Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals

A trial court judgment granting legal separation is final and appealable immediately upon issuance, even if it reserves the actual liquidation and division of conjugal properties for a later supplemental decision, because the dissolution of the property regime is a mandatory legal consequence of the decree under Article 106 of the Civil Code and the partition is merely incidental to the main judgment.

Antonio and Filomena Macadangdang married in 1946 and amassed significant wealth through various businesses in Davao. They separated in 1965 following the deterioration of their relationship and allegations of Antonio's illicit affairs. In 1971, Filomena filed a complaint for legal separation. The trial court granted the separation in 1973 but did not immediately divide the property due to the lack of an inventory, reserving this for a later decision. Antonio did not appeal this initial decision but later contested the court's jurisdiction to appoint an administrator, claiming the main case was not yet final.

• Antonio and Filomena Macadangdang married in 1946 and established a successful business empire in Davao, including merchandising, transportation, and real estate.
• The spouses separated in 1965; Filomena returned to Davao in 1971 and discovered Antonio's extramarital affairs.
• Filomena filed a complaint for legal separation (Civil Case No. 109) on April 28, 1971.
• On January 4, 1973, the Court of First Instance (CFI) rendered a decision granting legal separation and ordering Antonio to pay support, but the court reserved the division of the conjugal assets for a "supplemental decision" because a complete inventory was not yet available.
• Antonio did not appeal the January 4, 1973 decision within the 30-day reglementary period.
• Filomena subsequently filed motions for the appointment of an administrator to protect the conjugal assets from dissipation.
• The CFI issued orders in September and October 1973 directing the submission of names for an administrator.
• Antonio opposed these orders and filed a petition for certiorari, claiming the January 4, 1973 decision was an "incomplete judgment" and thus interlocutory, meaning the court could not yet proceed to execution or administration.
• The Court of Appeals ruled that the January 4 decision was final and valid.
• Antonio appealed to the Supreme Court but died on November 30, 1979, while the case was pending.

• The decision of January 4, 1973, was an "incomplete judgment" because it failed to resolve all issues, specifically the division of the conjugal partnership assets.
• Because the judgment was incomplete, it was interlocutory and could not become final and executory until the supplemental decision on property division was rendered.
• The appointment of an administrator was improper because the main case had not been fully disposed of.
• The petitioner's death on November 30, 1979, rendered the case and the civil action moot and academic.

• The January 4, 1973 decision became final and executory when the petitioner failed to appeal within the reglementary period of 30 days.
• The non-issuance of a supplemental decision regarding the specific division of properties did not prevent the decree of legal separation from becoming final.
• The appointment of an administrator was a necessary and proper exercise of the court's discretion to protect the properties pending their actual division.
• While the petitioner's death is an intervening circumstance, the legal separation decree remains valid and binding.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the death of the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal rendered the petition moot and academic.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether a trial court decision granting legal separation but reserving the division of conjugal property for a supplemental decision is a final and executory judgment or merely an interlocutory order.

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that the death of the petitioner did not render the legal issues moot. Due to the public policy implications and the need to settle the status of the properties, the Court resolved the issue of finality. However, the Court noted that with the petitioner's death, the actual distribution of the remaining estate would now be governed by the laws of intestate succession in the pending Special Proceedings No. 134.
• Substantive:
  • The Court ruled that the January 4, 1973 decision was a final and appealable judgment. Under Article 106 of the Civil Code, the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership are automatic consequences of a final decree of legal separation. The division of property is merely an incident to the judgment. Therefore, the failure of the petitioner to appeal the separation decree within the reglementary period made it final and executory. The Court explicitly abandoned the doctrine in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso (which held that judgments requiring accounting were interlocutory) and affirmed the rule that such judgments are final and appealable.

• Finality of Judgments with Accounting/Division — A judgment that determines the rights of the parties (such as granting legal separation or recovery of property) is final and appealable even if it orders a subsequent accounting or division of property. The accounting or partition is considered a mere incident to the execution of the judgment, not a barrier to its finality.
• Effects of Legal Separation (Article 106, Civil Code) — The decree of legal separation automatically mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains. This effect is ipso facto and does not require the property division to be completed within the same decision for the decree of separation to be final.

• "Imperative and controlling considerations of public policy and of sound practice in the courts... militate against such a novel and unprecedented situation where a judgment on the merits for recovery of properties would be left dangling and would be considered as 'interlocutory' and subject to revision and alteration at will for as long as the accounting ordered as a mere incident... has not been rendered."
• "Legal problems do not cease simply because one of the parties dies; the same problems may come up again in another case of similar magnitude."

• Miranda vs. Court of Appeals — Cited as the controlling precedent which declared that judgments for recovery with accounting are final and appealable without waiting for the accounting to be completed.
• Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso — The previous doctrine explicitly abandoned by the Court in this decision; it had held that decisions requiring accounting were interlocutory and not appealable.
• H.E. Heacock Co. vs. American Trading Co. — Cited to support the "better rule" that where the primary purpose is to determine ownership or rights, the judgment is final on the merits, and accounting is merely incidental.

• Civil Code, Article 106 — Provides that the decree of legal separation shall have the effect of dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains.
• Civil Code, Article 176 — Referenced regarding the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the partnership profits, though the Court noted this might be affected by the source of the property.
• Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 4 — Referenced in the context of execution of judgments and how accounting may proceed during an appeal.

• Justice Teehankee — Concurred in the result but observed that with the petitioner's death, the forfeiture of profits under Article 106 might be moot or inapplicable depending on the source of the assets (Article 176). He suggested that proceeding directly with the intestate settlement would be more efficacious than continuing the legal separation property division, as the wife and children are the forced heirs regardless.