The Court established a new three-part test for obscenity: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Court also held that "contemporary community standards" are those of the local or state community, not a national standard.

The case arose from a re-examination by the Supreme Court of the standards for regulating obscenity, an area that had caused significant legal difficulty and a lack of consistent majority opinions in previous cases. The Court sought to provide more concrete guidelines for states to regulate pornographic materials, particularly when disseminated to unwilling recipients or juveniles, while still protecting First Amendment rights for serious expression.

• Appellant Marvin Miller conducted a mass mailing campaign to advertise the sale of "adult" material, specifically illustrated books.
• Five unsolicited advertising brochures were sent in an envelope to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California.
• The restaurant manager and his mother opened the envelope, had not requested the brochures, and complained to the police.
• The brochures advertised four books ("Intercourse," "Man-Woman," "Sex Orgies Illustrated," "An Illustrated History of Pornography") and a film ("Marital Intercourse").
• The brochures primarily consisted of explicit pictures and drawings of men and women, individually and in groups, engaged in various sexual activities, with genitals prominently displayed.
• Miller was convicted of violating California Penal Code § 311.2(a) for knowingly distributing obscene matter.
• The trial court instructed the jury to evaluate the materials by the contemporary community standards of California, based on the then-existing California statute which incorporated elements of the Memoirs v. Massachusetts test.

• Appellant (Miller) contended that the application of state, rather than national, contemporary community standards violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
• Appellant argued that the California obscenity statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
• Appellant implicitly relied on the "utterly without redeeming social value" test from Memoirs v. Massachusetts as the standard for obscenity.
• Appellant argued that a prior dismissal of a prosecution in Los Angeles County based on the same brochures collaterally estopped the current prosecution (a "double jeopardy" claim).
• Appellant argued that adherence to a "national standard" is necessary to avoid unconscionable burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce.

• Respondent (State of California) argued that the state has a legitimate interest in regulating the distribution of obscene material.
• Respondent contended that the jury was correctly instructed to apply contemporary community standards of the State of California.
• Respondent asserted that the California obscenity statute, as applied, was constitutional.
• Respondent contended that the "double jeopardy" or collateral estoppel claim was improperly pleaded at trial, waived under California law, and that the prior dismissal was based on different circumstances or a failure of proof not present in this case.

• Whether state statutes regulating obscene material must be based on a "national standard" of "contemporary community standards" or if state/local standards are permissible.
• What is the appropriate constitutional standard for determining whether material is obscene and therefore unprotected by the First Amendment?
• Whether the "utterly without redeeming social value" test from Memoirs v. Massachusetts remains the constitutional standard for obscenity.
• Whether the California obscenity statute, under which the appellant was convicted, was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.

• The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the newly established First Amendment standards.
• The Court held that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.
• The Court rejected the "utterly without redeeming social value" test articulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts as a constitutional standard.
• The Court established a new three-part test for obscenity: (a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
• The Court ruled that the "contemporary community standards" to be applied by the trier of fact are those of the forum community (state or local), not a uniform national standard.
• The Court provided examples of what a state statute could define for regulation: patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts (normal or perverted, actual or simulated) and patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
• The Court determined that the California statute could be construed in accordance with these new standards and remanded for such consideration.

• First Amendment Protection of Speech and Press — The principle that the government cannot abridge the freedom of speech or of the press. The Court reaffirmed that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.
• Obscenity Doctrine — The legal concept that certain types of expression, deemed "obscene," fall outside the protection of the First Amendment and can be regulated by the state. The Court reformulated the test for obscenity, moving away from the Memoirs test.
• Contemporary Community Standards — A standard used in obscenity law to gauge whether material appeals to the prurient interest and is patently offensive. The Court clarified this refers to state or local community standards, not a national standard, for questions of prurient appeal and patent offensiveness.
• Police Power of the States — The inherent authority of state governments to enact laws and regulations to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens. The Court affirmed the States' legitimate interest in prohibiting the dissemination of obscene material under their police power.
• Vagueness Doctrine (Due Process) — The principle that a criminal law must define the prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The Court stated its new test provides fair notice.
• Overbreadth Doctrine — The principle that a law is unconstitutional if it prohibits not only unprotected speech but also substantially chills or punishes constitutionally protected speech. The new test aims to limit regulation to "hard core" pornography, thus avoiding overbreadth.
• Independent Appellate Review — The power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims, particularly in First Amendment cases, to ensure that protected expression is not suppressed. The Court noted this remains a safeguard.

