People vs. Caoili

Rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC is not necessarily included in rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A(1) because they differ in essential elements—specifically, the offender and victim may be of any sex in sexual assault (gender-free), while sexual intercourse requires a male offender and female victim with penile penetration; furthermore, the penalties differ (prision mayor vs. reclusion perpetua). However, lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is necessarily included in rape by sexual intercourse, allowing conviction thereunder pursuant to the variance doctrine when the acts proved constitute lascivious conduct (intentional touching of genitalia or insertion of object) and the victim is a minor exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse through coercion or influence.

Noel Go Caoili, alias "Boy Tagalog," was charged with raping his 15-year-old daughter, AAA, through sexual intercourse. During trial, the prosecution established that on October 23, 2005, Caoili kissed his daughter's lips, mashed her breasts, and inserted his finger into her vagina with a push-and-pull movement for thirty minutes. The trial court convicted him of rape by sexual assault, finding that the evidence showed digital penetration rather than penile penetration. The Court of Appeals set aside the conviction and remanded the case for the filing of a new Information charging the proper offense, holding that the variance between the offense charged (rape by sexual intercourse) and that proved (rape by sexual assault) precluded conviction without violating the accused's constitutional rights.

• On October 23, 2005, at approximately 7:00 p.m., at their residence in Barangay JJJ, Municipality of KKK, Province of LLL, the victim AAA, then 14 years, 1 month, and 10 days old, was sexually molested by her father, Noel Go Caoili.
• Caoili kissed AAA's lips, touched and mashed her breast, inserted the fourth finger of his left hand into her vagina, and made a push-and-pull movement with such finger for approximately thirty minutes, causing AAA excruciating pain.
• After the incident, AAA proceeded to the house of her uncle, BBB, located twenty meters away, against her father's warning not to leave the house. Caoili fetched her, dragged her home, beat her with a piece of wood, and boxed her on the stomach.
• On October 26, 2005, AAA disclosed the sexual molestation and physical violence to Emelia Loayon, her school guidance counselor, who accompanied her to the police station to report the abuse. AAA also executed a sworn statement before the Municipal Mayor.
• Dr. Ramie Hipe conducted a medical examination and issued a certificate dated October 26, 2005, showing multiple contusions on AAA's thigh and forearm, tenderness in the head and abdominal areas, and hymenal lacerations at the 12, 3, 6, 8, 9, and 11 o'clock positions.
• Dr. Lucila Clerino issued a Supplementary Medical Certificate dated October 28, 2005, indicating complete lacerations at the 6 and 9 o'clock positions and superficial laceration at the 12 o'clock position of the hymen.
• AAA was subsequently admitted to a rehabilitation center run by the Missionary Sisters of Mary through the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
• For his defense, Caoili denied the charges, claiming he only disciplined AAA by striking her thigh with a piece of wood after seeing her with her boyfriend at a cassava plantation, and that they slept in separate rooms after supper.
• The Information filed on June 22, 2006, charged Caoili with rape by sexual intercourse (carnal knowledge) under Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, with the aggravating circumstance of being the father of the victim and in relation to R.A. No. 7610.

• The Office of the Solicitor General (in G.R. No. 196342) argued that Caoili was convicted of a crime necessarily included in the offense charged, as rape by sexual assault is embraced within the same Article 266-A of R.A. No. 8353.
• The OSG contended that Caoili's constitutional right to be informed of the charge was not violated since he actively participated in the trial without questioning the presentation of evidence showing sexual assault rather than simple rape.
• The OSG asserted that the Court of Appeals had already affirmed the conviction for rape by sexual assault and that the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 in relation to Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable because judgment had already been rendered.
• Caoili (in G.R. No. 196848) argued that rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape by sexual intercourse due to substantial distinctions in their elements.
• Caoili contended that the case should not be remanded to the trial court pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 because these provisions apply only before judgment, and the CA's decision amounted to an acquittal.
• Caoili claimed the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged in the Information, and questioned AAA's credibility citing her alleged resentment toward his strict upbringing.

• Caoili (respondent in G.R. No. 196342) maintained that he could not be convicted of rape by sexual assault when the Information charged rape by sexual intercourse, as the two modes of rape are distinct and separate crimes with different elements.
• The People of the Philippines (respondent in G.R. No. 196848) argued that the variance doctrine allows conviction for a necessarily included offense, and that lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 is necessarily included in the crime of rape charged in the Information.
• The People contended that the CA erred in remanding the case since judgment had already been rendered, and that the accused could properly be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 based on the evidence presented.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case to the trial court pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court after judgment had already been rendered by the trial court.
  • Whether the CA's decision amounted to an acquittal of the accused.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC is necessarily included in rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A(1).
  • Whether the accused can be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 despite being charged with rape by sexual intercourse.
  • Whether the conviction of the accused for lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 violates his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

