Herrera vs. Barretto

Certiorari is available only when a court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction; it cannot be invoked to correct errors in the exercise of jurisdiction, however gross or irregular. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to hear and determine a cause—the right to act in a case—which exists independently of the correctness of the court's decisions or the regularity of its procedures.

The dispute arose from conflicting claims regarding the authority to issue cockpit licenses in the municipality of Caloocan. Constancio Joaquin sought to operate cockpits in Loma and Maypajo, but the municipal president refused to issue licenses, leading to a mandamus action and a request for a mandatory injunction to operate provisionally pending the case's resolution. The case addresses the limits of judicial review via certiorari and the nature of judicial jurisdiction in the Philippine legal system.

• On or about March 1, 1913, Constancio Joaquin filed an action for mandamus against Godofredo B. Herrera, in his capacity as Municipal President of Caloocan, to compel the issuance of licenses to open and exploit cockpits in the barrios of Loma and Maypajo.
• Joaquin alleged he was entitled to the licenses under Municipal Ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan and that the municipal authorities refused to issue them.
• Joaquin applied for a mandatory injunction (provisional license) to operate the cockpits during the pendency of the mandamus action.
• The CFI of Rizal, presided by Judge Alberto Barretto, issued the mandatory injunction ex parte on March 1, 1913, based solely on the verified complaint and annexed exhibits, without notice to Herrera or opportunity to show cause.
• Herrera alleged that under paragraph (j), section 40 of the Municipal Code and Article 4 of Municipal Ordinance No. 8, the issuance of cockpit licenses pertained to the Municipal Council, not the Municipal President, and that the President had discretion as to whom to issue licenses.
• Herrera claimed that any license previously issued to Joaquin had been annulled and cancelled by a subsequent municipal ordinance duly approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
• Herrera raised the pendency of two other civil cases involving the same subject matter: Civil Case No. 8673 (Bertol v. Herrera) and Civil Case No. 986 (challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 8), arguing that the injunction would render inefficacious the decisions in those cases.
• The Solicitor-General appeared for the petitioner (Herrera), while attorneys R. Diokno, and Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco appeared for the respondents.

• The CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction because, under paragraph (j), section 40 of the Municipal Code and Article 4 of Municipal Ordinance No. 8 of Caloocan, the issuance of cockpit licenses pertains to the Municipal Council, not the Municipal President.
• The CFI exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the mandatory injunction ex parte without giving the Municipal President opportunity to show cause why such injunction should not be issued, as required by Section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• The CFI exceeded its jurisdiction because the cockpit license which the President had previously issued to Joaquin had been annulled and cancelled by virtue of a municipal ordinance duly approved by the provincial board of Rizal.
• The CFI lacked jurisdiction because Civil Case No. 8673 was pending between the same parties and founded upon the same facts, making the issuance of the injunction an attempt to preempt the final decision in that case.
• The CFI lacked jurisdiction because Civil Case No. 986 (Bertol v. Herrera) was pending, challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 8 upon which Joaquin's entire claim was based, and the injunction would render inefficacious the decision in that case.
• Joaquin did not possess a valid license to maintain and run the cockpits of Loma and Maypajo, nor did he have the right to exploit them.

• (The respondents' specific arguments are not detailed in the text; however, the Court addressed the general position that the CFI possessed jurisdiction over mandamus actions and the inherent power to issue mandatory injunctions pending final determination of the case.)

• Procedural Issues:
  • Whether the Court of First Instance acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing a mandatory injunction ex parte without notice to the defendant.
  • Whether the pendency of other actions between the same parties involving the same subject matter affects the jurisdiction of the court to issue injunctive relief.
  • Whether the alleged violation of Section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (requirement of notice) constitutes a jurisdictional defect reviewable by certiorari.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether errors in determining which officer has authority to issue licenses (Municipal President vs. Municipal Council) or whether such officer has discretion constitute lack of jurisdiction or merely error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
  • Whether the distinction between lack of jurisdiction and erroneous exercise of jurisdiction affects the availability of certiorari as a remedy.
  • Whether certiorari may issue to correct errors of law or fact committed by a court acting within its jurisdiction.

• Procedural:
  • The Court held that the CFI had jurisdiction over the subject matter (mandamus action) and the parties. The issuance of the mandatory injunction, even if ex parte and erroneous, was an exercise of jurisdiction already conceded, not a lack thereof.
  • The Court ruled that the pendency of another action does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to act; it may affect the propriety of the action but not the jurisdictional authority to hear and determine the cause.
  • Certiorari was denied because the alleged errors—issuing the injunction ex parte, failing to give notice, and allegedly disregarding pending cases—were errors of procedure or judgment committed within jurisdiction, not acts without or in excess of jurisdiction.
• Substantive:
  • The Court distinguished between jurisdiction and the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause; it does not depend on the regularity of the exercise or the rightfulness of the decision.
  • Questions regarding which officer has discretion to issue licenses or whether such discretion exists are fundamental questions to be decided within the cause, not jurisdictional questions that deprive the court of power to hear the case. To hold otherwise would mean a court has jurisdiction if it decides correctly but no jurisdiction if it decides incorrectly—a novel and contradictory proposition.
  • The test of jurisdiction is whether the court has power to enter on the inquiry, not whether its decision is right or wrong.
  • Certiorari is restricted to correcting defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot be used to correct errors of law or fact. It is an extraordinary remedy available only when the inferior court's action is wholly void, where further steps would result in waste of time and money, where parties would be deceived, or where the final judgment would be a snare and delusion deciding nothing and protecting nobody.

