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Panaguiton, Jr. vs. Department of Justice

This case resolves whether the filing of a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor for preliminary investigation interrupts the four-year prescriptive period for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) under Act No. 3326. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and the Department of Justice, holding that such filing does interrupt the prescriptive period because, with the shift of preliminary investigation functions from justices of the peace to the executive branch, the term "proceedings" in Act No. 3326 now includes executive investigations. The Court also excused technical defects in the petitioner's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, ruling that strict compliance may be waived to serve the ends of justice.

Primary Holding

The filing of a complaint-affidavit with the prosecutor's office for preliminary investigation interrupts the running of the prescriptive period for offenses under special laws that do not provide their own prescriptive periods (such as B.P. Blg. 22, which is subject to the four-year period under Act No. 3326), because the "institution of proceedings" contemplated by law includes the commencement of executive investigative proceedings, not merely the filing of an information in court.

Background

The case involves the application of Act No. 3326, enacted in 1926, which establishes prescription periods for violations of special acts and municipal ordinances. At the time of its enactment, preliminary investigations were conducted by justices of the peace (judicial officers), hence the law's reference to the "institution of judicial proceedings." The dispute arose from conflicting interpretations of whether the modern preliminary investigation conducted by executive prosecutors constitutes such "proceedings" sufficient to toll the prescriptive period.

History

  1. Petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondents Cawili and Tongson with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office on August 24, 1995.

  2. City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara dismissed the charges against Tongson on December 6, 1995, finding probable cause only against Cawili.

  3. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of Tongson on July 11, 1997, after petitioner's partial appeal.

  4. Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson on March 15, 1999, holding that the offense had prescribed under Act No. 3326, as the four-year period was not interrupted by the filing with the prosecutor's office.

  5. The DOJ dismissed petitioner's appeal, agreeing that prescription had set in; however, on April 3, 2003, the DOJ reversed and ruled that prescription was interrupted, directing the filing of informations against Tongson.

  6. The City Prosecutor filed an information against Tongson on July 8, 2003, but the DOJ reversed its position again on August 9, 2004, ordering the withdrawal of the informations on the ground of prescription.

  7. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition on October 29, 2004, for non-compliance with verification and certification requirements.

  8. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration on March 21, 2005, prompting the present petition for review to the Supreme Court.

Facts

  • In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili borrowed various sums totaling P1,979,459.00 from petitioner Luis Panaguiton, Jr.
  • On January 8, 1993, Cawili and his business associate Ramon C. Tongson jointly issued three checks in payment of the loans, bearing both their signatures.
  • Upon presentment on March 18, 1993, the checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds or closure of the account.
  • Petitioner made formal demands to pay upon Cawili on May 23, 1995, and upon Tongson on June 26, 1995, but both failed to pay.
  • On August 24, 1995, petitioner filed a complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against Cawili and Tongson with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
  • During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed his signature was falsified and that he was not Cawili's business associate, but petitioner presented documents showing Tongson's signatures matching those on the checks.
  • The case underwent multiple reinvestigations and appeals within the Department of Justice, with resolutions alternating between finding prescription and finding none, spanning from 1995 to 2004.
  • The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's certiorari petition for alleged failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum shopping, and for attaching a mere photocopy of the April 3, 2003 DOJ resolution instead of the assailed August 9, 2004 resolution.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • The filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for violations of special laws, citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan which involved the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
  • The DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is misplaced because that case involved a municipal ordinance, and the delay in filing the information in court was attributable to the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions, not to petitioner's inaction.
  • The defect in the verification attached to the petition before the Court of Appeals is not fatal as it constitutes substantial compliance; the court may waive strict compliance to serve the ends of justice.
  • The petition before the Court of Appeals sought the annulment of the August 9, 2004 DOJ resolution, a certified true copy of which was attached, making the dismissal for failure to attach the 2003 resolution a grievous error.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Under Act No. 3326, violations of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribe after four years, and the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings" refers strictly to the filing of a case in court, not administrative proceedings before the prosecutor, citing Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.
  • The filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor did not interrupt the prescriptive period because preliminary investigation is an executive function, not a judicial proceeding.
  • The long delay in the proceedings violated the respondents' constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
  • The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari for non-compliance with the formal requirements of the Rules of Court regarding verification and certification of non-forum shopping, as these are mandatory and jurisdictional.

