Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation vs. Hon. Judge Nelson F. Lidua Sr.

In criminal cases involving violations of city or municipal ordinances governed by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the two-month prescriptive period under Act No. 3326 is interrupted only upon the filing of the information or complaint directly in court, and not by the prior filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office for preliminary investigation.

The case arose from the enforcement of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000, which authorized petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation to immobilize illegally parked vehicles using wheel clamps and to collect prescribed fees. The dispute centered on vehicle owners who forcibly removed these clamps from their wheels to free their vehicles. The legal controversy focused on the procedural mechanism for instituting criminal actions for ordinance violations and the precise moment when the prescriptive period is deemed interrupted—whether upon filing with the prosecutor or upon filing in court.

• On May 7, 2003, respondents Benedicto Balajadia, Jeffrey Walan, and John Does allegedly forcibly removed a wheel clamp attached to a Nissan Cefiro vehicle (Plate No. UTD 933) parked along Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City, which had been immobilized by Jadewell personnel for failure to pay parking fees.
• On May 17, 2003, respondents Edwin Ang, Benedicto Balajadia, and John Does allegedly dismantled and carried away a wheel clamp attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure (Plate No. WRK 624) parked at a Loading and Unloading Zone.
• Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation, through its Manager Norma Tan, filed an Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City on May 23, 2003, initially charging respondents with Robbery.
• The Provincial Prosecutor conducted preliminary investigation and issued a Resolution on July 25, 2003, finding no probable cause for Robbery (absence of intent to gain) but finding probable cause for violation of Section 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
• Two Informations for violation of the city ordinance were filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio City on October 2, 2003—almost five months after the commission of the offenses on May 7, 2003, and more than four months after the May 17, 2003 incident.
• The Informations alleged that the respondents willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously dismantled and took the immobilizing clamps worth ₱26,250.00, causing damage and prejudice to Jadewell.
• The prescriptive period for violations of municipal or city ordinances under Act No. 3326, as amended, is two months from the commission of the offense.

• The filing of the criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003, well within the two-month period, interrupted the running of the prescriptive period pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
• The Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, not the old Rules cited in Zaldivia v. Reyes, govern this case; under the new Rules, cases for violations of city ordinances "shall be commenced only by information," necessitating preliminary investigation and filing with the prosecutor.
• Zaldivia v. Reyes is inapplicable because it involved a violation of a municipal ordinance (filed directly in court), whereas this case involves a city ordinance requiring information filing; thus, the proceedings before the prosecutor should be considered "judicial proceedings" interrupting prescription.
• Section 2 of Act No. 3326 should be interpreted to include preliminary investigation proceedings before the National Prosecution Service as "proceedings" that interrupt prescription.
• The petitioner had legal personality to file the petition for certiorari as an "aggrieved person" under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

• The two-month prescriptive period under Section 1 of Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, commenced on May 7, 2003, and expired on July 7, 2003; the Informations filed on October 2, 2003 were filed out of time.
• Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, prescription is interrupted only by the institution of "judicial proceedings," which means the actual filing of the case in court, not the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office.
• Zaldivia v. Reyes is controlling precedent: for cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure (including city ordinance violations), the running of the prescriptive period is halted only on the date the case is filed in court, not on any date before that.
• The Rule on Summary Procedure, as a special law, prevails over the general provisions of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription.
• The private complainant (Jadewell) has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case via certiorari because only the offended party may appeal the civil aspect, not the criminal aspect, citing People v. Judge Santiago.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the petitioner has legal personality to file a petition for certiorari to assail the dismissal of the criminal cases, and whether the petition for review under Rule 45 was the proper vehicle for relief.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the criminal action for violation of City Ordinance No. 003-2000 had prescribed; whether the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 interrupted the two-month prescriptive period under Act No. 3326; and whether the doctrine in Zaldivia v. Reyes applies to violations of city ordinances commenced by information.

• Procedural: The Court did not extensively rule on the procedural objections regarding legal personality because the petition was resolved on the merits of the prescription issue; the Court found that the petitioner was a proper party as an "aggrieved person" under Rule 65, but ultimately denied the petition.
• Substantive: The criminal action had prescribed. The Court held that Act No. 3326, as amended, applies uniformly to all ordinances (whether municipal or city) and establishes a two-month prescriptive period. Under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which governs violations of city ordinances, the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information directly in court, not by the filing with the prosecutor's office. Citing Zaldivia v. Reyes, the Court ruled that "proceedings" under Section 2 of Act No. 3326 refers to judicial proceedings commenced by filing in court. Since the Informations were filed on October 2, 2003—more than two months after the offenses committed in May 2003—the cases had properly prescribed. The Court rejected the distinction between city and municipal ordinances, noting that the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure cover both, and affirmed that prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right that cannot be modified by procedural rules.

• Interruption of Prescription in Summary Procedure Cases — Unlike regular criminal cases where filing with the prosecutor interrupts prescription under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 110, offenses covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (including traffic violations and ordinance violations) require the actual filing of the information or complaint in court to interrupt the prescriptive period; filing with the prosecutor during preliminary investigation does not toll the statute of limitations.
• Act No. 3326 on Prescription — Violations of municipal or city ordinances prescribe after two months from the commission of the offense, and prescription is interrupted only by the institution of "judicial proceedings" (filing in court), not administrative or preliminary investigation proceedings.
• Hierarchy of Rules — Where there is a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure (as a special law) and the general Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 110), the former prevails; similarly, Act No. 3326 (a substantive law on prescription) prevails over procedural rules that cannot diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.

• "As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance."
• "The proceedings referred to in Section 2 [of Act No. 3326] are 'judicial proceedings,' contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings."
• "The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected." — Citing Zaldivia v. Reyes regarding the remedy for delays in prosecutor's filing.
• "Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right."

• Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. — Controlling precedent establishing that for offenses covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the prescriptive period is interrupted only by filing the complaint or information in court, not with the prosecutor; the Court applied this doctrine to hold that the two-month period had lapsed.
• People v. Pangilinan — Distinguished by the Court; held that Zaldivia does not apply to violations of special laws (where filing with the prosecutor may interrupt prescription), but rather applies only to ordinance violations governed by the Summary Procedure Rules.
• Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo — Cited for the analytical framework in resolving prescription issues: (1) the period of prescription, (2) when it starts to run, and (3) when it is interrupted.

• Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, Sections 1 and 2 — Establishes the two-month prescriptive period for violations of municipal and city ordinances, and provides that prescription begins to run from the day of commission and is interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings.
• Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code — Cited for the general rule on computation of prescription for crimes under the RPC (interrupted by filing of complaint or information), distinguished from the special rule under Act No. 3326 for ordinances.
• Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Sections 1, 9, and 11 — Section 1 (scope covering city ordinances), Section 9 (filing directly in court), and Section 11 (commencement by information in chartered cities) were invoked to establish that judicial proceedings commence only upon filing in court.
• Rule 110, Section 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure — Cited by petitioner regarding the interruption of prescription by filing with the prosecutor, but held inapplicable as it must yield to the special provisions of the Summary Procedure Rules and Act No. 3326.
• Presidential Decree No. 1275, Section 6 — Referenced regarding the organization of Regional State Prosecution Offices and the designation of filing centers for informations, emphasizing that the Regional Prosecutor was responsible for timely filing the information within the prescriptive period.