Mendoza-Arce vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)

A Clerk of Court who prepares a Letter of Administration strictly in accordance with the Manual for Clerks of Court and the dispositive portion of judicial orders, even if the document is technically incomplete for failing to mention a lease agreement referenced only in the body of the order, does not commit violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (absent manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross negligence) nor falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (absent criminal intent or mens rea), as the performance of such ministerial duties does not constitute a corrupt practice or willful falsification.

The case arose from a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, where intense sibling rivalry existed between Santiago B. Villaruz (the original administrator who was removed for neglect of duties) and his brother Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. (the subsequently appointed administrator). The dispute centered on the administration of nipa lands that were subject to a lease agreement in favor of Santiago, which was recognized by the trial court in the body of its orders but not incorporated in the dispositive portions.

• Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz was one of the oppositors in Special Proceeding Case No. V-6433 for the settlement of the estate of his mother, Remedios Bermejo-Villaruz, pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City.
• Santiago was originally appointed administrator of the estate but was removed by the RTC on June 10, 1998, for patent neglect of legal duties and failure to comply with court orders.
• In his place, his eldest brother Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. was appointed regular administrator upon filing and approval of an administrator's bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
• Nicolas filed a motion for approval of his bond on July 1, 1998, which Santiago and his brother Jose Ma. Villaruz opposed, praying instead for the appointment of Jose Maria as administrator.
• The opposition attached a certification dated August 31, 1988, executed by the decedent Remedios authorizing Santiago to manage nipa lands for 20 years or during her lifetime, and an agreement dated February 6, 1993, among the three children agreeing to honor the lease until August 23, 2008.
• In an order dated September 22, 1998, Judge Roger B. Patricio denied the opposition but held action on the bond approval in abeyance pending submission of an updated certification from the Supreme Court regarding the surety company's liabilities.
• The case was reassigned to Branch 19 of the RTC, presided over by Judge Sergio Pestaño.
• On October 12, 1998, Judge Pestaño issued an order approving the administrator's bond of Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr., after receiving certification that the surety company had no pending obligations to the government.
• Petitioner Susan Mendoza-Arce, Clerk of Court VI of the RTC Roxas City, prepared a Letter of Administration (LOA) dated October 16, 1998, based on the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court.
• The LOA stated that Nicolas B. Villaruz, Jr. had been appointed administrator by Judge Pestaño on October 12, 1998, with "full authority to take possession of all property/ies of said deceased."
• On December 7, 1998, Nicolas took possession of the entire estate, including the nipa lands leased to Santiago, accompanied by armed security guards and the deputy sheriff.
• In a letter-complaint dated March 25, 1999, Santiago alleged that petitioner committed falsification under Article 171, paragraph 3 of the RPC and violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by falsely attributing to Judge Pestaño the appointment of Nicolas and by causing undue injury to him through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
• Graft Investigation Officer Ricardo A. Rebollido issued a resolution dated April 20, 2001, finding a prima facie case against petitioner for both offenses, alleging she should have read the order recognizing the lease agreement.
• Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 29, 2001, prompting the filing of the instant petition for certiorari.

• Petitioner argued that she acted in compliance with the order of Presiding Judge Sergio Pestaño and merely adopted the legal form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court approved by the Supreme Court.
• She contended that her official duties as Clerk of Court were ministerial in nature and devoid of any bad faith or manifest partiality.
• She pointed out that neither the order dated June 10, 1998, nor the order dated September 22, 1998, mentioned the lease of nipa lands in their dispositive portions, and that she could not be guilty of the offenses charged as she was merely discharging her official functions in accordance with the dispositive portions of the orders.

