Odchigue-Bondoc vs. Tan Tiong Bio

The Department of Justice is not a quasi-judicial body, and its resolutions in preliminary investigations are not subject to the constitutional requirement under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and law on which they are based, because preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and does not involve the determination of guilt or innocence.

Tan Tiong Bio purchased a 683-square-meter lot from Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. in Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, fully paying the installment payments. Despite repeated demands, Fil-Estate failed to deliver the title to the lot, which was later discovered to be inexistent. This led to the filing of various complaints, including a perjury complaint against Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc, the Corporate Secretary of Fil-Estate, based on allegations in her counter-affidavit in the related estafa case.

• Tan Tiong Bio fully paid the installment payments for a 683-square-meter lot in Manila Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf & Development, Inc. in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-Estate failed to deliver the title despite repeated demands and also failed to refund the purchase price.
• Respondent later discovered that the lot sold to him was inexistent.
• Respondent filed a complaint for Estafa against Fil-Estate officials, including petitioner Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc in her capacity as Corporate Secretary of Fil-Estate.
• In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner alleged that she had no participation in the acts or transactions alleged, never being involved in the management and day-to-day operations of Fil-Estate, and specifically denied that handwritten approvals and endorsements were hers, stating she had never transacted directly or indirectly with respondent or Mrs. Ona.
• Based on these allegations in the Counter-Affidavit, respondent filed a complaint for Perjury against petitioner before the Pasig City Prosecutor's Office.
• The Pasig City Prosecutor dismissed the perjury complaint for insufficiency of evidence by Resolution of June 17, 2004.
• The Department of Justice, acting on petition for review, dismissed the petition motu proprio by Resolution of July 20, 2005 under Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal, finding no showing of any reversible error.
• The Court of Appeals set aside the DOJ Resolution, holding that the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion by failing to clearly and distinctly state the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution.

• Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of "courts of justice" and does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ, citing Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna.
• Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal expressly allows the DOJ Secretary to dismiss a petition for review motu proprio when there is no showing of any reversible error.
• The use of the word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution merely means "altogether," "entirely," or "openly," and was used in conjunction with the motu proprio action, not in the technical sense of Section 7 of the NPS Rule on Appeal.
• Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal represent a two-step approach in the Secretary's review power, and the dismissal was valid under Section 12.

• The constitutional requirement under Section 14, Article VIII is not limited to courts but extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto.
• The DOJ "muddled" the distinction between Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal, and an "outright" dismissal is not allowed under Section 12 since the DOJ must set forth the reasons why it finds no reversible error, citing Adasa v. Abalos.
• The dismissal under Section 12(c) was improper because the DOJ failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which the dismissal was based.

• Procedural Issues: Whether Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires decisions to clearly and distinctly state the facts and law on which they are based, applies to resolutions issued by the Secretary of Justice in preliminary investigations.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for review motu proprio under Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal.

• Procedural: The Supreme Court held that Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. Preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding because the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; it is merely inquisitorial. The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body, and its function in reviewing a prosecutor's order via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding. The constitutional provision applies only to courts of justice.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Sections 7 and 12 of the NPS Rule on Appeal are part of a two-step approach in the Secretary's review power. Section 12(c) validly allows the Secretary to dismiss a petition motu proprio if there is no showing of any reversible error. The use of the word "outright" was merely descriptive of the motu proprio action and did not violate the Rule. The case of Adasa is distinguishable because therein the accused had already been arraigned, whereas in the present case no Information had been filed against petitioner. Absent grave abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the prosecutor's determination of probable cause.

• Nature of Preliminary Investigation — Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. The prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused but only whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty. It is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the prosecutor.
• Non-Interference with Prosecutorial Discretion — In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information, courts will not interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal complaint is dismissed or given due course.

• "A preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since 'the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.'"
• "Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged [of] a crime and to enable the [prosecutor] to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof."
• "While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor]."
• "In the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of a public prosecutor who alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information, courts will not interfere with his findings; otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the exercise of discretion on his part each time a criminal complaint is dismissed or given due course."

• Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna — Cited by petitioner to support the argument that Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ.
• Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto — Cited by respondent but distinguished by the Court; the case involved the Ombudsman dismissing a complaint prior to preliminary investigation under evaluation procedures, not during preliminary investigation.
• Adasa v. Abalos — Cited by respondent but distinguished; therein the accused had already been arraigned, whereas in the present case no Information had been filed against petitioner.
• Balangauan v. Court of Appeals — Controlling precedent establishing that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and that the action of the Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor's order via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding.
• Bautista v. Court of Appeals — Cited for the definition that preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding since the prosecutor does not determine guilt or innocence.
• Sec. Evangelista v. Judge Jarencio — Cited for the principle that preliminary investigation partakes of an investigative or inquisitorial power for the sole purpose of obtaining information on what future action of a judicial nature may be taken.
• Santos v. Go — Cited in relation to Balangauan regarding the nature of DOJ review proceedings.
• Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim — Cited for the principle that the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that will establish probable cause.
• Dumangcas v. Marcelo — Cited for the principle that courts will not interfere with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion absent grave abuse.

• Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution — Provides that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based; held inapplicable to DOJ resolutions because the DOJ is not a court and preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
• Section 12(c) of Department Circular No. 70 (NPS Rule on Appeal) — Allows the Secretary to motu proprio or upon motion dismiss the petition for review if there is no showing of any reversible error; upheld as valid basis for dismissal.
• Section 7 of Department Circular No. 70 (NPS Rule on Appeal) — Provides grounds for outright dismissal of a petition (patently without merit, manifestly intended for delay, issues too unsubstantial, or accused already arraigned); distinguished from Section 12 as part of a two-step approach.
• Section 2, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman — Cited regarding the evaluation stage of complaints before preliminary investigation.