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Ong vs. Alegre

The Supreme Court En Banc dismissed the petitions for certiorari seeking to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution disqualifying Francis Ong from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections based on the three-term limit rule. The Court held that Francis Ong's uninterrupted service as mayor from 1998 to 2001 constituted "service for the full term" despite the subsequent nullification of his proclamation by the RTC in an election protest decided after the term expired, distinguishing it from cases where there was an involuntary severance from office. Consequently, the Court upheld the denial of due course to Rommel Ong's certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate, ruling that substitution under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code is only permitted when the original candidate is disqualified, not when the certificate of candidacy is denied due course or cancelled.

Primary Holding

For the three-term limit rule to apply, the official must have been elected for three consecutive terms and fully served three consecutive terms; uninterrupted assumption of office and discharge of duties for the entire duration of a term constitutes "service for the full term" even if the proclamation is subsequently declared void, provided there was no involuntary severance from office during the term.

Background

This case involves the interpretation of the three-term limit rule for elective local officials under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code, specifically addressing whether a term counts when the official served the full duration but was later declared not the winner in an election protest decided after the term expired. It also clarifies the distinction between disqualification of a candidate (which permits substitution) and denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy (which does not permit substitution).

History

  1. Joseph Stanley Alegre filed a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis Ong (SPA Case No. 04-048) with the COMELEC on January 9, 2004, seeking to disqualify Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 mayoralty elections based on the three-term limit rule.

  2. The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition on March 31, 2004, ruling that the 1998-2001 term could not be counted against Francis because he was not duly elected thereto, applying the rulings in _Borja_ and _Lonzanida_.

  3. The COMELEC en banc reversed the First Division on May 7, 2004, declaring Francis disqualified to run, ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates, and directing that votes cast for him be considered stray.

  4. On May 8, 2004 (after the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy), Rommel Ong filed a certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for his brother Francis, which the COMELEC subsequently denied due course based on _Miranda vs. Abaya_.

  5. Francis and Rommel filed separate petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 163295 and 163354), which were consolidated by the Court on June 1, 2004.

Facts

  • Francis Ong was the incumbent mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, having been elected in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections.
  • In the May 1998 elections, Francis Ong was proclaimed the winner, but Joseph Stanley Alegre filed an election protest (Election Case No. 6850) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Daet, Camarines Norte.
  • The RTC rendered its decision on July 4, 2001, declaring Alegre the duly elected mayor for the 1998 term, but this was after Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 term and had already begun serving the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect.
  • For the May 10, 2004 elections, Alegre filed a petition to disqualify Francis based on the three-consecutive-term limit, arguing that Francis had served the terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.
  • The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition on March 31, 2004, ruling that the 1998-2001 term could not be counted because Francis was not duly elected thereto, his proclamation having been voided by the RTC decision.
  • On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc reversed the First Division, disqualifying Francis and ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates.
  • On May 8, 2004, after receiving a fax copy of the May 7 resolution, Francis sought the nomination of his brother Rommel Ong as substitute candidate, and Rommel filed his certificate of candidacy at 5:05 p.m., past the deadline for filing.
  • On May 9, 2004, Alegre filed a petition to deny due course to Rommel's certificate of candidacy.
  • Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano issued a Memorandum on May 10, 2004, ordering the Provincial Election Supervisor to implement the May 7 resolution and denying due course to Rommel's certificate, citing the ruling in Miranda vs. Abaya that substitution is not proper when a certificate is denied due course.
  • On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate.
  • On June 4, 2004, the COMELEC dismissed Alegre's petition to deny due course to Rommel's certificate as moot and academic.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Francis Ong argued that he was not duly elected to the 1998-2001 term because his proclamation was contested and eventually nullified by the RTC decision dated July 4, 2001, citing Lonzanida vs. COMELEC to support the position that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all.
  • He contended that he merely assumed office as a "presumptive winner" subject to the final outcome of the election protest, and therefore the 1998-2001 term should not be counted for purposes of the three-term limit.
  • Rommel Ong argued that he should be allowed to substitute his brother Francis as the nominee of the Nationalist People's Coalition for the mayoralty position.
  • Rommel challenged the COMELEC's refusal to include his name in the official certified list of candidates as substitute for his brother.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Alegre argued that the COMELEC First Division misapplied the three-term rule because the factual milieu in Borja and Lonzanida was different; unlike those cases, there was no interruption in the continuity of Francis's service for the 1998-2001 term.
  • Alegre maintained that Francis actually served three consecutive full terms from 1995 to 2004, and discounting the 1998-2001 term would produce iniquitous effects and reward a legally disqualified loser.
  • COMELEC argued that Francis's assumption of office and continuous exercise of mayoral functions from start to finish of the 1998-2001 term constituted service for the full term, regardless of the subsequent nullification of his proclamation after the term expired.
  • COMELEC maintained that Rommel could not validly substitute Francis because Francis's certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled, not merely disqualified, citing Miranda vs. Abaya for the principle that there can be no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded by denial and cancellation of his certificate.

