Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals

A person who was not subjected to actual restraint or deprivation of liberty during an attempted warrantless arrest is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation under Section 3, Rule 112, and not merely an inquest under Section 7; however, the filing of charges and the issuance of a valid warrant of arrest against a person who was initially detained illegally will cure the defect of that detention and deny him the right to be released on account of such defect.

The case arose from the abduction of sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong on July 16, 1997 in Cebu City. Marijoy was found dead on July 18, 1997, while Jacqueline remained missing. Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga was subsequently charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The controversy centered on whether he was lawfully arrested without a warrant and whether he was properly accorded his constitutional right to preliminary investigation before the filing of the informations in court.

• Petitioner Francisco Juan Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Crim. Case Nos. CBU-45303 and CBU-45304) pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City, and was detained at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center.
• On September 15, 1997, members of the PNP Criminal Investigation Group (CIG) attempted to arrest petitioner without a warrant at the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City where he was attending classes.
• Petitioner resisted the arrest, contacted his relatives, and sought the assistance of Atty. Raymundo Armovit, who dissuaded the police from proceeding and proposed a meeting at Camp Crame.
• The police yielded and returned to their headquarters; petitioner and his relatives proceeded to the CIG headquarters where Atty. Armovit questioned the legality of the warrantless arrest before CIG Legal Officer Ruben Zacarias.
• After consulting superiors, Zacarias ordered the arrest stopped and allowed petitioner to go home; Atty. Armovit executed a written undertaking that he and petitioner would appear before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997.
• On September 17, 1997, two informations were filed against petitioner; on September 19, 1997, Executive Judge Priscila Agana issued warrants of arrest; and on September 22, 1997, petitioner was arrested by virtue of said warrants.
• On the morning of September 17, 1997, petitioner's counsel appeared before the City Prosecutor demanding a regular preliminary investigation, but the Prosecutor denied the motion, insisting on an inquest investigation scheduled for that afternoon, warning that failure to appear would be treated as a waiver.
• Petitioner and his counsel refused to attend the afternoon inquest to avoid any implication of waiving the right to a regular preliminary investigation.
• On October 14, 1997, petitioner was arraigned before Judge Ocampo but refused to enter a plea because of the pending petition regarding his right to preliminary investigation.

• The petitioner was denied his right to a regular preliminary investigation under Section 3, Rule 112 because he was never lawfully arrested without a warrant, rendering Section 7 of Rule 112 inapplicable.
• There was no valid waiver of the right to preliminary investigation, as the petitioner had vigorously invoked this right from the start of the proceedings; mere failure to appear at the inquest investigation could not be construed as waiver.
• The attempted warrantless arrest on September 15, 1997 was illegal because the crime of kidnapping was not a continuing offense at that time (the victims were already found dead or missing since July 1997), and petitioner was merely attending classes when the police approached him.
• The arraignment on October 14, 1997 did not cure the lack of preliminary investigation because the petitioner refused to enter a plea and had a pending case before the Supreme Court regarding this right.
• The petitioner should be released from detention pending the preliminary investigation because his detention was illegal from the start.
• The venue of the preliminary investigation should be transferred from Cebu City to Manila and conducted by the Office of the State Prosecutor instead of the Cebu City Prosecutor due to extensive prejudicial media coverage in Cebu that allegedly influenced public perception of his guilt.

