People vs. Lacson

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the provisional dismissal of criminal cases becomes permanent if not revived within one or two years (depending on the penalty), is inapplicable where the accused did not expressly consent to the provisional dismissal and where the offended parties were not notified of the motion for dismissal. Furthermore, the time-bar under said rule should not be applied retroactively to dismissals that occurred prior to the rule's effectivity if such retroactive application would reduce the period available to the State to revive the cases to less than the prescribed statutory period.

The case stems from the infamous "Kuratong Baleleng" killings of May 18, 1995, where eleven suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed in an alleged shoot-out with police officers in Quezon City. Among the accused was then-Senator Panfilo M. Lacson. The killings sparked public outrage and Senate investigations, which concluded that the victims were killed in cold blood while in police custody. Multiple murder charges were initially filed against Lacson and other police officers before the Sandiganbayan. The cases were subsequently transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. In 1999, the RTC provisionally dismissed the cases for lack of probable cause. In 2001, the Department of Justice conducted a new preliminary investigation based on affidavits from new witnesses and filed new Informations against Lacson, prompting him to invoke Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to bar the revival of the cases.

• On May 18, 1995, eleven alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were killed in an incident involving police officers, including respondent Panfilo M. Lacson, along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
• Multiple murder charges were filed against Lacson and twenty-five other police officers. The cases were initially docketed with the Sandiganbayan but were later transferred to RTC Quezon City, Branch 81, pursuant to a Supreme Court decision.
• On March 17, 1999, Lacson filed a "Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses," praying that the court conduct a judicial determination of probable cause and that warrants for his arrest be withheld or recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion.
• On March 29, 1999, Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. issued a Resolution dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 for lack of probable cause, noting the recantation of principal prosecution witnesses and the execution of affidavits of desistance by some relatives of the victims.
• On March 29, 2001, the Secretary of Justice received a letter from the PNP Chief indorsing affidavits of two new witnesses (Abelardo Ramos and Ysmael Yu) regarding the incident.
• A panel of State Prosecutors conducted a new preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause, filed new Informations for multiple murder on June 6, 2001 (Crim. Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112).
• Lacson filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the Court of Appeals, arguing that the dismissal in 1999 had become permanent under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (which took effect on December 1, 2000), as the cases were not revived within two years.
• The Court of Appeals granted Lacson's petition, declaring the new Informations null and void.
• The petitioners sought relief from the Supreme Court, which initially remanded the case for factual determination but, in this Resolution, granted reconsideration and ruled on the merits.

• Section 8, Rule 117 is inapplicable because the essential requirements for its application—express consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties—were not present when Judge Agnir dismissed the cases in March 1999.
• Respondent Lacson did not file a motion for provisional dismissal; he merely filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause, which is distinct from consenting to a provisional dismissal.
• The heirs of the victims were not given prior notice of the dismissal as required by the rule.
• The two-year time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 should not be applied retroactively because it would violate the State's right to due process and unduly impair its substantive right to prosecute under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code (which provides a 20-year prescriptive period for murder).
• Retroactive application would reduce the State's opportunity to revive the cases to less than the prescribed two-year period (from December 1, 2000 to March 31, 2001), which is unfair as the State could not be expected to comply with a rule not yet in effect.

• The dismissal was with his express consent because he himself moved for the dismissal through his motion for judicial determination of probable cause, which prayed for the dismissal of the cases if no probable cause was found.
• The heirs of the victims were duly notified of the motion and the hearing through the public and private prosecutors.
• Section 8, Rule 117 may be applied retroactively as it is a procedural rule that favors the accused, and procedural laws may generally be given retroactive effect.
• The two-year period commenced on March 29, 1999, and had already lapsed when the new Informations were filed in June 2001, making the dismissal permanent and barring the revival of the cases.
• The time-bar under Section 8 is distinct from the prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code and does not modify substantive rights; it merely regulates the revival of cases already filed in court.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Supreme Court should grant the Motion for Reconsideration of its Resolution dated May 28, 2002, which remanded the case to the trial court for factual determination.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure applies to the criminal cases against respondent Lacson.
  • Whether the provisional dismissal of the cases was with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended parties as required by the rule.
  • Whether the time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 should be applied retroactively to provisional dismissals that occurred prior to the rule's effectivity on December 1, 2000.

