Movers-Baseco vs. Cyborg

In determining the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court under Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, where the claim for damages is the main cause of action or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim must be included in computing the jurisdictional amount, notwithstanding that the action also involves the provisional remedy of replevin.

The dispute arose from a lease agreement between Cyborg Leasing Corporation (as lessor) and Conpac Warehousing, Inc. (as lessee) involving a Nissan forklift. When Conpac defaulted on monthly rental payments beginning April 1995, and Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. subsequently took possession of the equipment in May 1995, Cyborg initiated judicial proceedings to recover both the property and the accrued unpaid rentals, leading to procedural questions regarding court jurisdiction and the proper remedy of appeal.

• Cyborg Leasing Corporation entered into a lease agreement with Conpac Warehousing, Inc. for one Nissan forklift with a monthly rental of P11,000.00 starting from January 5, 1995.
• Conpac failed to pay rentals beginning April 9, 1995, accumulating unpaid rentals amounting to P180,000.00 as of the filing of the complaint on August 22, 1996.
• In May 1995, Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. took control of Conpac's operations and seized the subject forklift along with other cargoes and equipment.
• Cyborg demanded the return of the forklift from Movers-Baseco and presented a formal disclaimer of ownership from Conpac, but Movers-Baseco refused to comply.
• The complaint filed by Cyborg prayed for: (a) a writ of replevin for the seizure of the forklift; (b) actual damages of P11,000.00 per month from April 9, 1995 until repossession; (c) exemplary damages of P1,000,000.00; (d) attorney's fees of P50,000.00; and (e) in the alternative, payment of P150,000.00 as the actual market value of the forklift if it could not be seized.
• The total amount of claims, excluding interest and costs, amounted to P1,442,000.00 based on the computations presented by Movers-Baseco in its motion to dismiss.
• The MTC issued a writ of replevin on August 27, 1996 after Cyborg posted a P300,000.00 replevin bond, and the sheriff took possession of the forklift.
• Movers-Baseco was served with summons and the writ of replevin on February 6, 1997.
• The MTC dismissed the complaint on March 18, 1997, denied the motion for reconsideration on June 10, 1997, and ordered the return of the forklift to Movers-Baseco.
• Cyborg filed its petition for certiorari with the RTC on September 26, 1997, which was 74 days from its receipt of the order denying its motion for reconsideration on July 14, 1997.

• The MTC lacked jurisdiction over the complaint because the total amount of claims, including the market value of the forklift (P150,000.00), unpaid rentals (P242,000.00), exemplary damages (P1,000,000.00), and attorney's fees (P50,000.00), amounted to P1,442,000.00, which exceeded the P200,000.00 jurisdictional limit for MTCs in Metro Manila under Section 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691.
• The MTC's order of dismissal dated March 18, 1997 had become final and executory because Cyborg failed to file a timely appeal or petition for certiorari.
• Cyborg's petition for certiorari before the RTC was filed 14 days beyond the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and could not be used as a substitute for a lost appeal.
• The RTC erred in issuing a preliminary injunction without requiring Cyborg to post a separate injunction bond, as the replevin bond previously posted could not serve as the injunction bond required under Rule 58.

• The principal action was for replevin (recovery of personal property), and the other claims for damages were merely incidental thereto, which should be excluded from the computation of the jurisdictional amount pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
• The value of the forklift at P150,000.00 was within the jurisdiction of the MTC, and since replevin was the main relief sought, the MTC had jurisdiction over the entire case.
• The petition for certiorari was filed on time or alternatively, the delay was excusable and the RTC had the power to enjoin the enforcement of the MTC's order to prevent grave injustice.
• The replevin bond previously posted was sufficient to cover the injunction bond requirement, or alternatively, the RTC had discretion to waive the additional bond requirement.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the petition for certiorari filed by Cyborg before the RTC was filed within the reglementary period and whether certiorari can substitute for a lost appeal.
  • Whether a temporary restraining order or preliminary writ of injunction can be issued without an injunction bond apart from the replevin bond.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the complaint considering that the claims for damages were not merely incidental to the action for replevin.

• Procedural:
  • The petition for certiorari was filed 14 days late, having been submitted on the 74th day from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, instead of within the 60-day period prescribed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997.
  • Certiorari is a remedy of last resort that cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal; the RTC erred in granting the petition despite its tardy filing.
  • The Court did not rule on the injunction bond issue in view of the resolution of the jurisdictional and certiorari questions.
• Substantive:
  • The MTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
  • Under Section 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 09-94, while damages are generally excluded from the jurisdictional amount, this exclusion applies only where damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
  • Where the claim for damages is the main cause of action or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim must be considered in determining jurisdiction.
  • The claim for unpaid rentals amounting to P180,000.00 as of the filing of the complaint, plus the alternative claim for the market value of the forklift at P150,000.00, totaled P330,000.00, which exceeded the P200,000.00 jurisdictional limit of the MTC in Metro Manila.
  • It was incorrect to argue that the unpaid rentals were merely incidental to the replevin action because Cyborg specifically sought payment thereof as actual damages in the complaint, making it a principal cause of action.

• Determination of Jurisdiction by Averments in Complaint — Jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought vis-à-vis the corresponding provisions of the law involved; the court cannot vest jurisdiction upon itself by agreement of the parties.
• Damages as Principal Cause of Action vs. Incidental Damages — Under Section 33 of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 09-94, damages are excluded from the jurisdictional computation only when they are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action; where damages are the main cause of action or one of the causes of action, the amount thereof determines jurisdiction.
• Certiorari as Remedy of Last Resort — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal and must be filed within 60 days from receipt of the final order or resolution assailed.

• "It is a fundamental axiom in adjective law that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and where there is none, no agreement of the parties can vest competencia."
• "Hardly disputable is that jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determined by the averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought vis-à-vis the corresponding provisions of the law involved."
• "It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals were just incident of the action for the return of the forklift, considering that private respondent specifically sought in the complaint not only the seizure of the forklift from petitioner... but likewise the payment of unpaid and outstanding rentals."

• Leonor vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the principle that jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be vested by agreement of parties.
• Department of Health vs. National Labor Relations Commission — Cited for the principle that jurisdiction is determined by law and not by consent of the parties.
• Enerio vs. Alampay — Cited regarding the inclusion of exemplary damages in the jurisdictional computation when the amount is specified in the complaint.
• Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the doctrine that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the complaint and the relief sought.
• Sumulong vs. Court of Appeals — Cited for the same doctrine regarding determination of jurisdiction by complaint averments.
• Malayan Integrated Industries Corp. vs. Hon. Mendoza — Cited for the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

• Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691 — Defines the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases, establishing the P100,000.00/P200,000.00 jurisdictional limits and the exclusion of interest, damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs in determining jurisdiction unless damages are the main cause of action.
• Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94 — Clarifies the implementation of RA 7691, specifically that the exclusion of damages from jurisdictional computation applies only where damages are incidental to the main cause of action.
• Rule 60, Sections 1-8 of the Revised Rules of Court — Provisions governing the remedy of replevin.
• Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure — Provisions on certiorari, specifically the 60-day reglementary period for filing.
• Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure — Provisions on temporary restraining orders.
• Article 2208 of the New Civil Code — Provisions on attorney's fees as part of damages.