• The petitioner was lawfully arrested without a warrant because kidnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing crime, bringing his case under Section 7, Rule 112 (inquest investigation) rather than Section 3.
• The petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation by failing to appear before the City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 despite the express warning that such failure would be treated as a waiver.
• The filing of the informations in court and the issuance of the corresponding warrants of arrest by Executive Judge Agana cured whatever defect existed in the petitioner's arrest and detention, citing Sanchez v. Demetriou.
• The petitioner was validly arraigned on October 14, 1997, and the validity of such arraignment was not set aside by the Supreme Court's October 27, 1997 resolution.
• The petitioner is no longer a minor pursuant to R.A. 6809, thus his mother lacked authority to file the petition as his representative.
• Judge Ocampo alleged that petitioner's counsels deliberately withheld from the Supreme Court the omnibus order, supplemental order, and order of arraignment issued on October 14, 1997, thereby misleading the Court into issuing its October 27 resolution ordering the petitioner's release.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to order the change of venue of the preliminary investigation from Cebu City to Manila and to replace the investigating prosecutor.
  • Whether the petition was properly filed by the petitioner's mother given that petitioner may no longer be a minor under R.A. 6809.
  • Whether petitioner's counsels should be sanctioned for allegedly withholding court orders from the Supreme Court.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation under Section 3, Rule 112 or only to an inquest under Section 7, Rule 112.
  • Whether the petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation by failing to appear at the scheduled inquest or by being arraigned.
  • Whether the petitioner should be released from detention pending the preliminary investigation.
  • Whether extensive media coverage justifies changing the venue of the preliminary investigation.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to order the change of venue of the preliminary investigation or to replace the investigating prosecutor, as the holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive Department, not the Judiciary; the petitioner must address such plea to the Department of Justice.
  • The complaint against Attorneys Armovit, Teleron, and Florido is dismissed for lack of concrete evidence to prove that they deliberately withheld the orders with intent to mislead the Court.
  • The objection regarding the petitioner's minority status is moot because the supplemental petition for habeas corpus filed on October 6, 1997 converted the proceeding into a habeas corpus case, which under Section 3, Rule 102 may be filed by the party himself or by some person on his behalf.
• Substantive:
  • The petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation under Section 3, Rule 112 because he was not lawfully arrested without a warrant. An arrest requires actual restraint of the person or submission to custody; the events of September 15, 1997 showed no restraint upon the petitioner nor deprivation of his liberty, as the police yielded to Atty. Armovit's intervention and allowed petitioner to go home.
  • Even assuming there was an arrest, it would still be illegal because the crime of kidnapping was not a continuing offense at that time (the victims were already found dead or missing in July 1997, and there was no showing that petitioner was still detaining anyone in Quezon City in September 1997), and the arrest did not fall under any exception in Section 5, Rule 113.
  • There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation. A waiver must be clear and unequivocal; mere failure to appear at the inquest cannot be construed as waiver when the petitioner had vigorously invoked his right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings. Furthermore, the petitioner did not waive the right by being arraigned because he refused to enter a plea and had a pending case in the Supreme Court regarding this very issue.
  • The petitioner is not entitled to release from detention. The filing of the informations on September 17, 1997, and the issuance of the warrants of arrest on September 19, 1997, cured the defect of his detention. Citing Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Court held that the trial court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner's person by virtue of the valid warrant of arrest, and the absence of a preliminary investigation does not nullify the information or the warrant.
  • The motion to change the venue is denied. Even if the Court had jurisdiction, the petitioner failed to allege and prove that the City Prosecutor was actually affected by the publicity. The test for prejudicial publicity requires allegation and proof that the judges or prosecutors have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right to a fair trial.

• Curing the Defect of Illegal Detention — The filing of charges and the issuance of a corresponding warrant of arrest against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. The subsequent valid warrant of arrest allows the court to lawfully acquire jurisdiction over the person's detention.
• Waiver of Right to Preliminary Investigation — A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due process and cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed. Mere failure to appear or silence, when the right is being vigorously invoked, does not constitute waiver.
• Continuing Crime Doctrine — Kidnapping with illegal detention is considered a continuing crime only where the deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another. It does not apply when the victims have already been found dead or released, and there is no showing that the accused is still detaining anyone at the time of the attempted arrest.
• Actual Restraint Requirement for Arrest — An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is made by an actual restraint of the person or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Without actual restraint or submission, there is no arrest that would trigger the inquest procedure under Section 7, Rule 112.
• Test for Prejudicial Publicity — To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges or prosecutors have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The mere fact of extensive media coverage does not per se prove that the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings have been fatally infected.

• "An arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. An arrest signifies restraint on person, depriving one of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law."
• "A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in clear and unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17, 1997 cannot be construed as a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation, considering that petitioner has been vigorously invoking his right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings before the City Prosecutor."
• "Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed."
• "The filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."
• "The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field."
• "Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of the appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality."

• Sanchez v. Demetriou — Controlling precedent establishing that the filing of charges and issuance of a warrant of arrest cures the defect of an illegal detention and allows the court to lawfully acquire jurisdiction over the person.
• Parulan v. Director of Prisons — Cited by the prosecution but distinguished; established that kidnapping is a continuing crime only where deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from one place to another, which was not the situation in the present case.
• Webb v. De Leon — Applied the test for prejudicial publicity requiring proof of actual prejudice rather than mere possibility.
• Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al. — Established the standard that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be.
• People v. Teehankee — Reinforced that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial and that judges are trained to disregard off-court evidence and publicity.
• Go v. Court of Appeals — Established that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment, which was distinguished in the present case.
• Sanciangco, Jr. v. People — Held that the absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information.
• Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte v. Albano — Cited for the principle that the holding of a preliminary investigation is a function of the Executive Department, not the Judiciary.

• Section 3, Rule 112 — Governs the procedure for regular preliminary investigation, which the Court held was applicable to the petitioner.
• Section 7, Rule 112 — Governs inquest proceedings for persons lawfully arrested without warrant; held inapplicable because there was no lawful warrantless arrest.
• Section 5, Rule 113 — Enumerates the instances when a warrantless arrest is lawful; the attempted arrest did not fall under any of these exceptions.
• Sections 1 and 2, Rule 113 — Define arrest as the taking of a person into custody by actual restraint or submission.
• Section 3, Rule 102 — Provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed by the party for whose relief it is intended or by some person on his behalf, validating the mother's filing of the supplemental petition.
• Article 125, Revised Penal Code — Mentioned in the context of waiver provisions for inquest proceedings.
• R.A. 6809 — The law lowering the age of majority to 18, which the prosecution argued deprived the mother of standing to file the petition.