• "We hold that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press." (Quoting Roth)
• "The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
• "We do not adopt as a constitutional standard the 'utterly without redeeming social value' test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts..."
• "It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York City."
• "The First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent."

• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) — Reaffirmed for its holding that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. The Miller test's first prong (appeal to prurient interest under contemporary community standards) is derived from Roth.
• Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) — Explicitly rejected its "utterly without redeeming social value" test as a constitutional standard, finding it unworkable and having never commanded a majority of the Court.
• Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) — Referenced for its discussion on "national standards" (which Miller rejects for prurient appeal and patent offensiveness) and Justice Stewart's famous "I know it when I see it" concurrence regarding "hard-core pornography."
• Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972) — Cited for the proposition that obscene material is unprotected and for the "average person, applying contemporary community standards" language.
• Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) — Referenced in the context of states' power to regulate material for juveniles and for providing fair notice of prohibited conduct.
• Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968) — Cited for Justice Harlan's description of the "intractable obscenity problem" and the lack of agreement on standards.
• Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) — The Court stated it was abandoning the "casual practice" of Redrup (summarily reversing obscenity convictions where at least five Justices, applying their separate tests, found material protected), now that a majority agreed on concrete guidelines.
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) — Cited in Roth and referenced by Miller for the principle that certain classes of speech, including "the lewd and obscene," are not essential to the exposition of ideas and are of such slight social value that they do not raise constitutional problems.

• First Amendment, U.S. Constitution — The Court's entire analysis revolves around the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment to speech and press, concluding that obscenity falls outside this protection.
• Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Constitution — Makes the First Amendment applicable to the States. The Court's ruling defines the limits of state power to regulate obscenity under this framework.
• California Penal Code § 311.2(a) — The specific California statute under which Miller was convicted for knowingly distributing obscene matter. The Court's decision effectively required this statute (and others like it) to be interpreted or modified to align with the new three-prong test.
• California Penal Code § 311 (Definitions) — The California statute defining "obscene" at the time, which approximated the Memoirs test. The Court noted the trial was conducted under this framework but established new federal constitutional standards.
• Oregon Laws 1971, c. 743, Art. 29, §§ 255-262 — Cited as an example of a state law directed at the depiction of defined physical conduct, as part of the Court's guidance on how states could define "sexual conduct" under the new test.
• Hawaii Penal Code, Tit. 37, §§ 1210-1216 — Also cited as an example of a state law directed at the depiction of defined physical conduct for state regulation.

• Justice Douglas — Argued that "obscenity" is not mentioned in the Constitution or Bill of Rights and that the First Amendment allows no exception for it. He contended that defining obscenity involves subjective tastes and standards of literature, making any legal definition a trap, akin to an ex post facto law. Douglas proposed that no criminal prosecution for obscenity should be sustained until a civil proceeding has declared the specific material obscene, thus providing fair warning. He further argued against any government power to ban "offensive" publications, viewing it as censorship.
• Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall) — Referencing his dissent in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, Justice Brennan argued that the California statute (§311.2) under which Miller was prosecuted was unconstitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. He stated that the Court's attempt to formulate new standards for obscenity would not solve the inherent problems and vagueness that have plagued obscenity law, and that such statutes unduly chill protected expression. He would reverse the judgment and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with his view that the statute is facially unconstitutional.