People vs. Fieldad

The defense of uncontrollable fear under Article 12, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the duress or intimidation be present, imminent, and impending, leaving the accused no opportunity for escape or self-defense, and reducing them to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against their will; mere participation in a jailbreak and subsequent flight under threat from a co-conspirator, where multiple opportunities to overpower the threatening party or escape existed, does not constitute such uncontrollable fear to exempt from criminal liability for carnapping.

On March 9, 1999, a violent jailbreak occurred at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) Compound in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, resulting in the deaths of two jail guards and the escape of several detention prisoners. The incident involved the shooting of Jail Officer 2 Reynaldo Gamboa and Jail Officer 1 Juan Bacolor Jr., and the taking of a Tamaraw jeep without the owner's consent to facilitate the escape.

• On March 9, 1999, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Jail Officer 2 (JO2) Reynaldo Gamboa, JO1 Juan Bacolor Jr., and JO2 Marlon Niturada were inside a nipa hut at the BJMP Compound in Urdaneta City, conducting a routine headcount.
• JO2 Gamboa instructed inmate Dionisio Badua to open the prison cells using keys he provided.
• Inmate Julius Chan approached the nipa hut to inquire about his hearing schedule. While conversing with JO2 Gamboa, Chan suddenly placed his arm on the officer's shoulder and shot him with a short firearm, causing Gamboa to fall.
• JO2 Niturada, who had left to answer a telephone call and was returning, witnessed the shooting and drew his .38 caliber handgun.
• Appellant Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for possession of his armalite rifle; Cornista struck Bacolor at the back of the head, causing him to fall.
• Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa's 9mm pistol and shot JO1 Bacolor twice.
• Inmate Florante Leal seized the armalite from Bacolor and fired at JO2 Niturada.
• Cornista obtained keys from the fallen Gamboa and opened the main gate, allowing twelve inmates to escape.
• Outside the compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked red Tamaraw jeep (Plate No. CDY-255) belonging to Benjamin Bauzon without his knowledge or consent, using it as a getaway vehicle.
• The group picked up co-escapees Federico Delim and Julius Chan along the way, and later transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck which eventually turned turtle in San Miguel, Tarlac, leading to their arrest in a cane field.
• Autopsies confirmed JO2 Gamboa died of cardiac tamponade due to a heart gunshot wound, and JO1 Bacolor died of shock and hemorrhage from a lung gunshot wound.
• Fieldad tested positive for gunpowder nitrates in a paraffin test conducted by forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid.
• In their defense, Fieldad and Pimentel claimed they acted under uncontrollable fear, alleging that Florante Leal pointed firearms at them and forced them to drive and board the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate the escape, with Fieldad asserting he was merely fixing a vehicle when the violence erupted and Pimentel claiming he was hiding when Leal threatened him.
• Cornista, who was 17 years old at the time, claimed he hid in the jeep out of fear and was prevented from alighting by Leal's threats.

• The prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt as the eyewitness identification was unreliable and their testimonies were disregarded without basis.
• The trial court erred in appreciating treachery and conspiracy, arguing that the jail guards were armed and capable of defending themselves, and there was no evidence of prior agreement to commit the crimes.
• The defense of uncontrollable fear under Article 12(6) of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated, as they were compelled by Florante Leal at gunpoint to participate in the carnapping to avoid being killed, reducing them to mere instruments acting against their will.
• The trial court failed to properly consider the appellants' testimonies and the circumstantial evidence supporting their claims of duress and lack of criminal intent.