• Jurisdiction vs. Exercise of Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause—the right to act in a case. It does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made. A court may have jurisdiction to decide a question and yet decide it incorrectly; such error is subject to appeal, not certiorari.
• Certiorari Limited to Jurisdictional Defects — Certiorari lies only when a court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be used to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or of fact committed by a court acting within its jurisdiction.
• Void vs. Voidable Judicial Acts — Acts done without jurisdiction are void; acts done with jurisdiction but exercised wrongfully, defectively, or irregularly are merely voidable or erroneous and remain valid until reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside.
• Test of Jurisdiction — The test is whether the court has the power to enter upon the inquiry, and not whether its decision is right or wrong.

• "Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause —the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to hear and determine, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the rightfulness of the decisions made."
• "It is not the particular decision given which makes up jurisdiction, but it is the authority to decide the question at all. Otherwise all distinction between erroneous exercise of jurisdiction upon the hand, and a total want of it upon the other, must be obliterated."
• "The test of jurisdiction is, whether the court has power to enter on the inquiry, and not whether its decision is right or wrong."
• "The office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose."
• "It is truly an extraordinary remedy and, in this jurisdiction, its use is restricted to truly extraordinary cases—cases in which the action of the inferior court is wholly void; where any further steps in the case would result in a waste of time and money and would produce no result whatever; where the parties, or their privies, would be utterly deceived; where a final judgment or decree would be nought but a snare and a delusion, deciding nothing, protecting nobody, a judicial pretension, a recorded falsehood, a standing menace."

• Chase vs. Christianson (41 Cal., 253) — Cited for the proposition that where there is jurisdiction of the subject matter and person, the decision of all other questions is but the exercise of that jurisdiction, and erroneous decisions do not impair the validity of the judgment when collaterally questioned.
• Freeman vs. Thompson (53 Mo., 183) — Cited for the distinction between lack of power or want of jurisdiction and wrongful or defective execution of power.
• Paine vs. Mooreland (15 Ohio, 435) — Cited for the distinction between acts without jurisdiction (void) and acts with jurisdiction but exercised wrongfully (voidable only).
• Cooper vs. Reynolds (10 Wall., 308) — Cited for the rule that errors in the record do not invalidate a judgment unless they prove the court had no jurisdiction.
• In re Prautch (1 Phil. Rep., 132) — Cited for the requirement that certiorari lies only when the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal.
• Reyes vs. Roxas (1 Phil. Rep., 625) — Cited for the rule that refusal to hear witnesses constitutes error but not excess of jurisdiction.
• Dy Chuan Leng vs. Amber (1 Phil. Rep., 535) — Cited for the principle that errors committed in the exercise of jurisdiction must be corrected by appeal, not certiorari.
• Yangco vs. Rohde (1 Phil. Rep., 404) — Distinguished as a specific exception where the court had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit but lacked jurisdiction to grant alimony when the existence of marriage (the basis for alimony) was denied by the answer, representing a case where the right to relief had not accrued.
• Arzadon vs. Chanco (14 Phil. Rep., 710) — Cited for the definition of certiorari as the proper remedy when an inferior tribunal exceeds jurisdiction and no appeal exists.
• Rocha & Co. vs. Crossfield (6 Phil. Rep., 355) — Cited regarding cases where certiorari was allowed due to lack of statutory authority to appoint a receiver (analogous to bankruptcy proceedings prohibited by law).

• Section 202, Code of Civil Procedure — Required notice before issuance of injunction; alleged violation was claimed as jurisdictional defect but held to be mere procedural error.
• Section 217, Code of Civil Procedure — Provision for certiorari when an inferior tribunal exceeds its jurisdiction.
• Section 514, Code of Civil Procedure — Provision for prohibition when a tribunal exercises functions without or in excess of jurisdiction.
• Paragraph (j), Section 40, Municipal Code — Authority over issuance of cockpit licenses; cited to show dispute over which officer had discretion, but held to be a question of merits, not jurisdiction.
• Section 174, Code of Civil Procedure — Appointment of receivers; cited in discussion of cases where certiorari was allowed due to lack of statutory authority (bankruptcy analogy).
• Section 27, Election Law — Cited regarding special jurisdiction over election contests and the limited nature of such proceedings where certiorari was allowed due to specific statutory constraints.

• Arellano, C.J., Torres and Mapa, JJ. — Concurred in the decision without separate opinion.
• Trent, J. — Concurred in the result without separate opinion.