Junson vs. Martinez

In a month-to-month lease agreement, the lessor may terminate the lease by giving the lessee notice to vacate, and upon expiration of the period after such notice, the lease is deemed terminated, constituting a valid ground for ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877; furthermore, non-compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not jurisdictional and is deemed waived if not raised seasonably in the answer or allowed pleading.

Respondent spouses Antonio and Benedicta Martinez are registered owners of several parcels of land located at E. Jacinto Street, Sangandaan, Kalookan City. Petitioner spouses Emilio and Virginia Junson and Cirila Tan are lessees who erected their respective houses on portions of said land and have been occupying the premises under written lease agreements.

• Respondent spouses Antonio and Benedicta Martinez are the registered owners of several parcels of land located at E. Jacinto Street, Sangandaan, Caloocan City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. C-37014, C-48916, C-39002, and C-37015.
• Petitioner spouses Emilio and Virginia Junson are lessees of a portion of the land at 117 E. Jacinto Street where they erected their house.
• Petitioner Cirila Tan is a lessee of a portion of the land at 135 E. Jacinto Street where she erected her house.
• On June 21, 1985, Benedicta Martinez separately entered into written lease agreements with petitioner spouses Junson and Cirila Tan, allowing them to continue leasing on a month-to-month basis with a stipulation that either party may terminate the agreement upon three months' notice.
• In March 1988, respondents notified Cirila Tan that they needed the land for their own use, gave her three months to vacate rent-free, and stopped collecting rentals from her.
• In May 1988, respondents gave a similar notice to petitioner spouses Junson and stopped collecting rentals from them beginning June 1988.
• Despite the notices, petitioners failed to vacate the property and instead paid their respective rentals by depositing the same in a bank account in the name of respondent Benedicta Martinez.
• On July 18, 1994, petitioners filed petitions for consignation with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City and deposited their rentals with the court.
• Respondents brought the matter to the barangay lupon for conciliation, and after the parties failed to settle their dispute, respondents filed unlawful detainer cases against petitioners.
• The consignation cases filed by petitioners and the unlawful detainer cases filed by respondents were consolidated in the MeTC.

• The RTC erred in finding that petitioners' lease contracts were terminated on or about May 1988 (for the Junsons) and March 1988 (for Tan), transforming petitioners' occupancy to one of mere tolerance by private respondents.
• The RTC erred in finding that private respondents withdrew their tolerance by letters dated July 26, 1994 addressed to petitioners.
• The RTC erred in finding that private respondents' certification to file action is valid and that their complaints complied with the prescribed barangay lupon conciliation procedure.
• The RTC erred in ordering petitioners to vacate the premises and to pay attorney's fees.

• Procedural:
  • Whether the Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 where the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of two lower courts.
  • Whether non-compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is a jurisdictional requirement that deprives courts of jurisdiction.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the month-to-month lease contracts were validly terminated by the notices to vacate given in March 1988 and May 1988.
  • Whether the ejectment of petitioners is justified under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 on the ground of expiration of the lease contract.
  • Whether the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 is reasonable and proper under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; its jurisdiction under Rule 45 is limited to the review of errors of law. The appellate court's findings of fact are conclusive, especially where the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the two trial courts.
  • The conciliation procedure required under PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to it does not deprive a court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the defendant. Non-compliance does not prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction where defendants fail to object seasonably before the court first takes cognizance of the complaint, and such objection must be raised in the Answer or in such other pleading allowed under the Rules of Court.
• Substantive:
  • A lease on a month-to-month basis is a lease contract with a definite period, the expiration of which, upon previous demand by the lessor to vacate, can justify ejectment. The notices sent in March 1988 (to Tan) and May 1988 (to the Junsons) validly terminated the lease agreements as of the end of those respective months.
  • Ejectment is justified under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 on the ground of expiration of the period of the lease contract. If the lessor needs the property for his own use, the lease is considered terminated as of the end of the month after proper notice or demand to vacate has been given.
  • The award of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees is reasonable under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code, as petitioners' unjustifiable and unlawful retention of the premises compelled respondents to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest.

• Month-to-Month Lease Termination — A lease on a month-to-month basis is a lease contract with a definite period, the expiration of which, upon previous demand by the lessor to vacate, can justify ejectment under Section 5(f) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877. The lease is deemed to have expired as of the end of the month when notice to vacate was given.
• Barangay Conciliation Not Jurisdictional — The conciliation procedure required under PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to it does not deprive a court of its jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the defendant. The objection must be seasonably raised in the Answer or allowed pleading before the court first takes cognizance of the complaint.
• Rule 45 Limitations on Review — The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. In petitions for certiorari under Rule 45, jurisdiction is limited to the review of errors of law, and the Court of Appeals' findings of fact are conclusive when affirmed by two lower courts.

• "Time and again, we have held that this Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its function to examine and evaluate the probative value of the evidence which was presented before the concerned tribunal and which formed the basis of its impugned decision and resolution." — Emphasizing the limited scope of review in petitions under Rule 45.
• "The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of errors of law." — Reiterating the prohibition against factual review.
• "Suppletorily, it is settled that a lease on a month-to-month basis is a lease contract with a definite period, the expiration of which, upon previous demand by the lessor to vacate, can justify ejectment." — Establishing the rule on termination of month-to-month leases.
• "The conciliation procedure required under PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement in the sense that failure to have prior recourse to it does not deprive a court of its jurisdiction, either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant." — Clarifying the nature of the barangay conciliation requirement.

• Palanca vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (180 SCRA 119 [1991]) — Controlling precedent establishing that a month-to-month lease is terminable upon notice to vacate and expires at the end of the month, applying Article 1687 of the Civil Code.
• Trade Unions of the Philippines vs. Laguesma (236 SCRA 586 [1994]) — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
• Ronquillo vs. Court of Appeals (195 SCRA 433 [1991]) — Cited for the rule that the appellate court's findings of fact are conclusive on the Supreme Court.
• Insurance Services and Commercial Traders, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (341 SCRA 572 [2000]) — Cited for the binding nature of Court of Appeals findings when affirming lower courts.
• Galang vs. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 683 [1991]) — Cited for the rule that if the lessor needs the property for his own use, the lease is considered terminated as of the end of the month after proper notice.
• Ebol vs. Amin (135 SCRA 438 [1985]) and Millare vs. Hernando (151 SCRA 484 [1987]) — Cited for the principle that barangay conciliation under PD 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement.
• Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals (151 SCRA 289 [1987]) — Cited for the rule that objection to lack of barangay conciliation must be seasonably made.
• Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (127 SCRA 470 [1984]) — Cited for the requirement that objection must be made before the court first takes cognizance of the complaint.
• Garces vs. Court of Appeals (162 SCRA 504 [1988]) — Cited for the rule that objection to barangay conciliation must be raised in the Answer or allowed pleading.

• Article 1687, Civil Code — Referenced through Palanca regarding the determination of the period of lease agreements in month-to-month situations.
• Section 5(f), Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 — Grounds for judicial ejectment, specifically expiration of the period of the lease contract.
• Article 2208, Civil Code — Provisions on attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, particularly paragraph (2) regarding when the defendant's act compels the plaintiff to litigate.
• Presidential Decree No. 1508 — Barangay conciliation procedure; held to be not jurisdictional.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limitation of Supreme Court jurisdiction to errors of law in petitions for certiorari.