An absolute pardon granted to a convicted public officer removes the penal consequences of the crime, including accessory penalties like disqualification from public office, thereby restoring eligibility for public employment; however, it does not ipso facto restore the officer to the specific public office forfeited by reason of the conviction, nor does it extinguish civil liability arising from the offense or entitle the pardonee to back salaries for the period of suspension or non-employment.

Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was the assistant treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. This conviction, if finalized, carried with it accessory penalties including disqualification from public office. The core of the dispute arose after she received an absolute pardon from the President while her case was technically still pending (motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court), leading her to believe she was entitled to automatic reinstatement and other benefits.

• Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto, then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan on March 25, 1983, for the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents, and sentenced to imprisonment and a fine, and ordered to indemnify the government P4,892.50.
• Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision.
• While her motion for reconsideration was pending before the Supreme Court, President Marcos granted her an absolute pardon on December 17, 1984, which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
• Following the pardon, Monsanto requested the Calbayog City treasurer to restore her to her former post, which was still vacant.
• The Ministry of Finance initially ruled that Monsanto could be reinstated without a new appointment, effective from the date of pardon, provided the civil indemnity was paid.
• Monsanto sought reconsideration, arguing the pardon wiped out the crime, her government service was never interrupted, she should be reinstated as of her preventive suspension date (August 1, 1982), receive backpay, and be exempt from civil liability.
• The Office of the President, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., reversed the Ministry of Finance's ruling, stating that Monsanto was not entitled to automatic reinstatement, needed a new appointment, and remained liable for the civil indemnity.

• The absolute pardon, granted while her conviction was still pending appeal (motion for reconsideration), meant there was no final judgment of conviction, so the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach.
• The pardon effectively declared her not guilty of the crime charged, as if it were an acquittal, because it was issued before a final verdict of guilt.
• The full pardon wiped out the crime, implying her service in the government was never interrupted.
• She is entitled to reinstatement to her former position as of the date of her preventive suspension (August 1, 1982).
• She is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
• She should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the civil indemnity.

• Petitioner was convicted of the crime, and acquittal, not absolute pardon, is the only ground for reinstatement to a former position and entitlement to salaries and benefits during suspension.
• A former public official who has been pardoned must secure a reappointment to reassume their former position.
• A pardon does not exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed by the sentence, as per the Revised Penal Code.
• The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office is part of the punishment which, though removed by pardon, does not mean automatic reinstatement.
• The facts constituting her offense must be evaluated in considering her suitability for reappointment.

• Whether or not a public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive is entitled to automatic reinstatement to her former position without the need for a new appointment.
• Whether or not such pardon entitles the public officer to backpay for the period of her suspension.
• Whether or not such pardon extinguishes the civil liability imposed upon the public officer by the sentence.

• No, an absolute pardon does not entitle the public officer to automatic reinstatement to her former position; a new appointment is necessary. The pardon removes the disqualification from public office, restoring eligibility for appointment, but it does not ipso facto restore the office itself.
• No, the petitioner is not entitled to backpay for lost earnings and benefits. Pardon looks to the future and does not make amends for past suffering or losses.
• No, the pardon does not extinguish the civil liability arising from the crime. Civil liability subsists and can only be extinguished by causes recognized in the Civil Code, not by pardon, amnesty, or commutation of sentence.
• The Court affirmed the resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., holding that petitioner Monsanto must secure a new appointment and remains liable for the civil indemnity.
• The Court clarified that while pardon remits penal consequences, it does not blot out the guilt or the fact of conviction. It does not erase the moral stain or the historical fact of the commission of the crime.
• The acceptance of a pardon while an appeal is pending is deemed an abandonment of the appeal, and the unreversed conviction assumes the character of finality.

• Nature and Effects of Pardon — Pardon is an act of grace that exempts an individual from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime committed. The Court adopted a more realistic approach, rejecting the Ex Parte Garland view that pardon "blots out of existence the guilt." Pardon implies guilt, forgives, but does not forget. It does not erase the fact of conviction or the moral stain. It was applied to clarify that while Monsanto's pardon removed penal disabilities, it did not make her "innocent" or automatically restore her to office.
• Accessory Penalties — These are penalties that are inherent in and follow the principal penalty. For prision mayor, these include temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from suffrage. For prision correccional, suspension from public office is an accessory penalty. The Court noted that even if the principal penalty is pardoned, accessory penalties remain unless expressly remitted. However, it ultimately held that the pardon removed the disqualification aspect, making Monsanto eligible for reappointment.
• Civil Liability Arising from Crime — This refers to the obligation to make restitution or reparation for the damage caused by a criminal act. The Court stated that this liability is governed by the Revised Penal Code and subsists notwithstanding pardon, amnesty, or commutation of sentence. It can only be extinguished by causes recognized in the Civil Code. Applied here, Monsanto remained liable for the P4,892.50 indemnity despite the pardon.
• Public Office as a Public Trust — This principle underscores that public offices are for the collective benefit, not private interests. The Court invoked this to support the view that automatic reinstatement after a pardon for a crime involving breach of trust would be untenable. The appointing power must be able to assess the pardonee's character and suitability.
• Presidential Pardoning Power — The power of the Chief Executive to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons. The Court acknowledged this power but focused on interpreting its legal effects, stating that while broad, it does not automatically restore forfeited office or extinguish civil liability without express provisions or in contravention of established legal principles. The 1973 Constitution (applicable at the time of pardon) allowed pardon even before final conviction, unlike the 1987 Constitution.

