Maquilan vs. Maquilan

A Compromise Agreement effecting a partial voluntary separation of property between spouses is valid and binding even if one spouse has been convicted of adultery, as the penalty for adultery (prision correccional) does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction or automatic forfeiture of property rights absent a specific decree of legal separation or nullity requiring such forfeiture; furthermore, the participation of the Solicitor General is not a prerequisite for the validity of a property settlement that does not compromise the validity of the marriage bond.

The case stems from a marital dispute between Virgilio and Dita Maquilan. After Virgilio discovered Dita having an illicit affair, he filed a criminal case for adultery, resulting in the conviction of Dita and her paramour. Subsequently, Dita filed a civil case for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage based on psychological incapacity. During the pre-trial of this civil case, the spouses executed a Compromise Agreement to divide their assets, which the trial court approved. Virgilio later attempted to repudiate this agreement, leading to the current legal battle.

• Virgilio and Dita Maquilan were married and had a son, but the marriage deteriorated when Virgilio discovered Dita's affair with a paramour.
• Virgilio filed a case for adultery, resulting in the conviction of Dita and her paramour, who were sentenced to imprisonment ranging from one year and eight months to three years, six months, and twenty-one days.
• On June 15, 2001, Dita filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the RTC, alleging psychological incapacity.
• During the pre-trial of the nullity case, the spouses entered into a Compromise Agreement to partially settle their conjugal partnership of gains, agreeing to divide bank deposits, vehicles, and a store, and allocating the house and lot to their common child.
• The RTC approved this agreement in a Judgment on Compromise Agreement dated January 11, 2002 (erroneously dated Jan 2 in one instance).
• Virgilio subsequently hired a new lawyer and filed an Omnibus Motion to repudiate the Compromise Agreement, claiming his previous counsel failed to explain its legal effects and that the agreement was void due to Dita's conviction.
• The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
• Virgilio elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via Certiorari and Prohibition, but the CA dismissed the petition, ruling that the conviction for adultery did not disqualify Dita from property rights and that the agreement was valid.

• The Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law prohibiting a spouse convicted of adultery from sharing in the conjugal property.
• Dita's share in the conjugal partnership should be forfeited in favor of their common child pursuant to Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.
• The Compromise Agreement is void under Article 2035 of the Civil Code because adultery is a ground for legal separation.
• The proceedings approving the agreement were null and void due to the absence and lack of participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor.
• Petitioner's consent to the agreement was vitiated because his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously inform him of the consequential legal effects.
• Dita is disqualified from sharing in the property because her conviction constitutes civil interdiction.

• A conviction for adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction, meaning Dita retains her right to manage and dispose of property.
• Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code regarding forfeiture of property shares are inapplicable because there is no decree of legal separation or nullity of marriage based on the specific grounds requiring forfeiture.
• The Compromise Agreement is a valid voluntary separation of property under the Family Code and does not touch upon the validity of the marriage or grounds for legal separation prohibited by Article 2035 of the Civil Code.
• The presence of the Solicitor General is not indispensable for the validity of a compromise agreement regarding property, as its purpose is to prevent collusion regarding the marriage bond, which is not at issue in the property settlement.
• The agreement was written in simple language, and the petitioner cannot disown it simply due to a change of mind or alleged negligence of previous counsel.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the proceedings approving the Compromise Agreement were void due to the absence of the Solicitor General or Provincial Prosecutor.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a spouse convicted of adultery is disqualified from sharing in the conjugal partnership of gains.
  • Whether the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, specifically regarding the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share and the prohibition on compromise regarding grounds for legal separation.
  • Whether the petitioner can repudiate the agreement based on the alleged negligence of his previous counsel.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that the failure of the Solicitor General or Public Prosecutor to appear did not nullify the Compromise Agreement. The purpose of their participation is to prevent collusion regarding the validity of the marriage; since the agreement strictly concerned the separation of property and did not touch the merits of the marriage nullity case, there was no risk of fabricated evidence or collusion that the State needed to prevent.
• Substantive:
  • The Court held that Dita was not disqualified from sharing in the conjugal property because the penalty for adultery (prision correccional) does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction. Therefore, she retained her rights to manage and dispose of her property.
  • The Court declared the Compromise Agreement valid as a voluntary separation of property under Article 143 of the Family Code. Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code were deemed inapplicable because no decree of legal separation or nullity based on bad faith in a subsequent marriage had been issued.
  • The Court ruled that the petitioner could not repudiate the agreement based on his counsel's alleged negligence. The agreement was written in simple language, and the negligence of counsel binds the client unless it amounts to gross negligence depriving the client of due process, which was not proven in this case.

• Civil Interdiction — A legal penalty that deprives an offender of rights such as parental authority, marital authority, and the right to manage or dispose of property inter vivos. The Court applied this to clarify that the crime of adultery (punished by prision correccional) does not carry this accessory penalty, unlike crimes punished by reclusion temporal or higher.
• Voluntary Separation of Property — A regime under the Family Code (Article 143) allowing spouses to separate their property holdings voluntarily, subject to judicial approval. The Court used this to validate the Compromise Agreement as a legitimate exercise of the spouses' rights, distinct from the issue of the marriage's validity.
• Binding Nature of Counsel's Negligence — The principle that a client is bound by the mistakes or negligence of their lawyer in procedural matters. The Court applied this to reject the petitioner's attempt to annul the agreement, stating that he could not disown the settlement due to a change of mind or his lawyer's alleged failure to explain the effects, absent gross negligence.
• Role of the Solicitor General in Marriage Cases — The mandate for the State prosecutor to intervene in annulment/nullity cases to prevent collusion. The Court interpreted this as applicable to the status of the marriage itself, not to ancillary property compromises where no collusion on the marital bond is involved.

• "The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction."
• "Mistake or vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be evident."
• "The compromise agreement pertains merely to an agreement between the petitioner and the private respondent to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage."

• Salonga v. Court of Appeals — Cited to affirm the rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client and that a mistake by a lawyer regarding the legal effects of a compromise does not invalidate the judgment unless it results in the outright deprivation of property through a technicality or gross denial of due process.
• Republic v. Cuison-Melgar — Cited to reinforce the purpose of the Solicitor General's participation in marriage cases, which is specifically to prevent collusion between parties and ensure evidence is not fabricated.

• Family Code, Article 43(2) — Cited by petitioner to argue for forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share; the Court ruled it applies to the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, not the present case.
• Family Code, Article 63(2) — Cited by petitioner regarding forfeiture of profits in legal separation; the Court ruled it inapplicable as there was no decree of legal separation.
• Family Code, Article 143 — Cited by the Court to support the validity of voluntary separation of property for sufficient cause subject to judicial approval.
• Civil Code, Article 2035 — Cited by petitioner to argue that compromise on grounds for legal separation is void; the Court ruled the agreement was on property division, not on the grounds for separation/nullity.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 34 — Cited to define the effects of Civil Interdiction (loss of property rights), which the Court ruled did not apply to the respondent.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 333 — Cited to establish the penalty for adultery as prision correccional.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 43 — Cited to list the accessory penalties of prision correccional, showing that civil interdiction is not among them.
• Rules of Court, Rule 9, Section 3(e) — Cited regarding the court's duty to order the prosecutor to investigate collusion in default situations in marriage cases.