• The prosecution presented sufficient evidence including the positive identification by eyewitness Dionisio Badua, who detailed Fieldad's participation in the grapple for the armalite and the subsequent shooting of JO1 Bacolor.
• Treachery was correctly appreciated because the jail guards were taken by surprise and were unable to defend themselves despite being armed, with Chan shooting Gamboa while feigning conversation and Fieldad/Cornista attacking Bacolor from behind.
• Conspiracy was established through the coordinated acts of the appellants before, during, and after the killings, demonstrating a joint purpose to escape by eliminating the guards and using the vehicle.
• The defense of uncontrollable fear is untenable because the compulsion must leave no opportunity for escape or self-defense; here, appellants had multiple chances to escape during the flight, and with five inmates against one armed Leal, they could have easily overpowered him if they truly wished to avoid participation.
• The paraffin test results and circumstantial evidence corroborate Fieldad's active participation in the shootings.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the killings were attended by treachery qualifying them to murder.
  • Whether conspiracy existed among the appellants in the commission of the crimes.
  • Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear under Article 12, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable to exempt appellants from criminal liability for carnapping.
  • Whether the identities of Fieldad and Pimentel as perpetrators were sufficiently established by the prosecution.
  • Whether the awards for damages were properly computed by the lower courts.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • The Court affirmed that treachery was present, as the sudden and unexpected attack on the jail guards, who were completely taken by surprise and unable to defend themselves despite being armed, satisfied the elements of treachery under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.
  • The Court held that conspiracy was established through the concerted actions of the appellants, demonstrating a common design to kill the guards and escape; the act of one conspirator is deemed the act of all.
  • The Court rejected the defense of uncontrollable fear for the carnapping charge, ruling that for such defense to prosper under Article 12(6), the duress must be present, imminent, and impending, inducing a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm, and must reduce the accused to a mere instrument acting without and against their will, leaving no opportunity for escape or self-defense in equal combat. The Court found that with five inmates against the single armed Leal, and given the multiple stops where they could have fled, appellants failed to prove they had no opportunity to escape or that they acted against their will.
  • The Court upheld the positive identification of Fieldad by eyewitness Badua, corroborated by circumstantial evidence including the paraffin test, and found Pimentel's participation in the carnapping established through his own admissions and the circumstances of the escape.
  • The Court modified the damages: increased exemplary damages to ₱30,000.00 for each murder case; corrected the loss of earning capacity computation by multiplying the monthly income by twelve, resulting in ₱1,836,336.00 for Gamboa and ₱2,142,000.00 for Bacolor; deleted the moral damages award in the carnapping case for lack of proof of specific injury to the vehicle owner; and imposed legal interest of 6% per annum on all damages from finality until full payment. Fieldad was declared ineligible for parole under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.

• Treachery — Defined as the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The essence is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving them of any chance to defend themselves.
• Conspiracy — Exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
• Uncontrollable Fear (Article 12[6], RPC) — A person is exempt from criminal liability if they act under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. The defense requires that: (1) the threat must be present, imminent, and impending; (2) the fear must induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm; (3) the compulsion must reduce the accused to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against their will; and (4) there must be no opportunity to escape or for self-defense in equal combat.
• Positive Identification vs. Denial and Alibi — Positive identification by a credible witness prevails over bare denial and alibi, which is considered the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.
• Paraffin Test — The taking of paraffin casts to detect gunpowder residue does not violate the constitutional right against self-incrimination, as this right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not to the physical examination of the accused's body.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take."
• "For such defense [uncontrollable fear] to prosper the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done."
• "A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It is necessary that the compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat."
• "Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape individually."

• People v. Escote, Jr., 448 Phil. 749 (2003) — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery, emphasizing that the victim must be defenseless and the attack sudden and unexpected.
• People v. Tabaco, 336 Phil. 771 (1997) — Applied to establish that treachery may exist even if the victims are armed peace officers, provided they were taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the sudden attack.
• People v. Del Rosario, 365 Phil. 292 (1999) and People v. Tami, 313 Phil. 665 (1995) — Cited to establish the requisites for the defense of uncontrollable fear under Article 12(6) of the RPC, specifically the necessity that compulsion leaves no opportunity for escape or self-defense.
• People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, 431 SCRA 284 (2004) — Referenced for the principle that intent to gain in carnapping is presumed from the unlawful taking and mere use of the vehicle constitutes gain, not limited to pecuniary benefit.
• People v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 91374, 194 SCRA 372 (1991) — Cited to support the ruling that paraffin testing is a physical examination that does not violate the right against self-incrimination.
• People v. Sapigao, Jr., 614 Phil. 589 (2009) and People v. Visperas, Jr., 443 Phil. 164 (2003) — Cited regarding the trial court's superior position in assessing witness credibility and the weakness of the defense of alibi.

• Article 12, Paragraph 6, Revised Penal Code — Provides the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, requiring specific conditions of compulsion and lack of opportunity for escape.
• Article 14, Paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in crimes against persons.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as an agreement to commit a felony.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act Nos. 7956 and 8294) — Defines and penalizes murder.
• Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972), Section 2 — Defines carnapping as the taking of a motor vehicle without the owner's consent or by means of violence or intimidation.
• Republic Act No. 6539, Section 14 — Prescribes the penalty for carnapping, distinguishing between simple carnapping and carnapping with violence or intimidation.
• Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty), Section 3 — Renders persons convicted of crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua ineligible for parole.
• Civil Code, Articles 2216, 2217, and 2221 — Provisions governing the award of nominal, moral, and exemplary damages.