Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio

Corporate officers, by virtue of their positions, possess the authority to enter and perform maintenance on properties owned by the corporation; a letter of authority issued by a corporate President to a third party, without a supporting board resolution, is ultra vires and insufficient to establish lawful possession or control over corporate property; findings of probable cause by prosecutors are entitled to great weight and are not subject to judicial interference in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

The case arose from an intra-corporate dispute within the Ilusorio family involving control over Lakeridge Corporation, the registered owner of Penthouse Unit 43-C at the Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City. The conflict centered on conflicting claims of authority over the condominium unit between different factions of the family, specifically regarding who had the legal right to occupy, secure, and control access to the corporate property.

• Lakeridge Corporation is the registered owner of Penthouse Unit 43-C at the Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City.
• Petitioner Marietta K. Ilusorio, together with Erlinda K. Ilusorio, Ramon K. Ilusorio, and Shereen K. Ilusorio, claims ownership and control of the majority of shares of stock of Lakeridge Corporation.
• Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed to be the Chairperson and President of Lakeridge and the lawful occupant of Penthouse Unit 43-C.
• In October 1999, Erlinda left for the United States and allegedly gave petitioner "full authority" to take care of, oversee, and secure the unit through a letter dated October 7, 1999; this letter was received by the Pacific Plaza management only on November 3, 1999.
• On November 2, 1999, private respondents Sylvia K. Ilusorio (alleged Vice-President of Lakeridge) and Cristina A. Ilusorio (alleged Assistant Vice-President), together with unidentified persons and with the consent of Jovito Castro (Chief Security of Pacific Plaza), allegedly forcibly entered the unit by breaking the door and locks, causing the loss of documents and jewelry.
• On November 6, 1999, five unidentified persons allegedly entered the unit again with Jovito's permission, replaced the locks with new ones, and prevented petitioner's entrance.
• Private respondents submitted updated General Information Sheets, Secretary's Certifications, and SEC Certificates showing Sylvia as Vice-President and Cristina as Assistant Vice-President of Lakeridge.
• Private respondents claimed that Erlinda's authority to petitioner was ultra vires in the absence of any board resolution, and noted that the letter was received on November 3, 1999, after the November 2, 1999 incident.
• Lakeridge sent a letter dated October 20, 1999 to the Pacific Plaza Condominium Association stating that it had not authorized any lease or sale of the unit.
• Jovito Castro claimed he allowed the entry based on Sylvia's written request as one of the legitimate unit owners and for purposes of property maintenance.

• The evidence on record sufficiently established probable cause for the crimes of robbery, qualified trespass to dwelling, and violation of P.D. No. 1829.
• Petitioner and Erlinda K. Ilusorio were duly constituted officers of Lakeridge, and Erlinda, as lawful occupant, entrusted the unit to petitioner in her absence.
• The self-serving assertions of private respondents that they were representatives of Lakeridge did not authorize them to break open the doors and gain entry.
• The Office of the City Prosecutor and the DOJ committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal charges.

• Sylvia and Cristina were the duly elected Vice-President and Assistant Vice-President of Lakeridge, respectively, and as such officers, they had the right and authority to freely enter and perform acts of maintenance on Penthouse Unit 43-C.
• The authority given by Erlinda to Marietta was without force and effect, being ultra vires, in the absence of any board resolution to support it.
• The letter of authority dated October 7, 1999 was received by Pacific Plaza management only on November 3, 1999, which was after the November 2, 1999 incident.
• Marietta was not authorized by the board of directors of Lakeridge to institute the criminal case.
• As officers of Lakeridge, they had the right to enter the unit, negating the elements of robbery and qualified trespass to dwelling.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the dismissal of the criminal charges for lack of probable cause.
  • Whether the Supreme Court may review findings of probable cause by the prosecutor in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether probable cause exists for the crimes of robbery under Articles 293 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code.
  • Whether probable cause exists for qualified trespass to dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code.
  • Whether probable cause exists for violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1829.
  • Whether corporate officers have the authority to enter corporate property for maintenance purposes without specific board authorization for each entry.

