Office of the Court Administrator vs. Pe

Pregnancy and health conditions do not constitute sufficient justification to excuse habitual tardiness under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, although they may be considered as mitigating circumstances; an employee who incurs habitual tardiness for two separate periods commits two distinct counts of the offense warranting suspension under Section 52(C)(4), Rule VI of Civil Service Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, rather than a mere reprimand.

The case involves the enforcement of strict observance of working hours among court personnel and the maintenance of discipline in the judiciary. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) monitors attendance records of judiciary employees to ensure compliance with civil service rules on punctuality. The respondent was a government employee with eight years of service when the administrative charge was filed, and the case addresses the tension between compassionate considerations for employee health conditions and the imperative of public accountability.

• Rosemarie B. Pe was employed as Statistician II at the Regional Trial Court-Office of the Clerk of Court, Cebu City, with eight years of government service since August 18, 1997.
• Certification from the OCA Leave Division dated March 15, 2004 revealed that Pe incurred tardiness as follows: May 2002 (17 times), June 2002 (11 times), July 2002 (13 times), August 2002 (20 times), September 2002 (20 times), January 2003 (19 times), February 2003 (17 times), and March 2003 (20 times).
• Pe was pregnant from April 20, 2002 until she delivered her child on October 14, 2002, as evidenced by a medical certificate from her Obstetrician-Gynecologist.
• Despite the termination of her pregnancy in October 2002, Pe continued to incur numerous instances of tardiness from January to March 2003.
• Records showed that for the months of May, July, August, and September 2002, as well as January, February, and March 2003, she was tardy more often than she was punctual.
• This was the first time Pe was formally charged with habitual tardiness, though the records showed habitual tardiness spanning two years.
• Pe had no previous administrative charges on record.

• The Office of the Court Administrator argued that Pe's explanation was not justifiable, citing the Court's Resolution in A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC which established that a health condition is not a sufficient justification to excuse habitual tardiness.
• The OCA recommended that Pe be reprimanded for her habitual tardiness during the months of May to September 2002 and January to March 2003, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

• Rosemarie B. Pe explained in her letter dated April 8, 2003 that she incurred tardiness on the aforementioned months due to her pregnancy.
• She claimed that prior to her pregnancy, she was seldom late for work.
• She argued that she experienced sudden physiological and biological changes common to all pregnant women, and expressed hope that her tardiness would be excused considering her delicate condition during those months.

• Procedural Issues:
  • N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether Pe's pregnancy constitutes a valid justification to excuse her habitual tardiness under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998.
  • Whether the penalty of reprimand is appropriate for Pe's habitual tardiness, or whether a stiffer penalty of suspension should be imposed considering she committed two counts of habitual tardiness.

• Procedural:
  • N/A
• Substantive:
  • The Supreme Court agreed with the OCA's finding that Pe committed habitual tardiness but deemed the penalty of reprimand insufficient under the circumstances.
  • The Court held that Pe's health concerns and pregnancy do not suffice to completely excuse her habitual tardiness, although these may be considered to mitigate administrative liability.
  • The Court ruled that Pe committed two counts of habitual tardiness: first, during the months of May to September 2002, and second, during January to March 2003, noting that the tardiness continued even after her pregnancy ended in October 2002.
  • Applying Section 52(C)(4), Rule VI of Civil Service Circular No. 19, Series of 1999, the Court held that the second offense warrants suspension of 1-30 days, not merely a reprimand.
  • Pe was suspended for twenty (20) days without pay, considering her eight years of service and lack of previous administrative charges, with a stern warning that repetition would be dealt with more severely.

• Habitual Tardiness — Defined under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998 as incurring tardiness, regardless of the number of minutes, ten (10) times a month for at least two (2) months in a semester or at least two (2) consecutive months during the year. The Court applied this definition strictly to find Pe guilty of two counts of the offense.
• Public Office is a Public Trust — Court officials and employees must be role models in faithfully observing this constitutional canon, which includes strict observance of prescribed office hours and efficient use of every moment for public service to recompense the Government and the people who maintain the Judiciary.
• Mitigation of Administrative Liability — While health conditions, domestic concerns, and financial problems are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness, they may be considered to mitigate the penalty imposed.

• "Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998, applies without distinction to all government employees."
• "Hence, Pe's health concerns do not suffice to completely excuse her habitual tardiness."
• "The Court has previously held that moral obligations, performance of household chores, traffic problems and health, domestic and financial concerns are not sufficient reasons to excuse habitual tardiness, although these may be considered to mitigate administrative liability."
• "Court officials and employees must strictly observe official time. As punctuality is a virtue, absenteeism and tardiness are impermissible."
• "By reason of the nature and functions of their office, officials and employees must be role models in the faithful observance of the constitutional canon that public office is a public trust."
• "Inherent in this mandate is the observance of prescribed office hours and the efficient use of every moment thereof for public service, if only to recompense the Government and ultimately, the people who shoulder the cost of maintaining the Judiciary."

• Re: Imposition of Corresponding Penalties for Habitual Tardiness Committed During the Second Semester of 2002, A.M. No. 00-6-09-SC, August 14, 2003 — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that health conditions are not sufficient justification to excuse habitual tardiness, though they may mitigate liability.
• Habitual Tardiness of Arthur R. Cabigon, Sheriff IV, RTC-OCC, Cebu City, A.M. No. 04-5-277-RTC, August 31, 2004 — Cited in determining the appropriate penalty of suspension for twenty days considering the employee's length of service and absence of previous administrative charges.

• Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 23, Series of 1998 — Defines habitual tardiness as incurring tardiness ten times a month for at least two months in a semester or two consecutive months during the year; served as the basis for finding Pe guilty of the charge.
• Section 52(C)(4), Rule VI of Civil Service Circular No. 19, Series of 1999 (Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service) — Provides the graduated penalties for habitual tardiness: 1st offense - Reprimand; 2nd offense - Suspension 1-30 days; 3rd offense - Dismissal. Applied to justify the suspension penalty for Pe's second count of habitual tardiness.
• Administrative Circular No. 1-99 — Cited for the principle that court officials and employees must strictly observe official time to enhance the dignity of courts as temples of justice.
• Administrative Circular No. 2-99 — Cited for the directive on strict observance of working hours and disciplinary action for absenteeism and tardiness.

• Chief Justice Artemio V. Puno — Concurred in the resolution.
• Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez — Concurred in the resolution.