People vs. De Guzman

Fencing under Presidential Decree No. 1612 (the Anti-Fencing Law) is not a "continuing offense" but a separate and distinct crime from robbery or theft; consequently, venue and jurisdiction for fencing cases lie in the place where the act of fencing was committed, not in the place where the predicate crime of robbery or theft occurred.

The case arose from a robbery committed in September 1985 at the residence of Jose L. Obillos, Sr. in Quezon City, where jewelry worth millions of pesos was stolen. While the perpetrators of the robbery were charged in Quezon City, the stolen items were subsequently recovered from the possession of the Alcantara spouses in Antipolo, Rizal. An information for fencing was filed in Quezon City against the spouses, prompting a jurisdictional challenge that would define the territorial parameters of the Anti-Fencing Law.

• On September 9, 1985, a robbery was committed at the house of Jose L. Obillos, Sr. in Quezon City, where various pieces of precious jewelry alleged to be worth millions of pesos were unlawfully taken.
• An Information for robbery was filed on September 30, 1985 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-42078, against the perpetrators of the robbery.
• The stolen jewelry was subsequently recovered from the possession of the respondent spouses Danilo A. Alcantara and Isabelita Esguerra-Alcantara in Antipolo, Rizal.
• On October 22, 1985, an Information for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612) was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, against the Alcantara spouses, alleging that they bought, received, possessed, or otherwise dealt with the stolen jewelry knowing it to have been derived from robbery.
• The accused spouses filed a Motion to Quash the Information for fencing, arguing that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction because the alleged act of fencing took place in Antipolo, Rizal, and not in Quezon City.
• The prosecution opposed the motion, contending that fencing is a "continuing offense" and that since an essential element of fencing is the commission of robbery (which occurred in Quezon City), the Information was properly filed in Quezon City pursuant to Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
• The trial court granted the Motion to Quash in its Order dated February 28, 1986, ruling that criminal actions must be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed, and since the fencing allegedly occurred in Antipolo, Rizal, the Quezon City court had no jurisdiction.
• The private prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court in its Order dated March 21, 1986, prompting the People of the Philippines to file a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Supreme Court.

• Fencing constitutes a "continuing offense" that allows the filing of the Information in the place where the principal offense of robbery was committed (Quezon City), as an essential element of fencing is the commission of the predicate crime of robbery.
• The filing of the Information in Quezon City accords with Section 15 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (now Section 15, Rule 110), which provides that criminal actions may be instituted where any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place.
• The Anti-Fencing Law was enacted to impose a heavier penalty on persons who profit from the effects of robbery or theft, treating fences as equally guilty with the perpetrators of the predicate crime rather than merely as accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
• The refusal of the trial court to assume jurisdiction over the case constitutes a serious error of law and a grave abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a writ of certiorari and mandamus.

• Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612 is an independent crime, separate and distinct from the crime of robbery, and jurisdiction lies exclusively with the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged fencing actually took place (Antipolo, Rizal).
• Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place; since the acts constituting fencing (buying, receiving, possessing) allegedly occurred in Antipolo, Rizal, the Quezon City court lacks territorial jurisdiction.
• The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly two distinct offenses; the law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit robbery or to have been involved in its commission, and the consummation of robbery does not depend on the act of fencing.
• The place where the robbery occurs is inconsequential to the prosecution for fencing, analogous to the crime of bigamy where the place of the prior subsisting marriage does not determine the venue for the bigamy prosecution.
• The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in quashing the Information, as it merely applied the established rule on venue in criminal cases.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in quashing the Information for fencing and denying the motion for reconsideration.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the crime of fencing under the Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612) constitutes a "continuing offense" that would allow the filing of an information therefor in the place where the robbery or theft was committed rather than where the accused actually acquired, possessed, or dealt with the stolen property.

• Procedural: The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information and denying the motion for reconsideration. The Court found that the trial court merely interpreted and applied the jurisdictional rules governing venue in criminal cases, and its decision was supported by law and jurisprudence. The Court declined to order a change of venue under Article VIII, Section 5(4) of the Constitution, finding no compelling circumstances or serious and weighty reasons to believe that a fair and impartial trial could not be had in the proper venue.
• Substantive: The Supreme Court ruled that fencing is not a continuing offense (delito continuado). The Court defined a continuing offense as a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division, requiring plurality of acts, unity of penal provision infringed, and unity of criminal intent. Fencing does not meet this definition because it is a distinct and independent offense from robbery or theft. While the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of robbery or theft, the place where the predicate crime occurred is inconsequential to the venue of the fencing prosecution. The crime of fencing is committed where the accused buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells, or disposes of the stolen property, and jurisdiction lies in that place, not where the original robbery took place.

• Delito Continuado (Continuing Offense) — Defined as a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division, characterized by plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time, unity of penal provision infringed, and unity of criminal intent or purpose. The Court applied this doctrine to determine that fencing is not a continuing offense because it is distinct from the predicate crime of robbery/theft and does not arise from the same criminal resolution as the original taking.
• Independent Nature of Fencing — Under PD 1612, fencing is an independent crime separate and distinct from robbery or theft; the fence need not have participated in the criminal design or commission of the predicate crime, and the consummation of fencing does not depend on the place where the robbery or theft occurred.
• Venue in Fencing Cases — Jurisdiction and venue for prosecution under the Anti-Fencing Law are determined by the place where the accused committed the acts of buying, receiving, possessing, keeping, acquiring, concealing, selling, or disposing of the stolen property, not by the place where the robbery or theft was committed.

• "The crimes of robbery and fencing are clearly then two distinct offenses. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft."
• "True, the object property in fencing must have been previously taken by means of either robbery or theft but the place where the robbery or theft occurs is inconsequential."
• "It may not be suggested, for instance, that, in the crime of bigamy which presupposes a prior subsisting marriage of an accused, the case should thereby be triable likewise at the place where the prior marriage has been contracted."
• "A 'continuous crime' is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division."

• People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 (1976) — Cited for the authoritative definition of a "continuous crime" or "delito continuado" as a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division.
• Ganchero v. Bellosillo, 28 SCRA 673 (1969) — Cited by analogy to demonstrate that the place where a predicate act occurred (prior marriage in bigamy cases) does not determine the venue for the subsequent crime, similarly applying to the relationship between robbery and fencing.
• People v. Gutierrez, 36 SCRA 172 (1970); People v. Pilotin, 65 SCRA 635 (1975); and Mondiguing v. Abad, 68 SCRA 14 (1975) — Cited in relation to the Supreme Court's discretionary power to order a change of venue when the interest of justice and truth so demand, though the Court found no compelling circumstances in the present case to warrant such action.

• Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law of 1979) — Defines fencing as the act of buying, receiving, possessing, keeping, acquiring, concealing, selling, or disposing of anything of value which the offender knows or should know to have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft, and establishes it as a distinct offense separate from the predicate crimes.
• Article 293, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of robbery as the taking of personal property belonging to another with intent to gain by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
• Article 19, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Referenced to contrast the liability of accessories under the Revised Penal Code with the independent and more severe penalty imposed on fences under PD 1612.
• Section 14, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Establishes the general rule that criminal actions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of its essential ingredients took place.
• Article VIII, Section 5(4), 1987 Constitution — Grants the Supreme Court the power to order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice in the interest of justice and truth.

• N/A (Feliciano, Bidin, Romero, and Melo, JJ., concurred with the majority opinion without writing separate concurring opinions).