• Procedural:
  • The Court held that the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court for the filing of a new Information because Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court apply only "before judgment" has been rendered. In this case, the trial had been concluded and the RTC had already returned a guilty verdict, which was reviewed by the CA.
  • The Court ruled that the CA's decision did not amount to an acquittal. Although the CA stated that no valid conviction could be had without violating the accused's constitutional rights, the immediately succeeding directive remanding the case for further proceedings showed that the CA still had cause to detain Caoili and intended that he answer for the proper offense, which is inconsistent with the concept of acquittal as a discharge or formal certification of innocence.
• Substantive:
  • The Court held that rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape by sexual intercourse. The two modes of rape have material distinctions: (1) in rape by sexual intercourse, the offender is always a man and the victim is always a woman, while in rape by sexual assault, the offender and victim may be of any sex; (2) the former requires penile penetration of the vagina, while the latter involves insertion of the penis into the mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice; (3) the penalty for the former is reclusion perpetua, while for the latter it is prision mayor.
  • The Court ruled that Caoili cannot be convicted of rape by sexual assault when the Information charged rape by sexual intercourse, as this would violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
  • The Court held that Caoili can be convicted of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 because it is necessarily included in the crime of rape by sexual intercourse. The variance doctrine under Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court allows conviction for an offense proved which is included in the offense charged.
  • The Court found that all elements of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 were established: (1) Caoili committed lascivious conduct (kissing, breast mashing, finger insertion); (2) the act was performed with a child subjected to sexual abuse through the coercion and influence of her father; and (3) the victim was below 18 years of age.
  • The Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, applying the alternative circumstance of relationship as an aggravating circumstance under Article 15 of the RPC and Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610, which mandates the maximum period when the perpetrator is the parent of the victim.
  • The Court awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of Php 75,000.00 each, plus a fine of Php 15,000.00 pursuant to Section 31(f) of R.A. No. 7610, all subject to 6% interest per annum from finality until fully paid.

• Variance Doctrine — Embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, this doctrine allows conviction of an accused for an offense proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former constitute the latter.
• Distinction Between Rape by Sexual Intercourse and Rape by Sexual Assault — Under Article 266-A of the RPC as amended by R.A. No. 8353, rape by sexual intercourse (paragraph 1) and rape by sexual assault (paragraph 2) are distinct crimes with different elements, modes of commission, and penalties. The former is gender-specific (male offender, female victim) requiring penile penetration, while the latter is gender-free (any person may be offender or victim) involving insertion of objects or penis into other orifices. Neither is necessarily included in the other.
• Lascivious Conduct under R.A. No. 7610 — Defined in the IRR of R.A. No. 7610 as the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. When committed against a child below 18 years of age through coercion or influence, it falls under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
• Moral Ascendancy as Equivalent to Intimidation — In cases where the offender is a close relative (father, stepfather, uncle, common-law spouse of mother), moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation, and the victim's consent is immaterial.

• "The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done - to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime."
• "Rape is no longer a crime simply against the chastity of a woman. It is a crime against her person. It is not simply a violation of a woman's moral preferences. It is a violation of her human dignity."
• "The finger is as much part of the human body as the penis. It is not a separate instrument or object. It is an organ that can act as a conduit to give both pleasure as well as raw control upon the body of another."
• "The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as enacted by the Legislature."
• "Consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense because it is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed."

• People v. Pareja — Cited for the proposition that the assessment of credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court judge, and for the duty of public prosecutors to see that justice is done to the State, the victim, and the offender.
• People v. Abulon — Controlling precedent holding that due to material differences between the two modes of rape, rape by sexual intercourse is not necessarily included in rape by sexual assault, and vice versa; an accused charged with rape through carnal knowledge cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault.
• People v. Leonardo — Cited for the application of the variance doctrine allowing conviction for sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 when the crime charged is rape, because the former is included in the latter.
• People v. Bon — Referenced for the guideline that when the victim is under 12 years old, the nomenclature should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610."
• Quimvel v. People — Cited for the definition of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610, and the rule that Section 5(b) does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse different from what is complained of.
• People v. Jugueta — Applied for the award of damages (civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of Php 75,000.00 each) when the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

• Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 — Defines rape through sexual intercourse (paragraph 1) and rape by sexual assault (paragraph 2), establishing the two distinct modes of committing rape.
• Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 — Punishes those who commit sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, with a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
• Section 4 and Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court — Embody the variance doctrine, allowing conviction for an offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or vice versa.
• Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 19, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court — Provisions regarding amendment or substitution of information and correction of mistakes in charging the proper offense, applicable only before judgment.
• Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code — Defines alternative circumstances, including relationship, which is aggravating in crimes against chastity when the offended party is the descendant of the offender.
• Section 31(c) and Section 31(f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 — Mandate the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty when the perpetrator is the parent of the victim, and impose a fine for the rehabilitation of the child victim, respectively.

• Justice Peralta — Concurred in finding Caoili guilty of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 rather than merely acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A. No. 7610. He argued that sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 is necessarily included in acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, which is necessarily included in rape. He emphasized that the penalty for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 varies based on the victim's age, and that for victims 12 years old and above but below 18, the proper designation is "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" without reference to Article 336. He also noted the incongruity in penalties where acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 in relation to R.A. No. 7610 (reclusion temporal) carry a higher penalty than rape by sexual assault (prision mayor).
• Justice Caguioa — Concurred in the result but differed in the application of Section 5(b), emphasizing that the second element (child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse) requires proof of coercion, influence, or prior sexual abuse. He held that the allegation of relationship and minority in the Information suffices to meet the requirement of coercion or influence, as moral ascendancy takes the place of violence. He maintained that R.A. No. 7610 does not subsume all sexual abuses against children to the exclusion of the RPC.

• Justice Leonen — Dissented from the refusal to convict Caoili of rape by sexual intercourse. He argued for a gender-sensitive and expansive interpretation of "carnal knowledge" and "sexual intercourse" to include digital penetration, stating that the finger is part of the human body and its forced insertion constitutes sexual bodily connection. He criticized the archaic, penis-centric definition of rape and advocated for interpreting the law from the victim's perspective, holding that the entirety of the father's acts constituted rape by sexual intercourse as charged.
• Justice Martires — Dissented, arguing that "fingering" or digital penetration constitutes carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(1) because carnal knowledge is defined as "sexual bodily connection," which is achieved when any body part (finger, tongue) penetrates the vagina. He distinguished between penetration by a body part (carnal knowledge) and insertion of an instrument or object (sexual assault), submitting that the accused should have been convicted of rape under the first paragraph of Article 266-A.