Issues

  • Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing the petition for certiorari on technical grounds, specifically (a) the alleged failure to attach a proper verification and certification against forum shopping, and (b) the alleged failure to attach a certified true copy of the April 3, 2003 DOJ resolution.
  • Substantive Issues: Whether the offense of violating B.P. Blg. 22 has already prescribed, considering that the complaint was filed with the prosecutor's office within the four-year prescriptive period but the information in court was filed more than four years after the commission of the offense.

Ruling

  • Procedural: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner substantially complied with the verification requirement by attaching the amended verification to his motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, and that strict compliance may be excused to serve the ends of justice as the defect is not jurisdictional. Regarding the certified true copy requirement, the Court found that the petition sought to annul the August 9, 2004 resolution, a certified true copy of which was attached; the April 3, 2003 resolution was not the subject of the petition, rendering the Court of Appeals' dismissal on this ground a grievous mistake.
  • Substantive: The Supreme Court ruled that the offense has not prescribed. The filing of the complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor on August 24, 1995, signified the commencement of proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. The Court interpreted Section 2 of Act No. 3326, enacted when justices of the peace conducted preliminary investigations, to include the institution of executive investigative proceedings (preliminary investigation by prosecutors) as proceedings that toll prescription, given the shift of such functions to the executive branch. The Court ordered the DOJ to refile the information against Tongson.

Doctrines

  • Interruption of Prescriptive Period under Act No. 3326 — The running of the prescriptive period for violations of special laws is tolled upon the institution of any investigative proceeding against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to prosecution. The term "institution of judicial proceedings" in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 must now be understood to include executive proceedings (preliminary investigation by prosecutors), not merely judicial trial proceedings, given the current setup where the investigation phase is an executive function and the trial phase is judicial.
  • Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules — Defects in the verification of a petition are neither jurisdictional nor always fatal; courts may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.

Key Excerpts

  • "While it may be observed that the term 'judicial proceedings' in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before 'investigation and punishment' in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term 'proceedings' should now be understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage."
  • "Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control."
  • "Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies."
  • "The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."

Precedents Cited

  • Ingco v. Sandiganbayan — Cited as controlling precedent holding that the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period for violations of special laws (R.A. No. 3019).
  • Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. — Distinguished by the Court; while it held that proceedings refer to judicial proceedings for municipal ordinances, the Court clarified that this strict interpretation should not apply to the context of special laws where preliminary investigation has shifted to the executive branch.
  • Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation — Cited for the doctrine that investigative proceedings by executive agencies equivalent to preliminary investigation interrupt prescription under Act No. 3326.
  • People v. Olarte — Cited for the principle that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even for preliminary examination, interrupts the period of prescription.
  • U.S. v. Lazada and People v. Joson — Historical cases cited to establish that at the time of the enactment of Act No. 3326, preliminary investigation was conducted by justices of the peace, and filing complaints with them tolled prescription.

Provisions

  • Act No. 3326, Sections 1 and 2 — Establishes that violations of special acts prescribe in four years (for penalties involving imprisonment of more than one month but less than two years) and that prescription is interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person; interpreted by the Court to include executive preliminary investigation.
  • Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — The special law penalizing the making or drawing of checks without sufficient funds; does not provide for its own prescriptive period, thus Act No. 3326 applies.
  • Rule 46, Section 3 of the Rules of Court — Cited regarding the requirement to attach a certified true copy of the judgment or resolution subject of the petition; the Court found compliance as the assailed August 9, 2004 resolution was attached.
  • Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure — The procedural basis for the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.