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# AK747709

Lapuz vs. Eufemio

Carmen Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against her husband, Eufemio, but died in a vehicular accident before the trial could be concluded. Her father attempted to substitute her in the proceedings to pursue the case, arguing that the property rights involved (specifically the forfeiture of the husband's share of profits) should allow the action to survive. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case, ruling that an action for legal separation is purely personal and abates upon the death of the plaintiff, regardless of any property rights involved, as such rights are merely effects of a decree that can no longer be issued.

Primary Holding

An action for legal separation is purely personal in nature and abates upon the death of one of the spouses; it does not survive the death of the plaintiff even if property rights are involved, as those rights are mere effects of a decree of legal separation which cannot be rendered after death has already dissolved the marriage.

Background

The case arose from a marital dispute where the wife sought legal separation due to her husband's abandonment and cohabitation with another woman, while the husband countered that their marriage was void due to his prior existing marriage. The legal proceedings were interrupted when the wife died in a car accident, raising the legal question of whether her heirs could continue the lawsuit to secure the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the forfeiture of the husband's share of the profits.

History

  1. Filed Petition for Legal Separation in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila

  2. Case dismissed by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court due to death of plaintiff

  3. Motion for Reconsideration denied by the lower court

  4. Filed Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court

Facts

  • Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio on August 18, 1953, alleging abandonment and cohabitation with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok.
  • Eufemio filed an answer with a counterclaim seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Carmen ab initio, claiming a prior subsisting marriage to Go Hiok.
  • The trial proceeded, but before Eufemio could present his surrebuttal evidence, Carmen died in a vehicular accident on May 31, 1969.
  • Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition on June 9, 1969, arguing that Carmen's death abated the action for legal separation.
  • Carmen’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased plaintiff with her father, Macario Lapuz, to continue the litigation.
  • The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court dismissed the case on July 29, 1969, ruling that the cause of action did not survive Carmen's death.
  • Carmen's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on September 15, 1969.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • The action for legal separation should not abate because it involves property rights, specifically the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share in the conjugal partnership profits.
  • The husband's counterclaim for a declaration of nullity converted the action into one that can stand independent adjudication and should therefore survive the plaintiff's death.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • The action for legal separation is purely personal and therefore abates upon the death of the plaintiff.
  • The petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code.
  • The counterclaim for nullity was effectively abandoned or acquiesced to when the respondent prayed for the affirmation of the lower court's dismissal order.

Issues

  • Procedural Issues:
    • Whether the death of the plaintiff in an action for legal separation allows for the substitution of parties under the Rules of Court or requires the dismissal of the case.
  • Substantive Issues:
    • Whether an action for legal separation survives the death of the plaintiff when property rights are involved.
    • Whether a counterclaim for declaration of nullity of marriage survives the death of the plaintiff in the context of a legal separation suit.

Ruling

  • Procedural:
    • The Court ruled that substitution of the deceased party under Rule 3, Section 17 of the Rules of Court is not applicable because the claim is extinguished by death. Furthermore, an action for legal separation is not included in the enumeration of actions that survive against an administrator under Rule 87, Section 1.
  • Substantive:
    • The Court held that legal separation is a purely personal action, evidenced by the Civil Code provisions allowing only the innocent spouse to file and permitting reconciliation to stop proceedings. Consequently, the death of one party causes the death of the action (actio personalis moritur cum persona). The Court further ruled that property rights are merely effects of a decree of legal separation; since death prevents the issuance of such a decree, the expectant property rights remain unborn. Regarding the counterclaim for nullity, the Court ruled it became moot and academic because death automatically dissolved the marriage, and any property questions could be resolved in a separate partition or estate proceeding.

Doctrines

  • Actio personalis moritur cum persona — A legal maxim meaning "a personal right of action dies with the person." The Court applied this doctrine to establish that because legal separation is based on the personal relation of the spouses, the action cannot survive the death of either party.
  • Abatement of Action — The principle that a lawsuit may be terminated upon the occurrence of certain events, such as the death of a party. The Court used this to affirm that death settles the question of separation beyond controversy, depriving the court of jurisdiction to continue the suit.

Key Excerpts

  • "Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself – actio personalis moritur cum persona."
  • "A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence."
  • "If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn."

Precedents Cited

  • Bushnell vs. Cooper — Cited to support the proposition that death settles the question of separation beyond all controversy.
  • Wren vs. Moss — Cited as part of the collective jurisprudence establishing that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding before a final decree abates the action.
  • McCurley vs. McCurley — Cited to reinforce the rule that divorce actions are of a personal nature and abate upon death.

Provisions

  • Civil Code, Article 100 — Cited to demonstrate that only the innocent spouse can claim legal separation, proving the action is purely personal.
  • Civil Code, Article 106 — Enumerates the effects of a decree of legal separation, including the dissolution of property; the Court used this to show that property rights are merely consequences of the decree, not independent causes of action.
  • Civil Code, Article 108 — Cited to show that spouses can stop proceedings by reconciliation, further proving the personal nature of the suit.
  • Rules of Court, Rule 3, Section 17 — Governs substitution of parties upon death; the Court ruled this inapplicable because the claim for legal separation is extinguished by death.
  • Rules of Court, Rule 87, Section 1 — Lists actions that survive against an executor or administrator; the Court noted that legal separation is not included in this list.