

• Eyewitness Victor Peñasales failed to identify accused-appellant as the assailant despite being only one meter away from David, thus Salvador Galvez, Jr., who was situated at a similar distance, could not have identified him either.
• The testimony of prosecution witness Rodney Albito was coached because he was a man-servant of Salvador Galvez, Jr., rendering his identification of accused-appellant suspect.
• The trial judge's intervention during the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses was prejudicial to the defense and violated the accused's right to an impartial trial.
• The prosecution's failure to present Henry Hualde as a witness gives rise to the presumption that his testimony would have been adverse to the prosecution's case.

• The identity of accused-appellant was clearly and positively established by Salvador Galvez, Jr., who had known accused-appellant for many years, and by Rodney Albito, who was not shown to have any ill-motive or grudge against accused-appellant.
• Conditions of visibility were favorable at 8:00 a.m., the distance between the witnesses and accused-appellant was minimal, and there were no obstructions to their view.
• Mere relationship of a witness to the victim by employment does not erode credibility; interested witnesses are more worthy of belief as they would be unnatural to implicate persons other than the real culprits.
• The defense of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical identification of the accused by eyewitnesses.
• The trial judge's questions were merely clarificatory and designed to ferret out the truth; a judge is not an idle arbiter during trial.
• The prosecution has discretion to determine which witnesses to present, and failure to present a particular witness does not create an adverse presumption where the evidence is merely corroborative or cumulative, or available to both parties.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the trial judge's intervention during cross-examination violated the accused's right to an impartial trial.
  • Whether the prosecution's failure to present witness Henry Hualde creates a presumption that his testimony would be adverse to the prosecution.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the accused was positively identified as the perpetrator of the crimes.
  • Whether treachery attended the attack on Salvador Galvez, Jr.
  • Whether the crime committed against Salvador Galvez, Jr. was Frustrated Murder or Frustrated Homicide.

• Procedural:
  • The trial judge's intervention did not indicate bias; the questions propounded were merely clarificatory and designed to ferret out the truth. A trial judge is not an idle arbiter and may ask clarificatory questions to witnesses.
  • The failure of the prosecution to present Henry Hualde does not give rise to the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced, where the evidence is at the disposal of both parties or where the only object of presenting the witness would be to provide corroborative or cumulative evidence.
• Substantive:
  • Accused-appellant was positively identified by Salvador Galvez, Jr. and Rodney Albito; the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is binding on the appellate court absent facts or circumstances of weight and substance that were overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.
  • Treachery attended both attacks; the sudden and unexpected attack on David Galvez, who was squatting with his head bent, and the swift succession of events (only three seconds between accused-appellant's arrival and the shooting of David, and two seconds between the shootings) rendered Salvador unable to defend himself. Treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger, provided that at the time the blow was struck, the victim was helpless and unable to defend himself.
  • The crime committed against Salvador Galvez, Jr. is Frustrated Murder, not Frustrated Homicide, because treachery qualifies the attack, and accused-appellant performed all acts of execution which would have produced death by reason of causes independent of his will (timely medical intervention).

• Positive Identification over Alibi and Denial — Positive, categorical, and consistent identification of the accused by eyewitnesses without any ill-motive prevails over the defenses of denial and alibi, which are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of weight unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender employs means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and such means were deliberately or consciously adopted. The existence of treachery is not dependent on the success of the assault and may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger, provided that at the time the blow was struck, the victim was helpless and unable to defend himself.
• Frustrated Felony — A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
• Waiver of Double Jeopardy upon Appeal — When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to him, and whether assigned as errors or not.
• Credibility of Witnesses — The trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude; such findings are binding and conclusive on the appellate court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.

• "Where conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased, his assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should be accepted as trustworthy."
• "Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the accused, when categorical and consistent and without any ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial."
• "Treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that at the time the blow was struck, the victim was helpless and unable to defend himself."
• "When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives his constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to him, and whether they are assigned as errors or not."

• People v. Apelado (316 SCRA 422) — Cited for the principle that the relationship of a witness to the victim by employment does not erode credibility; interested witnesses are more worthy of belief as it would be unnatural for them to implicate persons other than the real culprits.
• People v. Yatco (G.R. No. 138388) — Cited regarding the rule that where conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to be biased, his assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should be accepted as trustworthy.
• People v. Gonzales (G.R. Nos. 143143-44) — Cited regarding the binding nature of trial court findings on credibility of witnesses.
• People v. De Leon (G.R. No. 144052) — Cited for the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial.
• People v. Padilla (G.R. Nos. 138472-73) — Cited regarding the prosecution's discretion to choose witnesses and the rule that failure to present a witness does not create an adverse presumption where evidence is merely corroborative.
• People v. Castillo (289 SCRA 213) — Cited regarding the trial judge's authority to ask clarificatory questions without indicating bias.
• People v. Discalsota (G.R. No. 136892) — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery.
• People v. Gutierrez (G.R. No. 142905) — Cited regarding sudden and unexpected attack constituting alevosia.
• People v. Tejero (G.R. No. 135050) — Cited for the principle that the existence or non-existence of treachery is not dependent on the success of the assault.
• People v. Rivera (G.R. No. 125895) — Cited for the rule that treachery may be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of danger.
• People v. Las Piñas (G.R. No. 133444) — Cited regarding the waiver of double jeopardy upon appeal and the appellate court's power to modify judgments.
• People v. Dela Cruz (G.R. No. 139970) — Cited for the prevailing jurisprudence fixing civil indemnity at P50,000.00.
• People v. Labitad (G.R. No. 132793) — Cited regarding the award of moral damages without need for proof other than the fact of death.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 6 — Defines frustrated felonies as those where the offender performs all acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 41 — Provides for the accessory penalties accompanying reclusion perpetua.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 42 — Provides for the accessory penalties accompanying reclusion temporal.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 248 — Defines the crime of Murder and imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 63, paragraph 2 — Provides the rules for applying penalties when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty for frustrated murder.

• Justice Vitug — Joined the decision as Acting Chairman.
• Justice Carpio — Concurred in the decision.
• Justice Azcuna — Concurred in the decision.