Hildawa vs. Enrile

The creation and deployment of special police operation teams to address rising criminality is valid and within the state's police power; however, granting such teams a "license to kill" or allowing them to act simultaneously as law enforcers, prosecutors, judges, and executioners violates the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and equal protection, as every person must be accorded the opportunity to defend themselves before deprivation of life, liberty, or property.

During the early 1980s, Metro Manila experienced a significant proliferation of robbery-holdups and violent crimes against passengers of public utility vehicles. In response to this surge in criminality, police authorities organized special operation teams, initially known as "secret marshals" and later renamed "crimebusters," to conduct concentrated campaigns against criminal elements preying on commuters. These teams, reportedly trained in ranger tactics and jungle warfare, were allegedly responsible for numerous summary executions of suspected criminals, leading to widespread public concern over "salvage operations," violations of human rights, and the erosion of the sanctity of human life.

• Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte filed special civil actions assailing the creation and fielding of "secret marshals" or "crimebusters" by the police, alleging these teams possessed absolute authority to kill thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets, and slashers.
• The petitions alleged violations of constitutional provisions including due process, equal protection, presumption of innocence, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment.
• Respondents denied the existence of any written executive or administrative order authorizing secret marshals to shoot and disable suspected criminals, admitting only the formation of special operation teams to counter the resurgence of crimes against passengers of public conveyances.
• Petitioners failed to present copies of the alleged executive order and admitted they had not seen nor read such an order.
• The special operation teams were reportedly reactivated upon verbal orders to intensify the drive against robbery-holdups, deploying approximately 760 secret marshals in Metro Manila, including 160 INP field force members trained in ranger tactics and jungle warfare.
• From August 1982 to May 31, 1984, the secret marshals reportedly killed 106 holdup men and arrested 128 others.
• In June 1984 alone, the teams killed 25 suspected criminals in one week, including a youth allegedly about to return to his job in Saudi Arabia and another who aimed a toy pistol at the marshals.
• From May 4 to May 9, 1985, fifteen alleged holduppers were killed by policemen involved in these operations, with cases subsequently filed against them at the Judge Advocate General's Office.
• Reports indicated that suspects were often shot fatally in the head and other vital parts of the body rather than merely disabled, and some killings appeared to involve torture or barbaric brutality.
• Various sectors, including the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, Manila Mayor Ramon Bagatsing, and Metro Manila Vice Governor Ismael Mathay, Jr., publicly denounced the operations as violations of human rights and called for the disbanding of the secret marshals.

• The formation and fielding of secret marshals or crimebusters with authority to kill suspected criminals violates the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection, presumption of innocence, and the rights of the accused.
• The alleged executive or administrative order creating these teams with a "license to kill" is null and void for being unconstitutional and contrary to the Bill of Rights.
• The operations constitute an unconstitutional usurpation of judicial power, as police officers are effectively acting simultaneously as prosecutors, judges, and executioners.
• The petitioners sought a preliminary injunction directing respondents to recall the crimebusters and restraining them from fielding police teams with authority to kill, and after hearing, a declaration of nullity of the order creating the secret marshals.

• There exists no executive or administrative order authorizing secret marshals or crimebusters to shoot and disable suspected criminals; petitioners failed to substantiate the existence of such an order.
• The special operation teams were created and fielded in response to the proliferation of robbery-holdups and other crimes against passengers of public conveyances, which falls within the legitimate police power of the state.
• Members of these teams do not enjoy any immunity beyond that of other law enforcement officials and are subject to the same laws and legal standards governing arrests and use of force.
• The burden of proof regarding allegations of summary executions lies with the petitioners, who have failed to present concrete evidence of a policy authorizing killings.

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of an executive/administrative order creating secret marshals where no such written order was presented.
  • Whether the petitioners have a cause of action for certiorari and prohibition.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the creation and deployment of secret marshals or crimebusters with alleged authority to kill suspected criminals violates constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and presumption of innocence.
  • Whether the use of lethal force by these special teams in apprehending suspects, and the alleged failure to investigate such killings, constitutes a violation of constitutional and statutory rights.
  • Whether the Court should direct the disbanding of these special operation teams.