• Procedural: The Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The Resolution dated May 28, 2002 is set aside. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 is reversed. The petition filed by Lacson with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is dismissed for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81, is directed to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
• Substantive:
  • Section 8, Rule 117 is inapplicable to the cases at bar. The respondent failed to prove the essential requisites of the first paragraph of the rule: (1) express consent to a provisional dismissal, and (2) notice to the offended parties. The motion filed by Lacson was for judicial determination of probable cause, not for provisional dismissal; it prayed for the withholding or recall of arrest warrants, not for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent's admissions in the Court of Appeals that he did not move for dismissal or agree to a provisional dismissal are binding judicial admissions. Furthermore, there was no proof that all heirs of the victims (specifically those of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda) were notified of the motion or the hearing.
  • The time-bar under Section 8, Rule 117 should not be applied retroactively against the State. While procedural laws may generally be applied retroactively to pending actions, they should not be if such application would work injustice or hardship. Applying the rule retroactively would give the State only from December 1, 2000 (the rule's effectivity) to March 31, 2001 (the end of the two-year period from dismissal), which is less than the full two-year period prescribed by the rule. This would be unfair to the State and would adversely affect the administration of justice.

• Express Consent to Provisional Dismissal — Express consent must be positive, direct, and unequivocal, requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. It may be given viva voce or in writing. Mere inaction, silence, or failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion for judicial determination of probable cause does not, by itself, constitute express consent to a provisional dismissal.
• Notice to Offended Party — Section 8, Rule 117 requires that the offended party or the heirs of the victims be given adequate prior notice of any motion for provisional dismissal to enable them to comment on or object to the motion and to protect their interests.
• Retroactivity of Procedural Laws — Procedural laws are generally retroactive to pending actions, but not if their retroactive application would work injustice, involve intricate problems of due process, or impair the independence of the Court. A procedural rule that fixes a time-bar for the revival of cases should not be applied retroactively if it would reduce the period available to the State to less than that prescribed in the rule.
• Conditions Sine Qua Non — The requirements of express consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117. Without these, the State is not barred by the time limit.

• "Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning."
• "The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent."
• "To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice."
• "Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the other."
• "The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law. It is but a limitation of the right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused."

• Allado v. Diokno — Cited by respondent regarding the authority of courts to dismiss cases for lack of probable cause; distinguished by the Court as the circumstances were different.
• Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the general rule that procedural statutes are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
• People v. Bellosillo — Cited regarding the rationale for requiring express consent to provisional dismissal (to bar subsequent claims of double jeopardy).
• Republic v. Agoncillo — Cited regarding the doctrine that dismissal without prejudice does not bar the filing of a new information for the same offense.
• Baesa v. Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur — Cited for the rule that a motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal constitutes express consent.
• Griffin v. People — Cited for the principle that courts should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law.
• Snyder v. State of Massachusetts — Cited for the principle that the concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament.
• Dimatulac v. Villon — Cited for the principle that a judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State and offended party to due process.

• Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — The central provision interpreted, which provides for the provisional dismissal of cases and the time-bar for their revival.
• Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — Cited regarding the judicial determination of probable cause before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
• Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code — Cited regarding the prescription of crimes (twenty years for crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or reclusion temporal).
• Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code — Cited regarding the computation of the prescriptive period for offenses.
• Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence — Cited regarding judicial admissions made by parties in the course of proceedings.
• Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution — Cited regarding the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.

• Justice Bellosillo — Concurred in the result but provided extensive discussion distinguishing "revival" from "refiling" of criminal cases. He opined that Section 8, Rule 117 is purely administrative in character and does not bar the State from filing new Informations under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. He also discussed the application of the "Balancing Test" to determine violations of the right to speedy disposition of cases, concluding that no such violation occurred in this case.

• Justice Puno — Dissented, arguing that the motion for judicial determination of probable cause was tantamount to a motion for provisional dismissal and thus carried the respondent's express consent. He maintained that Section 8, Rule 117 should apply retroactively as it is procedural and was designed to address inexcusable delays by the State in prosecuting pending cases.
• Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez — Dissented, arguing that the respondent's constitutional right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases was violated by the two-year delay in the refiling of the charges. She maintained that Section 8 applies to bar not just the "revival" but also the "refiling" of new Informations for the same offense, and that the "permanent" dismissal contemplated in the rule constitutes a bar to subsequent prosecution.
• Justice Vitug — Filed a separate opinion concurring with Justice Puno that there were evidentiary issues that needed to be determined first by the trial court before the Supreme Court could rule on the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117.