Ocampo vs. Florenciano

A decree of legal separation may be granted even if the defendant spouse admits to the offense or expresses conformity to the separation, provided that the decree is based on independent evidence of the ground (adultery) and not solely on a confession of judgment, and provided there is no collusion between the parties to simulate the ground.

The case arises from a petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife after discovering her in the act of sexual intercourse with another man in 1955. This incident followed a history of the wife's previous infidelity in 1951 and her eventual abandonment of the conjugal home in 1952.

• Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in April 1938 and had several children.
• In March 1951, Jose discovered Serafina having illicit relations with a man named Jose Arcalas; he subsequently sent her to Manila to study beauty culture.
• While in Manila, Serafina continued to date other men, and in June 1952, she finished her studies, left Jose, and they lived separately.
• On June 18, 1955, Jose caught Serafina in the act of having illicit relations with another man named Nelson Orzame.
• Jose expressed his intention to file for legal separation, to which Serafina agreed, provided she would not be charged criminally with adultery.
• Jose filed the petition for legal separation on July 5, 1955; Serafina did not answer the complaint and was declared in default.
• Pursuant to Article 101 of the Civil Code, the Provincial Fiscal investigated the case and reported to the court that no collusion existed between the parties.
• During the investigation, Serafina admitted her sexual relations with Orzame and her desire to be separated.
• Jose presented independent testimonial evidence from several witnesses to prove the commission of adultery.

• The specific act of adultery committed with Nelson Orzame in 1955 is a valid and existing ground for legal separation.
• There is no collusion between the parties, as verified by the Provincial Fiscal's investigation.
• The evidence presented, including witness testimony, is sufficient to prove the ground for separation independent of the wife's admissions.

• N/A (The respondent was declared in default and did not file an answer or arguments in court, though she admitted the offense to the Fiscal).

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the wife's admission of fault to the Fiscal and her conformity to the petition constitutes a prohibited "confession of judgment" under Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the husband's failure to bring his wife back after she left him constitutes condonation or consent to the adultery.
  • Whether the action for legal separation has prescribed due to the earlier adultery discovered in 1951.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court ruled that Article 101 prohibits a decree based exclusively on a confession of judgment, which typically occurs when a defendant appears in court and formally admits the plaintiff's right to judgment. The Court held that admissions made outside of court are admissible evidence. Since the petitioner presented independent evidence (witnesses) proving the adultery, the decree is based on that evidence, not solely on the wife's confession.
• Substantive:
  • Regarding condonation, the Court ruled that the husband's failure to actively search for his wife and bring her home after she abandoned him in 1952 did not constitute condonation or consent to her subsequent adultery. It was not the husband's duty to search for the wife who voluntarily left the conjugal home.
  • Regarding prescription, the Court affirmed that the action based on the 1951 adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed under the one-year rule, but the action based on the 1955 adultery with Nelson Orzame was filed within the prescriptive period and is valid.
  • Regarding collusion, the Court determined none existed because the adultery actually occurred, and the wife would not risk criminal prosecution and jail time by falsely admitting to adultery merely to secure a separation.

• Confession of Judgment (Legal Separation) — A procedural act where a defendant acknowledges the plaintiff's claim in court. In legal separation cases, a decree cannot be issued solely on this basis to prevent collusion; however, this doctrine does not bar the admission of extrajudicial confessions or admissions as corroborative evidence when independent proof of the offense exists.
• Collusion — An agreement between spouses to simulate a matrimonial offense or suppress a valid defense to obtain a separation or divorce. It is a ground for denying the petition but is not presumed merely because both parties desire the separation or because the defendant does not present a defense.
• Condonation — The forgiveness of a marital offense, which bars legal separation. The Court held that mere failure to search for a spouse who abandoned the home does not constitute condonation of their subsequent infidelity.

• "What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession."
• "If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it."
• "Collusion in divorce, or legal separation means the agreement... between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit... a matrimonial offense... for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce."

• Brown vs. Yambao — Cited to support the ruling that the husband's right to legal separation based on the 1951 adultery had prescribed.
• Phil. National Bank vs. Ingersoll — Cited regarding the definition and nature of confession of judgment.
• People vs. Sensano and People vs. Guinucud — Cited as cases where the Court previously inferred consent or condonation, but distinguished from the present case because in those precedents, the husband had abandoned the wife, whereas here the wife abandoned the husband.
• Griffiths vs. Griffiths — Cited to provide the legal definition of collusion.
• Pohlman vs. Pohlman — Cited to establish that a defendant's desire for divorce and lack of defense does not by itself constitute collusion.

• Article 100, New Civil Code — States that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse provided there is no condonation or consent, and mandates dismissal if collusion exists.
• Article 101, New Civil Code — Prohibits the promulgation of a decree of legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment and mandates the intervention of the prosecuting attorney to check for collusion.
• Article 102, New Civil Code — Referenced regarding the one-year prescriptive period for filing an action for legal separation from the date of discovery.