In re: UP Law Faculty

Lawyers, particularly law professors who serve as exemplars to future attorneys, cannot invoke freedom of expression or academic freedom to shield themselves from disciplinary action for uttering intemperate, contumacious statements that denigrate the dignity of the courts, promote distrust in the administration of justice, or tend to influence the outcome of pending cases; such conduct violates the Code of Professional Responsibility regardless of the purity of intention or the validity of the underlying criticism.

The controversy stemmed from the April 28, 2010 decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230), penned by Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo, which dismissed the petition of Filipino "comfort women" seeking official government action against Japan. On July 19, 2010, while a Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioners' counsel filed a Supplemental Motion alleging that the ponencia plagiarized portions from three foreign legal scholars without attribution and misrepresented the authors' conclusions. The UP Law Faculty, composed of prominent legal academics, issued a public statement titled "Restoring Integrity" on July 27, 2010, condemning the alleged plagiarism as an "extraordinary act of injustice" and calling for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo. Dean Marvic Leonen formally submitted this statement to the Supreme Court on August 11, 2010. The Court viewed this as an improper intervention in pending proceedings and an attack on judicial integrity, prompting the administrative action.

• On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, dismissing the petition of the "Malaya Lolas" (Filipino comfort women) seeking official government action to secure justice from Japan.
• On July 19, 2010, counsel for the Malaya Lolas filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo committed plagiarism by copying without attribution portions from works by Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent, Christian J. Tams, and Mark Ellis, and by misrepresenting the authors' conclusions to support the dismissal of the petition.
• On July 27, 2010, the Faculty of the UP College of Law drafted a statement entitled "Restoring Integrity," which accused the Court of a "singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation," described the decision as based on "polluted sources," and called for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo to "save the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court."
• The Statement was signed by 37 members of the UP Law Faculty, including the incumbent Dean and four former Deans, and was published in various online news outlets on August 9, 2010, before its formal submission to the Court on August 11, 2010.
• Dean Marvic Leonen submitted to the Court a version of the Statement (Restoring Integrity II) that did not contain actual signatures but only the names of signatories with the notation "(SGD.)", which included the name of former Justice Vicente Mendoza who had not actually signed, and omitted the name of Atty. Miguel Armovit who had signed.
• The Show Cause Resolution issued on October 19, 2010, noted that the Statement treated the plagiarism allegations as established fact despite the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration and an ethics investigation (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), and found that certain remarks constituted an "institutional attack" that undermined the Court's integrity.
• The foreign authors allegedly plagiarized (Prof. Criddle, Dr. Ellis, and Prof. Tams) wrote letters to the Court expressing concern over the misuse of their works but used deferential and scholarly language, contrasting sharply with the tone of the UP Law Faculty Statement.

• N/A (The Supreme Court initiated this administrative proceeding motu proprio; there is no separate complainant)

• Respondents argued that the Statement was issued in the exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression and academic freedom as law professors and citizens, and that the Court's Show Cause Resolution constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint.
• They asserted that their intentions were pure and noble, aimed at defending the integrity of the Supreme Court and ensuring public confidence in the legal system, not at maligning the Court.
• They claimed they were being singled out for sanction while other commentators, including former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and Senator Francis Pangilinan, made similar criticisms without facing disciplinary action.
• They argued that they were not parties nor counsel in the Vinuya case and therefore had no standing to influence the Court improperly, and that their Statement was submitted for the Court's "proper disposition" as constructive criticism.
• Dean Leonen explained that the submission of the unsigned version (Restoring Integrity II) was due to administrative oversight and miscommunication with his staff regarding Justice Mendoza's authorization to sign, and that the document was a "live" public manifesto with evolving signatories.
• Prof. Vasquez separately acknowledged that he might have been remiss in assessing the effects of the Statement's language and could have been more careful, showing candor and deference to the Court.
• Prof. Lynch manifested that he was not a member of the Philippine Bar but of the Minnesota Bar, and invoked the doctrine of "clear and present danger" to argue that his speech was protected.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the proceeding is for indirect contempt under Rule 71 or an administrative matter under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court?
  • Whether the Show Cause Resolution denied respondents due process by allegedly constituting a prejudgment of their liability without a formal hearing?
  • Whether respondents are entitled to a formal hearing and access to the records and evidence in the related ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the "Restoring Integrity" Statement violated Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
  • Whether freedom of expression and academic freedom constitute valid defenses for lawyers, particularly law professors, against disciplinary action for criticizing the courts?
  • Whether Dean Leonen violated Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02, and 10.03 by submitting an unsigned "dummy" version of the Statement?