• "While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness."
• "To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable."
• "Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence."
• "While we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a pardon, being presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent."

• Pelobello v. Palatino (72 Phil. 441) — Cited as reiterating the broad view from Cristobal v. Labrador that an absolute pardon blots out the crime and removes all disabilities. The Court in Monsanto moves away from the sweeping generalizations of this older view, particularly the Ex Parte Garland influence.
• Cristobal v. Labrador (G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940) — Referenced for its broad view on the effects of pardon, suggesting it removes all disabilities. Monsanto critiques this expansive interpretation.
• Ex Parte Garland (4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366) — Identified as the source of the doctrine that pardon "blots out of existence the guilt." The Monsanto decision explicitly states that the modern trend of authorities rejects the "unduly broad language" of Garland and adopts a more "realistic approach."
• Miranda v. Imperial (77 Phil. 1966) — Cited by the Office of the President as a juridical guide supporting the view that acquittal, not pardon, is the ground for reinstatement and entitlement to back salaries.
• People v. Lising (Crim. Case No. 6675, Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, October 4, 1985) — Also cited by the Office of the President to support the argument that acquittal is necessary for reinstatement.
• State v. Hazzard (247 P. 957) — Quoted for its strong observation that pardons do not necessarily imply innocence and cannot erase the stain of bad character fixed by conviction.
• Illinois C.R. Co. v. Bosworth (133 U.S. 92) — Cited in support of the principle that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office, although it restores eligibility.

• Revised Penal Code, Article 36 (Pardon; its effects) — States that a pardon shall not restore the right to hold public office or suffrage unless expressly restored by the pardon, and shall not exempt the culprit from civil indemnity. The Court's ruling aligns with the non-exemption from civil liability and implies that even if "full civil and political rights" are restored, specific reinstatement to office is not automatic.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 40 (Death - Its accessory penalties) — Mentioned in Justice Feliciano's concurring opinion to show that accessory penalties like perpetual absolute disqualification remain unless expressly remitted in the pardon.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 41 (Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal - Their accessory penalties) — Mentioned in Justice Feliciano's concurring opinion regarding civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification, which subsist despite pardon unless expressly remitted.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 42 (Prision mayor - Its accessory penalties) — States that prision mayor carries temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, which remain unless expressly remitted by pardon. This was relevant as petitioner was sentenced to prision mayor as maximum.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 43 (Prision correccional - Its accessory penalties) — States that prision correccional carries suspension from public office and perpetual special disqualification from suffrage (if imprisonment exceeds 18 months), which remain unless expressly remitted by pardon. This was relevant as petitioner was sentenced to prision correccional as minimum.
• Revised Penal Code, Articles 112-113 (Extinguishment of Civil Liability) — Referenced implicitly when the Court stated that civil liability may only be extinguished by causes recognized in the Civil Code (payment, loss of thing due, remission, etc.), not by pardon.
• 1973 Constitution, Article VII, Section 11 (Pardoning Power) — The provision governing the President's pardoning power at the time of the pardon, which allowed clemency even before final conviction. The Court noted this but stated it was not material to the outcome regarding reinstatement.

• Justice Padilla — Concurred in the result but on different grounds. He emphasized Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, arguing that a pardon does not restore the right to hold public office unless expressly stated in the pardon. Since the pardon granted to Monsanto, while restoring "full civil and political rights," did not expressly restore the right to hold public office, she was not entitled to it. He advocated for a modification of prior jurisprudence if it suggested an absolute pardon automatically includes the right to hold public office, stressing that such restoration must be explicit.
• Justice Feliciano — Concurred in the result and joined Justice Padilla's separate opinion, adding further clarification. He highlighted that Article 36 and Articles 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code consistently require express remission of accessory penalties (like disqualification from public office or suffrage) in the pardon itself. He argued that the standard printed form of pardon restoring "full civil and political rights" was insufficient to expressly restore the specific right to hold public office. He submitted that these RPC provisions are not unconstitutional restrictions on the pardoning power but reasonable requirements for explicitness, especially concerning public trust. Thus, the pardon was ineffective to restore Monsanto's right to hold public office.