Partosa-Jo vs. Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court held that a technical omission in the dispositive portion of a final judgment may be corrected to conform with the body of the decision when necessary to serve substantive justice, and that under the Family Code, physical separation coupled with a refusal to provide support constitutes abandonment and failure to comply with family obligations, which are valid grounds for judicial separation of property.

The case arises from a marital dispute where the husband, a Chinese citizen, admitted to cohabiting with three different women and fathering fifteen children, while denying the validity of his marriage to the petitioner. After being refused entry to the conjugal home in 1942 and denied financial support since 1968, the petitioner sought legal remedies to secure support and separate the conjugal assets accumulated during the marriage, some of which were registered in the names of dummies.

• Jose Jo (private respondent) admitted to cohabiting with three women and fathering fifteen children, while Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo claimed to be his legal wife with whom he had one daughter, Monina Jo.
• In 1980, Petitioner filed Civil Case No. 51 for judicial separation of conjugal property, which was consolidated with Civil Case No. 36, an action for support.
• The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on November 29, 1983, declaring the parties legally married and ordering Jose Jo to pay support and arrears.
• The penultimate paragraph of the RTC decision explicitly stated that the properties in question were conjugal and subject to separation of property, but this ruling was inadvertently omitted from the dispositive portion (the "Wherefore" clause) of the decision.
• Petitioner testified that she initially left the conjugal home in Dumaguete City by agreement during her pregnancy, but when she attempted to return in 1942, Respondent refused to accept her.
• Respondent refused to provide financial support to Petitioner and their daughter from 1968 until the final determination of the support case in 1988, and he consistently denied the existence of their marriage.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the support ruling but dismissed the complaint for judicial separation of property, citing the lack of a ruling in the dispositive portion and arguing that separation by agreement was not a valid cause of action.

• The omission of the ruling on property separation in the dispositive portion was a clerical error, as the body of the decision clearly resolved the issue in her favor.
• The separation was not permanently by agreement; the agreement was temporary during pregnancy, and the arrangement was repudiated in 1942 when she returned and Respondent refused to accept her.
• Respondent's refusal to admit her to the conjugal home and his refusal to provide support constituted abandonment, which justifies judicial separation of property.
• The Court of Appeals misinterpreted Articles 175, 178, and 191 of the Civil Code regarding the grounds for separation of property.

• The trial court's decision had become final and executory, and since the dispositive portion made no disposition regarding Civil Case No. 51 (separation of property), that case must be considered impliedly dismissed.
• The Petitioner should have filed a motion to correct the decision earlier and is now barred by the finality of the judgment.
• The separation was due to mutual agreement, which renders the agreement void but does not constitute legal abandonment or a valid ground for judicial separation of property.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court can amend or clarify a final judgment where the dispositive portion failed to include a ruling on separation of property that was explicitly resolved in the body of the decision.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the physical separation of the spouses and the husband's refusal to support the wife constitute "abandonment" or failure to comply with family obligations sufficient to justify judicial separation of conjugal property under the Family Code.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that while the dispositive portion generally controls, a technical omission should not prevail over substantive justice. The Court held it may clarify an ambiguity caused by an omission in the dispositive portion by referring to the body of the decision, pleadings, and findings of fact, even after the judgment has become final.
• Substantive:
  • The Court granted the petition for judicial separation of property. It applied Article 128 of the Family Code retroactively, ruling that abandonment is established not just by leaving the dwelling but also by failing to comply with family obligations. The Respondent's refusal to admit the Petitioner back into the home in 1942, his denial of the marriage, and his refusal to support her constituted abandonment and a failure to comply with marital obligations.

• Conflict between Dispositive Portion and Body of Decision — Where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of a decision, the Court may clarify such ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final, by resorting to the pleadings, findings of fact, and conclusions of law expressed in the text.
• Abandonment (Family Code) — Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without providing for the family. Under Article 128, it is also deemed to occur when a spouse fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family (marital, parental, or property relations) without just cause, even if they do not leave the conjugal dwelling.
• Retroactivity of the Family Code — Amendments introduced in the Family Code are applicable to cases pending at the time of its effectivity (August 3, 1988) provided no vested rights are impaired, as appellate courts review judgments based on the law prevailing at the time of the final disposition.

• "The past has caught up with the private respondent. After his extramarital flings and a succession of illegitimate children, he must now make an accounting to his lawful wife of the properties he denied her despite his promise to her of his eternal love and care."
• "Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so."

• Republic Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court — Cited to support the principle that the Court may clarify ambiguities in the dispositive portion by amendment even after finality.
• Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals — Cited to establish that an appellate court reviews a judgment according to the law prevailing at the time of the appellate disposition, justifying the application of the Family Code.
• De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz — Cited to define the concept of abandonment as absolute cessation of marital relations with the intention of perpetual separation.

• Family Code, Article 128 — Allows an aggrieved spouse to petition for judicial separation of property if the other spouse abandons them without just cause or fails to comply with obligations to the family.
• Family Code, Article 135 — Lists sufficient causes for judicial separation of property, including separation in fact for at least one year where reconciliation is highly improbable.
• Civil Code, Article 178 — The predecessor provision regarding separation in fact and abandonment, which the Court noted was superseded by the Family Code but initially invoked by the Petitioner.