• Respondent Santiago B. Villaruz argued that legal forms are mere guidelines in the preparation of legal documents and that petitioner usurped the functions of the branch clerk of court when she issued the LOA.
• He maintained that petitioner acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence by falsely attributing to Judge Pestaño the appointment of Nicolas as administrator and investing him with full authority to take possession of all properties, when it was actually Judge Patricio who appointed Nicolas subject to the terms of the lease agreement in favor of Santiago.
• He claimed that he suffered undue injury in the form of lost income and deprivation of bancas and boats used in his business as a result of the issuance of the LOA.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, despite the provision in Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that petitions relating to acts of quasi-judicial agencies should be filed in the Court of Appeals.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding a prima facie case for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against the petitioner.
  • Whether the Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding a prima facie case for falsification under Article 171, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is alleged, following the rulings in Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario and Kuizon v. Desierto.
  • While appeals from orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are cognizable by the Court of Appeals, special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65 to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution in criminal cases may be filed directly in the Supreme Court.
• Substantive:
  • The Office of the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the filing of informations against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3(e), despite the absence of probable cause.
  • The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are: (1) the accused are public officers; (2) they committed prohibited acts during performance of official duties; (3) they caused undue injury to any party; (4) they gave unwarranted benefits to private parties; and (5) they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
  • Petitioner performed a ministerial duty in preparing the LOA based on the dispositive portions of the orders dated September 22, 1998, and October 12, 1998, and merely copied substantially the form prescribed in the Manual for Clerks of Court.
  • There is no basis for finding that petitioner acted with "partiality" (bias that excites a disposition to see matters as wished rather than as they are), "bad faith" (dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing), or "gross negligence" (want of even slight care, acting willfully with conscious indifference).
  • The LOA may be inaccurate for lack of reference to the lease agreement, but this does not establish gross negligence or corrupt motive, especially since petitioner used phrases prescribed by the Supreme Court in the Manual rather than her own words.
  • The Ombudsman also acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding prima facie case for falsification under Article 171, paragraph 3 of the RPC.
  • Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification.
  • There is no reasonable ground to believe criminal intent was present; petitioner prepared the LOA on the basis of Judge Pestaño's order dated October 12, 1998, approving the administrator's bond, and by such approval, Nicolas qualified as administrator, making the statement in the LOA correct in substance.
  • There was nothing willful or felonious in petitioner's act warranting prosecution for falsification.

• Exceptions to Non-Interference in Preliminary Investigations — While the general rule is non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, exceptions exist when: (1) necessary to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights of the accused; (2) necessary for orderly administration of justice; (3) prejudicial question is sub judice; (4) acts of officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) prosecution is under invalid law; (6) double jeopardy is apparent; (7) court has no jurisdiction; (8) persecution rather than prosecution; (9) charges are manifestly false; and (10) there is clearly no prima facie case and motion to quash has been denied. In this case, the tenth exception applied.
• Ministerial Nature of Clerk of Court Duties — The Manual for Clerks of Court describes the clerk of court as an officer of the court and public officer whose office is essentially ministerial, not judicial. A clerk who prepares documents based on prescribed forms and the dispositive portions of court orders acts in a ministerial capacity and cannot be held liable for falsification or graft absent criminal intent or bad faith.
• Criminal Intent in Falsification — In felonies committed by means of dolo (deceit) such as falsification under Article 171 of the RPC, criminal intent or mens rea must be proven. The mere inaccuracy in a document prepared in good faith based on judicial orders does not constitute falsification.
• Elements of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 — The offense requires proof of: (1) public officer status; (2) commission of prohibited acts during official duties; (3) causing undue injury to any party; (4) giving unwarranted benefits to private parties; and (5) acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. All elements must be proven.
• Definitions of Mental States in Anti-Graft Law — "Manifest partiality" means bias that excites a disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are; "evident bad faith" means not merely bad judgment or negligence but dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing amounting to fraud; "gross inexcusable negligence" means negligence characterized by want of even slight care, acting willfully and intentionally with conscious indifference to consequences.

• "The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined. But as has been held, infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution."
• "The Manual for Clerks of Court describes the clerk of court as 'an officer of the Court, a public officer, and an "officer of the law," [although] the position is not that of a judicial officer, nor is it synonymous with the Court. . . . The office is essentially a ministerial one.'"
• "Criminal intent must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification."
• "These elements must all be proven." (referring to the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019)

• Tirol, Jr. v. del Rosario — Cited for the rule that although appeals from orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are cognizable by the Court of Appeals, special civil actions of certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed in the Supreme Court to set aside the Ombudsman's order or resolution in criminal cases where grave abuse of discretion is alleged.
• Fabian v. Desierto — Referenced as the case which held that appeals from orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
• Kuizon v. Desierto — Cited to establish that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal cases.
• Posadas v. Ombudsman — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule of non-interference in preliminary investigations, and for the principle that criminal prosecution may be enjoined when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused.
• Bunye v. Sandiganbayan, Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, Ponce de Leon v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
• Avila, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, Fernando v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the requirement that all elements of the offense must be proven.
• Fonacier v. Sandiganbayan, Alejandro v. People — Cited for the definitions of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence.

• Rule 65, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provision stating that petitions for certiorari involving acts of quasi-judicial agencies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals, which respondent invoked to challenge the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
• Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — The provision penalizing public officers who cause undue injury or give unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.
• Article 171, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code — The provision penalizing falsification by public officers through attributing to persons who participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.
• Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules of Court — Defines probable cause as such facts and circumstances as would engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
• Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code — Defines felonies as acts or omissions punishable by law, committed by means of dolo (deceit) or culpa (fault), cited to emphasize the requirement of criminal intent in dolo offenses like falsification.