• Procedural:
  • The Supreme Court adheres to the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, particularly when the findings are well-supported by the facts on record.
  • Findings of probable cause are essentially factual in nature; the Supreme Court is not duty-bound to scrutinize anew established facts in a petition for review under Rule 45, as it is not a trier of facts.
  • The conduct of preliminary investigation is executive in nature, vesting the prosecutor with a wide latitude of discretion on what and whom to charge upon proper finding of probable cause.
  • A prosecutor is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is convinced that there is not enough evidence to support its averments.
  • No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the investigating prosecutor, the DOJ, or the Court of Appeals in finding lack of probable cause.
• Substantive:
  • No probable cause exists for robbery because petitioner failed to prove by competent evidence that: (1) the property taken belonged to another (as opposed to the corporation which respondents represented); (2) the respondents were armed (required for robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299); and (3) the respondents acted without authority.
  • No probable cause exists for qualified trespass to dwelling because petitioner failed to prove that: (1) the unit was the dwelling place of Erlinda (evidence showed Erlinda resided in Antipolo); (2) the entry was against the will of the lawful occupant; and (3) the respondents lacked authority to enter.
  • As Vice-President and Assistant Vice-President of Lakeridge, Sylvia and Cristina ostensibly had the right and authority to freely enter and perform acts of maintenance on the corporate property, including breaking open doors and replacing locks apparently due to loss of keys.
  • The authority given by Erlinda to Marietta was insufficient to establish lawful possession or control because it was signed "for LAKERIDGE" without the appropriate board resolution to support it, rendering the act ultra vires.
  • The charge against Jovito Castro for violation of P.D. No. 1829 should also be dismissed, as it is dependent on the commission of the principal crimes of robbery and qualified trespass, which were not established.

• Authority of Corporate Officers — Corporate officers, by virtue of their positions (such as Vice-President and Assistant Vice-President), possess the apparent authority to enter and perform maintenance on properties owned by the corporation. This authority includes taking necessary actions such as breaking open doors and replacing locks when justified by circumstances (e.g., loss of keys). In this case, the Court recognized that Sylvia and Cristina, as corporate officers, had the right to enter Penthouse Unit 43-C for maintenance purposes.
• Ultra Vires Acts — Acts of corporate officers that exceed the scope of their authority as defined by the board of directors or the corporate charter are ultra vires and without force and effect. Here, the Court held that Erlinda's letter authorizing Marietta to secure the unit was ultra vires because it was issued without a supporting board resolution and purported to bind the corporation without proper authorization.
• Probable Cause Definition — Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime. It requires more than bare suspicion but does not import absolute certainty.
• Non-Interference with Prosecutorial Discretion — The conduct of preliminary investigation is executive in nature, and courts generally adhere to a policy of non-interference with the prosecutor's findings of probable cause, particularly when such findings are well-supported by evidence. Judicial review via certiorari is available only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.

• "Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion, that the person charged is guilty of the crime for which he is sought to be prosecuted."
• "The conduct of preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is executive in nature. The right to prosecute crime is reposed in the executive department of the government primarily responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the land."
• "Thus, a prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is convinced that there is not enough evidence to support its averments, or that the evidence at hand, to his mind, necessarily leads to a different conclusion."
• "As such officers, they would, ostensibly, have the right and authority to freely enter and perform acts of maintenance of Penthouse Unit 43-C. The right could include breaking open the door and replacing its locks, apparently due to loss of the keys."

• Paredes v. Calilung — Cited for the definition of probable cause as the existence of facts leading a person of ordinary caution to entertain an honest and strong suspicion of guilt.
• Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the definition of probable cause.
• Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the principle that probable cause requires more than bare suspicion.
• Webb v. De Leon — Cited for the principle that preliminary investigation serves to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution.
• Salonga v. Paño — Cited for the policy of non-interference with the conduct of preliminary investigations.
• Serapio v. Sandiganbayan — Cited for the principle that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts in petitions for certiorari.

• Rule 45 of the Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court.
• Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — Governs petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (as invoked in the prior proceedings).
• Revised Penal Code, Article 293 — Defines robbery as taking personal property belonging to another with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 299 — Penalizes robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons, requiring that the malefactors be armed to constitute the offense.
• Revised Penal Code, Article 280 — Defines qualified trespass to dwelling as entering the dwelling of another against the latter's will, with higher penalties if committed by means of violence or intimidation.
• Presidential Decree No. 1829, Section 1 — Penalizes the obstruction, impediment, frustration, or delay of the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, including altering, destroying, suppressing, or concealing evidence.