• Procedural:
  • The Court proceeded to address the merits of the consolidated cases, exercising its jurisdiction as the guarantor of constitutional rights, despite objections raised in dissent regarding the lack of jurisdiction over petitions for declaration of nullity and the alleged lack of cause of action.
• Substantive:
  • The creation and deployment of special operation teams to combat criminality is lawful and within the police power of the state; there is nothing inherently wrong in forming special squads to address specific crime problems.
  • However, granting these teams a "license to kill" or authorizing the summary execution of suspected criminals violates the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, as law enforcers cannot simultaneously act as prosecutors, judges, and executioners.
  • When a person is killed by a peace officer, the burden of proving self-defense or other justifying circumstances lies on the assailant, who must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he is not the unlawful aggressor, that there was lack of sufficient provocation, and that he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel aggression.
  • Respondents are directed to exercise strict supervision and control over special operation teams, and members are ordered not to use unnecessary force, to comply strictly with the law, and to accord suspects all their constitutional rights.
  • Should death or injury result from the apprehension of suspected criminals, respondents must immediately report the matter to superior officers and the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for investigation and appropriate action.
  • NAPOLCOM should investigate killings to determine the identity of assailants and the reasons for death without waiting for formal complaints from relatives of the deceased.
  • Once the identity of killers is established, investigating officers should file cases in proper courts or tribunals to determine whether killings were justified as self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers, or fulfillment of duty.

• Due Process Clause — Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without opportunity to be heard in court; requires that the accused be proceeded against under orderly process of law with notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment. Applied to prohibit police from acting as judges and executioners and to mandate that arrests be made without unnecessary force.
• Equal Protection of the Laws — Requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike under the law; applied to ensure that suspected criminals are not denied constitutional protections available to all citizens and that the government does not create classes of targets for summary execution.
• Presumption of Innocence — Mandates that the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved; cited to emphasize that suspected criminals retain full constitutional rights until proven guilty in a court of law.
• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — When a person is killed by another, the burden of proving self-defense is on the assailant, who must rely on the strength of his own evidence and establish by clear and convincing evidence the elements of self-defense.
• Separation of Powers — Implicit in the prohibition against law enforcers simultaneously acting as prosecutors, judges, and executioners; maintains that only courts can determine guilt and impose punishment after proper proceedings.
• Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment — Constitutional guarantee that excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel or unusual punishment inflicted; cited in relation to summary executions and the requirement that restraint not exceed what is necessary for detention.

• "What is bad is if they kill these 'criminals' because then they are not only law enforcers but also the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners."
• "For, if in maintaining peace and order, the peace officer becomes the person to be feared the citizen will find himself between the criminal and the lawless public official."
• "Violence does not find support in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails."
• "It is our way of life that a man is entitled to due process which simply means that before he can be deprived of his life, liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself."
• "No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint that is necessary for his detention."
• "In a democratic state, you don't stoop to the level of criminals. If we stoop to what they do, then we're no better than they... there would be no difference." — Justice Teehankee
• "No one is licensed to kill." — attributed to Metro Manila Vice Governor Ismael Mathay, Jr., cited with approval by Justice Teehankee

• Ong Chang Wing vs. U.S., 40 Phil. 1049 — Cited for the definition of due process requiring hearing before deprivation of life, liberty, or property; established that due process requires inquiry and investigation upon notice with opportunity to be heard.
• Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 — Referenced in Justice Teehankee's concurring opinion regarding constitutional and human rights protections.

• Constitution, Article IV, Section 1 — Due process and equal protection clauses; cited as fundamental guarantees violated by summary executions.
• Constitution, Article IV, Section 17 — Requirement that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
• Constitution, Article IV, Section 19 — Rights of the accused including presumption of innocence, right to be heard by counsel, right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation, and right to speedy, impartial, and public trial.
• Constitution, Article IV, Section 20 — Right against self-incrimination and right to remain silent; prohibition against forced confessions obtained through violence, threat, intimidation, or other means vitiating free will.
• Constitution, Article IV, Section 21 — Prohibition against excessive fines and cruel or unusual punishment.
• Rules of Court, Rule 113, Section 2, paragraph 2 — Mandates that no violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest and that the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.
• Universal Declaration of Human Rights — Referenced regarding inherent dignity and worth of every human being and the right to life, liberty, and security of person.

• Chief Justice Makasiar — Concurred in the result but opined that respondents should merely be "reminded" rather than "directed" to respect constitutional rights, as it was not established that respondents actually authorized the killing of criminals in violation of constitutional rights.
• Justice Gutierrez, Jr. — Concurred but emphasized that there was no evidence whatsoever that the special teams were given official orders to liquidate criminals; distinguished between acts of special teams acting under orders versus rogue acts of individual lawless persons; commended the majority of police officers who perform duties faithfully and warned against lowering police morale.
• Justice Teehankee — Concurred with the remedial measures but would grant the petition to disband the secret marshals entirely; extensively discussed the history of "salvage operations," the unsuitability of troops trained in "ranger tactics and jungle warfare" for urban police work, and the record of over 160 killings; emphasized that the Supreme Court stands as guarantor of constitutional and human rights and cannot abdicate its role.

• Justice Aquino — Dissented outright, arguing that in the Valmonte case, the petitioner has no cause of action for certiorari and prohibition, and in the Hildawa case, the Court has no jurisdiction over the petition for declaration of nullity of an executive/administrative order; maintained that both cases should have been dismissed outright as petitioners' remedy lies in other forums.