• Procedural:
  • The Court ruled that this is an administrative matter for disciplinary purposes under Rule 139-B, not an indirect contempt proceeding under Rule 71, and therefore does not require the strict procedural formalities of a contempt charge.
  • The Court held that due process was satisfied because respondents were given the opportunity to be heard through their written compliances, and a formal trial-type hearing is not mandatory in administrative proceedings where the facts are established by the records.
  • The requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC were denied as irrelevant to the issue of whether the respondents' own statements violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Substantive:
  • The Court found that 35 respondents violated Canons 1, 11, and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by using intemperate, contumacious, and disrespectful language that denigrated the Court and tended to influence pending proceedings.
  • The Court held that freedom of expression is not an absolute defense for lawyers; while criticism is allowed, it must not cross the line into abuse and slander that undermines judicial integrity or promotes distrust in the administration of justice.
  • The Court ruled that academic freedom cannot be invoked by law professors to shield themselves from disciplinary action for professional misconduct, as their duty to uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility is inextricably entwined with their role as teachers of law.
  • The Court found Dean Leonen's explanation regarding the submission of the unsigned Statement unsatisfactory, holding that he failed to observe full candor and honesty required by Canon 10, and admonished him for his lack of diligence.
  • The Court found Prof. Vasquez's Compliance satisfactory for his candid acknowledgment of possible remissness and his respectful tone.
  • Prof. Lynch was excused from the proceedings as he is not a member of the Philippine Bar, though reminded to observe professional standards.

• Freedom of Expression for Lawyers — Lawyers enjoy the constitutional right to criticize courts, but such criticism must be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety; intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts and subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.
• Academic Freedom as Limited by Professional Responsibility — Law professors cannot successfully invoke academic freedom as a defense in administrative proceedings for intemperate speech tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case; the fact that they teach law is inextricably entwined with their status as lawyers bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
• Duty of Candor to the Court (Canon 10) — Lawyers owe candor, fairness, and good faith to the court and must not do any falsehood, mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice; submitting a document that makes it appear a person participated in an act when such person did not constitutes a violation of this duty.
• Respect for Courts (Canon 11) — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others; this duty is essential to the orderly administration of justice.

• "It is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents' own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court."
• "A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts."
• "The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive recriminations."
• "They who seek to judge must first themselves be judged." (Justice Sereno, dissenting)
• "The Court, which has the greater duty of restraint and sobriety, but which appears to the public to have failed to transcend its instinct for self-preservation and to rise above its own hurt, gains nothing by punishing those who, to its mind, also lacked such restraint." (Justice Sereno, dissenting)

• Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 (1935) — Established that lawyers must uphold the dignity of courts and that want of intention to offend is no excuse from liability for disrespectful language, though it may mitigate the penalty.
• In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562 — Held that criticism of courts must be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety; affirmed the lawyer's duty of respectful subordination to courts.
• In re: Vicente Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 (1949) — Affirmed that criticism tending to undermine confidence in the judiciary or degrade the administration of justice constitutes contempt and subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.
• Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, 248 Phil. 542 (1988) — Held that freedom of expression needs to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of maintaining the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
• Choa v. Chiongson, 329 Phil. 270 (1996) — Distinguished between fair criticism and abuse/slander of courts, noting that the right to criticize must be exercised responsibly.
• United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918) — Recognized the right to criticize judicial conduct as essential to a free society, but cited by the majority as subject to limitations for members of the Bar.

• Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
• Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
• Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers.
• Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
• Code of Professional Responsibility, Rules 1.02, 10.01, 10.02, 10.03, 11.05 — Specific rules prohibiting activities aimed at defiance of law, falsehoods, misquoting, and requiring proper submission of grievances against judges.
• Rules of Court, Rule 139-B, Section 13 — Provision on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court.
• Rules of Court, Rule 71 — Provisions on indirect contempt (distinguished by the majority from the present administrative proceeding).
• Constitution, Article III (Bill of Rights) — Freedom of speech and expression (held not absolute in the context of lawyer discipline).
• Constitution, Article XIV — Academic freedom (held inapplicable as a defense for professional misconduct by lawyers).

• Justice Antonio T. Carpio — Argued that the UP Law Faculty's statement was constitutionally protected political speech on a matter of public concern; applied the "clear and present danger" test and found no danger to judicial independence; criticized the majority for impermissibly expanding administrative powers to abridge free speech and for failing to view the statement as a whole.
• Justice Conchita Carpio Morales — Maintained that the proceeding was irregularly initiated as indirect contempt disguised as administrative action; found injudiciousness in the premature prejudgment of the statement and the lack of reasonable ground to initiate the case motu proprio.
• Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno — Argued that the proceeding was actually for indirect contempt without due process protections required by Rule 71; emphasized that courts must exercise restraint and that heavy-handed responses to criticism diminish judicial legitimacy; cited international standards on the role of lawyers and the importance of academic freedom as a check on judicial power.
• Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (Separate Opinion) — Found the respondents' explanations satisfactory, noting their good faith and the absence of clear and present danger; voted to consider the matter closed and terminated, effectively dissenting from the majority's finding of liability.