Issues

  • Procedural: N/A
  • Substantive Issues:
    • Whether Francis Ong's assumption of office as mayor for the 1998-2001 term, despite the subsequent nullification of his proclamation in an election protest decided after the term expired, constitutes "service for the full term" for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
    • Whether Rommel Ong can validly substitute Francis Ong as candidate when Francis's certificate of candidacy was denied due course and cancelled, as opposed to merely being disqualified.

Ruling

  • Procedural: N/A
  • Substantive:
    • Francis Ong's service from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 constitutes "service for the full term" under the three-term limit rule. The Court distinguished Lonzanida where there was a failure of elections and the candidate was ordered to vacate before the term expired (involuntary severance), whereas Francis served the entire 1998-2001 term without interruption despite the subsequent nullification of his proclamation. The RTC decision came after the term expired, making it without practical or legal value for term-counting purposes.
    • The requisites for the three-term limit concur: Francis was elected in 1995 and 2001, and while his 1998 election was contested, he served the full 1998-2001 term continuously without involuntary severance.
    • Rommel Ong cannot substitute Francis because under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, substitution is only allowed when the original candidate is disqualified, not when the certificate of candidacy is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78. Following Miranda vs. Abaya and applying expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a person whose certificate is cancelled is no candidate at all and cannot be substituted.
    • The petitions were dismissed and the COMELEC en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 was affirmed.

Doctrines

  • Three-Term Limit Rule — Under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code, no local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Two requisites must concur: (1) the official has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms. Applied to hold that uninterrupted service of a full term counts as service even if the proclamation is later voided, provided there was no involuntary severance from office during the term.
  • Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius — The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Applied to Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code to mean that since the law enumerated disqualification as a ground for substitution but did not mention denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy, substitution is not allowed in the latter case.
  • Service for the Full Term — Voluntary renunciation or involuntary severance from office (as in Lonzanida) interrupts the continuity of service for purposes of the three-term limit, but mere subsequent nullification of a proclamation after the official has fully served the term does not negate the term served.

Key Excerpts

  • "His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule." — Establishing that uninterrupted actual service constitutes a full term regardless of subsequent nullification of the proclamation.
  • "The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election." — Illustrating the inequity of allowing a protest declared after a term expires to negate the actual service rendered by the proclaimed winner.
  • "There can be no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy." — Quoting Miranda vs. Abaya to emphasize the distinction between disqualification and denial of due course regarding substitution rights.
  • "A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all." — Reinforcing the principle that cancellation of a certificate renders the person a non-candidate who cannot be substituted.

Precedents Cited

  • Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (311 SCRA 602) — Distinguished; held that the candidate did not fully serve the term because he was ordered to vacate before expiration due to failure of elections, constituting involuntary severance and interruption of service.
  • Borja vs. COMELEC (295 SCRA 157) — Distinguished; involved voluntary renunciation through appointment to another office interrupting the continuity of service.
  • Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) — Followed; established that substitution is not permitted where a certificate of candidacy is denied due course or cancelled under Section 78, as opposed to mere disqualification.
  • Adormeo vs. COMELEC (376 SCRA 90) — Cited for the requisites of the three-term limit rule (elected for three consecutive terms and fully served three consecutive terms).
  • Bautista vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) — Cited in Miranda and followed; held that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all.

Provisions

  • Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution — Provides that no local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation shall not be considered an interruption.
  • Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) — Restates the three-term limit rule and the provision on voluntary renunciation not constituting interruption.
  • Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) — Governs substitution of candidates, allowing substitution only when an official candidate of a registered or accredited party withdraws or is disqualified.
  • Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code — Governs the denial of due course to or cancellation of certificates of candidacy based on false material representations.
  • Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — Procedural basis for the petitions for certiorari.
  • Section 13, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Cited regarding the finality of COMELEC decisions (5 days from promulgation for special actions).

Notable Concurring Opinions

  • Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ. — Joined in the unanimous decision without separate written opinions.